Graduate Seminars 2016-17

Spring 2017

Philos 207: Post-Medieval Logic in Agricola’s Dialectical Invention

Instructor: Brian Copenhaver
Tuesdays 2-5PM
Location: 399 Dodd Hall

We’ll read parts of Rudolph Agricola’s book On Dialectical Invention. After Agricola wrote this book, the foundations of logic became the ‘instruments’ that he called ‘finding’ or ‘invention’ and ‘judgment.’ Agricola – and those he influenced – abandoned the structure of logic as universities had taught the subject since the thirteenth century, usually through the Summaries of Logic by Peter of Spain. The basic elements of Peter’s logic were ‘terms’ combined in ‘propositions’ and then combined again into ‘syllogisms.’ A syllogism is a type of argument. But when Agricola used the word argumentum in Latin, he was talking about a term as part of a proposition, hence not an ‘argument’ at all in the usual sense. This is just one innovation in Agricola’s book that our seminar will examine.

Philos 220: Pictures of Sensation in Early Modern Philosophy

Instructor: John Carriero
Thursdays 2-5PM
Location: 399 Dodd Hall

In the Prolegomena, Kant writes “all philosophical insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was spoiled by making sensibility merely a confused mode of representation,” whereas “sensibility consists, not in this logical distinction of clearness and obscurity, but in the genetic one of the origin of knowledge itself” (Beck translation, pp. 37-38). To what extent is Kant’s characterization apt of Leibniz? Spinoza? Descartes? And to the extent that it is, what drove these philosophers to a picture of sensation that strikes Kant (and, no doubt many of us) as so odd?

We’ll begin by sketching Aquinas’s account of sensation, and then turn to Descartes, Locke (and perhaps Berkeley), Spinoza, and Leibniz. We’ll be especially interested in how these thinkers see the relation of sensory cognition to understanding.

Philos 246: Coherence and the Self

Instructor: Daniela Dover
Wednesdays 2-5PM
Location: TBD

We will be surveying theories of the self and of personal identity, with a focus on the ubiquitous but mysterious notion of intrapersonal coherence (also known as “consistency,” “unity” and “integrity”). We will study the various notions of coherence found in these theories and evaluate the normative claims in which these notions figure. Coherence is often treated as an ideal or as a demand: the claim is that we should try to be as coherent as we can, or at least avoid falling below some minimal threshold of coherence. Why? What is so bad about failing to cohere? We will begin by reading some short selections from Plato and longer selections from Korsgaard’s Self-Constitution, which provides a contemporary reworking of Plato’s coherentism. Later readings will come from Frankfurt, Jaeggi, Velleman, Taylor, and others.

One of our main aims will be to think through what coherentism would mean for our relations with others. Maintaining intrapersonal coherence requires us to be wary of external influences that threaten to upset our internally consistent self-conceptions and sets of values. Whether this is a point in favor of coherentist theories of the self or the basis for an objection to them depends on one’s antecedent ideas about when interpersonal influence is to be welcomed and when it is to be guarded against.

Philos 247: Liberal Political Theory and Racial Injustice

Instructor: Barbara Herman
Tuesdays 2-5PM
Location: 325

One of the standing criticisms of liberal political theory is that it fails to provide terms to register and rectify the wrongs of racial injustice. It is thought to be an especially difficult topic in what is called “non-ideal theory”. The seminar will explore this question (primarily) through recent work of Tommie Shelby (Dark Ghettos), Elizabeth Anderson (The Imperative of Integration), and Charles W. Mills (The Racial Contract or Black Rights/White Wrongs, if it is available). Other readings will be added to supplement and provide background.

Because the problems for non-ideal theory are often non-ideal in socially and historically specific ways, the seminar will also look at some recent non-philosophical studies that bear directly on its topic. Readings will be assigned from such books as Matthew Desmond’s Evicted, Mitchell Duneier’s Ghetto, Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow.

One of the projects of the seminar is to think about questions of method raised by the use of such historical and sociological materials.

Philos 254A/B: Legal Theory Workshop

Instructor: Mark Greenberg
Thursdays 5:30-7:30 PM
Location: Law 1314. (Timing is a little different in weeks when there is a speaker.)

This unusual seminar is structured around the Legal Theory Workshop. The Workshop is modeled on Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Nagel’s long-running workshop at NYU. It brings leading scholars from around the country to discuss their works-in-progress with students and interested faculty. The papers are diverse, ranging across, for example, moral philosophy, the relevance of philosophy of language to legal interpretation, philosophy of law, and legal theory more generally. The seminar involves biweekly discussions with visiting scholars, with intervening preparatory weeks in which the class discusses the paper to be presented in the following week. One major focus of the class is on how to ask good questions.

