- B.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1982
- J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law, 1985
- B.Phil., Magdalen College, Oxford University, 1990
- D.Phil., Jesus College, Oxford University, 2001
- “Principles of Legal Interpretation,” preliminary draft (some of this material will form part of a chapter on legal interpretation for the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy)
- Trump’s Corrupt Use of The Pardon Power, Lawfare blog (June 2018)(co-author).
- Can Trump Obstruct Justice? New York Review of Books Daily (January 2018)
- Can Trump pardon his way out of trouble after the Manafort indictment? Op-Ed in the LA Times (October 2017)
- All the President’s Defenses, Lawfare blog, (September 2017)
- What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants, forthcoming in the Harvard Law Review Forum (February 2017)
- “The Moral Impact Theory, The Dependence View, and Natural Law,” The Dependence View, and Natural Law, in G. Duke and R. George, eds., Cambridge Companion to Natural Law (forthcoming 2016)
- “How to Explain Things with Force,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 129: 1932-79 (2016)
- “Explaining the Asymmetry between Mistakes of Law and Mistakes of Fact,” Jurisprudence, vol. 6: 95-111 (2015)
- “Troubles for Content I,” in A. Burgess and B. Sherman, eds., Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (Oxford University Press 2014).
- “Troubles for Content II,”: Explaining Grounding, in A. Burgess and B. Sherman, eds., Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (Oxford University Press 2014).
- “The Moral Impact Theory of Law,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 123: 1288-1342 (2014).
- “Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II,” 30 Law and Philosophy 453-475 (2011). Corrected version: Erratum: Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II, Law and Philosophy, 31 : 619-642 (2012).
- “Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication,” in A. Marmor and S. Soames, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (Oxford University Press 2011).
- “The Standard Picture and Its Discontents,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 1: 39-106 (2011)
- “Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law,” 30 Law and Philosophy 419-451 (2011).
- “Moral Concepts and Motivation,” Philosophical Perspectives 23: 137 (2009)
- “Reasons without Values?”, 2 Social Political and Legal Philosophy 133 (2007).
- “On Practices and the Law,” 12 Legal Theory 113-136 (2006). Reprinted in Enrique Villanueva, ed., Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, vol. 2 (2007).
- “Hartian Positivism and Normative Facts: How Facts Make Law II,” in Exploring Law’s Empire (edited by Scott Hershovitz, Oxford University Press, 2006).
- “Conceptual Role Semantics” (with Gilbert Harman), in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (edited by Ernie Lepore and Barry Smith, Oxford University Press, 2006).
- “A New Map of Theories of Mental Content,” Philosophical Issues, vol. 15, (2005).
- “Goals versus Memes: Explanation in the Theory of Cultural Evolution,” in Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, eds., Perspectives on Imitation (2005).
- “Proving Rationality,” in Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, eds., Perspectives on Imitation (2005)
- “How Facts Make Law,” Legal Theory, vol. 10 (2004), reprinted in Scott Hershovitz, ed., Exploring Law’s Empire (OUP 2005) and in Enrique Villanueva, ed., Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, vol. 2 (2005)
- “Life’s a Game” (Reviewing Robert Wright, Nonzero), The Economist, July 13, 2000.
- “Apocalypse Not Just Now,” 21 London Review of Books 19 (July 1, 1999), reprinted (in Portuguese) in Best of (1999).
- “The Meaning of Original Meaning,” 86 Geo. L.J. 569 (1998) (co-author) (Runner-up, American Philosophical Association’s 2001 Berger Memorial Prize in Philosophy of Law).
Works in Progress
- Principles of Legal Interpretation
- Solving Religious Freedom (with Lawrence Sager)