Information about the spring workshops can be found here: http://law.ucla.edu/centers/interdisciplinary-studies/law-and-philosophy-program/events/legal-theory-workshop/

Philos 281: The Evolution of Cognition

Instructor: Josh Armstrong
Mondays 2-5PM
Location: 325 Dodd Hall

This course will explore philosophical questions related to the evolution of cognition. In the first half of the course we will focus on broadly conceptual questions: about the nature of cognition, about the scope of the evolutionary process, and about the prospects of saying anything illuminating concerning how evolution and cognition are related to each other. Readings will be drawn from Peter Godfrey-Smith, Janet Radcliffe Richards, Richard Lewontin, and others.

In the second half course we will turn to a critical evaluation of two leading empirical frameworks for understanding the evolution of

cognition: the version of Evolutionary Psychology developed by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, and duel-inheritance models which highlight co-evolutionary relationships between individual minds and social structures. No prior familiarity with either philosophy of mind or with evolutionary theory will be assumed. Those taking the course for credit will be required to either submit two short papers (5-8 pages), or a single longer paper (12-20) on a topic or topics to be determined in consultation with the instructor.

Winter 2017

Philos 201: Themes in Early and Middle Plato

Instructor: Gavin Lawrence

Plato is often treated as a systematic theorist. I take him really to be an open-ended philosopher. The dialogs (especially early and middle) are invitations to join a conversation, which the reader can continue for themselves. They are also multi-layered, concerned with their overt content and the background issues of why we should be investigating these questions; with methodology, with teaching a way of approaching and discussing issues, with what it is to philosophize; with metaphysics and a correlative semantics; with basic logical grammar—in the dialogs Plato aims to introduce, or train, the reader in various basic techniques and distinctions: to disambiguation (different senses of `what is F?’ question), to the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions, to the conditions on definition.

We will begin with the early dialogs Ion and Laches. Other dialogs we will examine include Euthyphro, Apology, Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno, Republic (Books 1 and 4) along with passages from others.

Among the foci and themes that will run through the course are these.

The conception of skill/art (techne), and its similarity and contrast with virtue (arete).

The early theory of Forms and the concern with definition.

The soul-care program and the tripartite distinction of goods.

Aspects of virtue: (1) The examination of a specific virtue, (a) courage; (b) justice. (2) Plato’s view of the nature of virtue. (3) The contrast with skill (as above). (4) The unity and diversity of the virtues. (5) The question of its teachability. (6) The analogy of justice with health.

The `scientific’ measurement of goodness, and the concern with scientific, non-perspectival, stability.

Socratic paradoxes; the alleged impossibility of akrasia.

Methodology; the contrast of philosophy with rhetoric, sophistry, and poetry.

The arguments of Republic Book 1

Course requirements

You may submit either 2 short papers (5-8 pages), or a single longer paper (12-20) on a topic or topics to be agreed with me. You are encouraged to set up an initial appointment with me to discuss the topic, and then to submit a draft and discuss that.

Philos 206: Intentionality and Skepticism in the Aristotelian Trandition

Instructor: Henrik Lagerlund

Abstract: In this course we set out to examine the concepts of intentionality and skepticism as they came up in a broadly Aristotelian philosophical tradition in Western Europe. As the concepts are developed in this tradition they appear closely related. This is largely because the concept of intentionality or, as I will call it, the historical concept of intentionality is foremost about how the mind acquirers content. It is generally taken for granted in this tradition that the mind has content.

We will look at Aristotle and Aquinas as developing the paradigmatically Aristotelian view of intentionality and knowledge (episteme/scientia). For both of them there is no problem of intentionality and as a consequence skepticism is a non-issue. We will cast Aristotle against later developments of Hellenistic philosophy where we can witness the birth of epistemology, and Aquinas against developments in later thirteenth and early fourteenth century where we will find a rebirth of epistemology. It is ultimately this rebirth that comes to have a profound influence on developments in modern philosophy. We will take a look at this influence towards the end of the course.

Philos 254A/B: Legal Theory Workshop

Instructor: Mark Greenberg

Thursdays 5:30-7:30 PM. Law 1314. (Timing is a little different in weeks when there is a speaker.)

Information about the spring workshops can be found here: http://law.ucla.edu/centers/interdisciplinary-studies/law-and-philosophy-program/events/legal-theory-workshop/

Philos 258: Philosophy of Law: Authority and Human Rights

Instructor: Ariel Zylberman

Legal and political authorities claim a power to generate obligations on their subjects. But this claim seems paradoxical. If authorities are wrong, how can they bind their subjects? And if authorities are right, we have the obligations regardless. So the claim that an authority generates obligations seems false. Authority, then, appears either pernicious or redundant. The aim of this seminar in moral and legal philosophy is to investigate the concept of practical authority, specifically in view of the limits on authority human rights seem to place. The seminar will have three parts. The first will lay the groundwork for an account of authority in the theory of practical reason. An important element in the recent literature on practical reason concerns the authority of moral norms. What makes a moral norm authoritative? The second part of the seminar will focus on legal authority in particular and will examine various attempts to dissolve the paradox about legal authority. The third part seeks to bring together the first two and to resolve the puzzle by reflecting on the relationship of human rights to legal authority. The seminar should appeal to any student interested in ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law, practical reason, or human rights.

Philos 281: 80’s Classics

Instructor: Gabriel Greenberg

We’ll be kicking it Old Skool winter quarter, with MJ, Madonna, Bruce… and the 80’s literature on naturalizing content! Authors in this tradition took on the heroic task of understanding how content-bearing mental states could arise from non-mental natural phenomena. Though the conclusions of this research program are still up for debate, the terms they set are the background for much of contemporary philosophy of mind. We’ll be reading, in order, large chunks of three classic books:

Dretske 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information
Millikan 1984, Language, Thought, and other Biological Categories
Fodor 1990*, A Theory of Content [*I realize this isn’t technically the 80’s, but it’s pre-Nirvana, so it’ll count.]

While this material isn’t easy, the course is intended to be introductory. I’ll try not to assume much background familiarity with philosophy of mind, outside of the readings themselves and material from proseminar.

Philos 418: Contemporay Philosophy of Law: the Cutting-Edge

Instructor: Mark Greenberg

MW 1:45 – 3:10 PM. Law 3473

I have previously taught an introduction to philosophy of law that takes students through a relatively traditional syllabus of topics covering work from the last 50 years. The core idea of the new course is to engage students with cutting-edge work — the most exciting developments of the past five years or so — in addition to giving them enough of a picture of the traditional landscape for them to understand the developments. I plan to focus on four or five topics that have recently been the subject of important and interesting developments. These will include many or all of the following: criminal attempts; foundations of negligence liability; legal interpretation; law as a branch of morality; the parallels and interactions between metaethics and philosophy of law. The plan is to begin with less abstract topics and to move gradually to the more abstract and theoretical ones. Thus, I plan to begin with topics like criminal attempts and legal interpretation, and to conclude with topics like law as a branch of morality and metaethics/philosophy of law.

The pace of the course will allow us time to explore background material on each topic before approaching the cutting-edge work. For example, in the case of criminal attempts, we’ll begin by reviewing the courts’ doctrinal struggles with fascinating conundrums such as how to treat impossible attempts. We’ll then examine the recent intriguing theory of Gideon Yaffe and how it purports to solve the problems. Similarly, in the case of legal interpretation, we’ll begin with well-known theories of legal interpretation, such as textualism and intentionalism. We’ll then turn to recent work that draws on contemporary ideas in philosophy of language and linguistics.

This is a law school class, but graduate students are welcome. Law students will write a short reaction papers and a final exam. Graduate students could do the same assignments or could choose to write a substantial paper.

Fall 2016

Philos 246: Self-Conscious Lives

Instructor: A.J. Julius

Tuesdays 2-5 PM
Dodd 325

The topics are self-consciousness,awareness of an objective reality that includes that awareness, how I know what I’m doing, my nature as a thing that can do what it knows itself to be doing as a body that canmove through and work on the world, my life understood as a potentially self-conscious process of my living as I understand myself to be living, the wretchedness of humans’ relating to their own activity as a causal basis for predicting more of the same, the inescapability of this epistemic stance in our actualwretched cities, the impossibility of *knowing* your place within oppressive social relations, the hope that in acting to tear them down we’ll finally know what we’re doing.

Philos 248: Moral Demand and Moral Failure

Instructor: Pamela Hieronymi

Tuesdays 2-5 PM
325 Dodd Hall

In recent years philosophers have been examining the nature of blame and of other responses to moral failure (such as resentment, indignation, guilt, shame, and forgiveness). Some philosophers think of these as forms of address, communication, or protest. Others think of them as ways of holding others to others to accounting, holding others responsible, or even respecting others as participants in the moral community. There is disagreement about when, if ever, these are appropriate responses. We will consider these issues and try to come to some clarity about the nature of moral demand and moral failure.

Philos 287: Categories and Concepts

Instructor: Sam Cumming

Thursdays 2-5 PM

399 Dodd Hall

We will begin by talking about categories, and then move on to how agents conceptualize those categories.

The classification of a given case (as tall or as good or as a case of knowledge) is an objective matter, which depends on the particular features of the case. I will try to defend this claim against well-known threats:

(i) Generally speaking, categories don’t have rigid definitions, but instead exhibit “open texture”;

(ii) The criteria for the application of an evaluative category like good or tasty can vary widely from agent to agent without the imputation either that the category is imperfectly grasped or that people are talking past each other.

The first few weeks will address these issues, delving into the relevant literature in metaethics, philosophy of language, and linguistics, from Hare to MacFarlane. The nonmonotonic approach to analysis developed in collaboration with John Horty will be presented in response to (i), and used to show how categories can be genuinely vague about their boundaries. The basics can be found on the slides at our NASSLLI webpage.

Concepts are the psychological image of categories. They are the means by which agents classify objects (as well as being the catalyst for certain sorts of inference). In the remaining weeks, we will become familiar with experiments that bear on how people learn and store information about categories. We will consider the psychological theories of concepts that these experiments were designed to distinguish, but also look at ideas from statistics and machine learning that have enabled computers to mimic human performance.