

Aristotle on Imperfect Syllogisms

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Text 1: 27a1-5, initial remarks at I.5.

“There cannot be a perfect syllogism *in this figure* in any way, but there will be a possible syllogism both if the terms are universal and if they are not. [If the terms are universal, there will be a syllogism whenever the middle belongs to all of one and none of the other, whichever term the privative is joined to; but, otherwise, in no way]” (27a1-5; my translation, modified from Striker’s and Smith’s).

τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμὸς οὐδαμῶς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχή- 27^a
ματι, δυνατὸς δ’ ἔσται καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὄρων
ὄντων. καθόλου μὲν οὖν ὄντων ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ὅταν τὸ μέ-
σον τῷ μὲν παντὶ τῷ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχη, ἂν πρὸς ὅποτερωοῦν
ἢ τὸ στερητικόν· ἄλλως δ’ οὐδαμῶς. κατηγορεῖσθω γὰρ τὸ Μ 5

Text 2: 28a15-17, initial remarks at I.6.

“Now *in this figure* too no perfect syllogism will come about, but a syllogism will be possible both when the terms are universal in relation to the middle and when they are not” (28a15-17, Striker’s translation).

ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, ἔσχατον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐ γί- 15
νεται συλλογισμὸς οὐδ’ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ’ ἔσται
καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὄρων ὄντων πρὸς τὸ μέσον. 17

Text 3: 26a13-16, I.4, after the universal premise-pairs have been explored.

“So if the terms are universal, it is clear when there will be a syllogism in this figure and when not; also, [it is clear] that, **if there is a syllogism, then the terms must necessarily be related as we have said**, and if they are so related, then there will be a syllogism”. (26a13-16, Striker’s translation).

νάς. καθόλου μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν ὄρων, δῆλον ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι πότε ἔσται καὶ πότε οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, καὶ ὅτι ὄντος τε συλλογισμοῦ τοὺς ὄρους ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν ὡς εἶπομεν, 15 ἂν θ’ οὕτως ἔχωσιν, ὅτι ἔσται συλλογισμός.

Text 4: 26b26-29, I.4, final remarks of the chapter.

“It is now evident from what has been said that **if there is a syllogism for a particular conclusion in this figure, then the terms must necessarily be related as we have said, for if they are related otherwise, no syllogism ever comes about.**

[It is also clear that all syllogisms in this figure are perfect, for they all reach their conclusion through the initial assumptions]” (26b26-30, Striker’s translation).

Φανερόν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς ἐὰν ἦ συλλογισμός ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι κατὰ μέρος, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ὄρους οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς εἶπομεν· ἄλλως γὰρ ἐχόντων οὐδαμῶς γίνεται. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ συλλογισμοὶ τέλειοί εἰσι· 30 (πάντες γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦνται διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ληφθέντων), καὶ ὅτι

Text 5: 27a23-25, I.5, after the universal premise-pairs have been explored.

“It is evident, then, **that if there is a syllogism with universal terms, the terms must be related as we said at the beginning, for if they are related in some other way, the necessary does not come about**” (27a23-25, Striker’s translation modified).

ζῶον–λίθος. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι ἂν ἦ συλλογισμός καθόλου τῶν ὄρων ὄντων, ἀνάγκη τοὺς ὄρους ἔχειν ὡς ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπομεν· ἄλλως γὰρ ἐχόντων οὐ γίνεται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

25

Text 6: I.5, 28a1-3[-7], final remarks of the chapter.

“It is evident from what has been said that if the terms are related to one another as we have said, then a syllogism will come about of necessity, **and if there is a syllogism, it is necessary for the terms to be so related.**

[It is also clear that all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect, for all of them are brought to perfection by adding some things that are either necessarily inherent in the terms or assumed as hypotheses, as when we give a proof through the impossible]. (28a1-7, Striker’s translation).

Φανερόν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐάν τε οὕτως ἔχωσιν οἱ 28^a
ὄροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡς ἐλέχθη, γίνεται συλλογισμὸς ἐξ
ἀνάγκης, ἂν τ’ ἢ συλλογισμὸς, ἀνάγκη τοὺς ὄρους οὕτως ἔχειν.
δηλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάντες ἀτελεῖς εἰσὶν οἱ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι
συλλογισμοί (πάντες γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦνται προσλαμβανομένων 5
τινῶν, ἃ ἢ ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ὄροις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τίθενται ὡς
ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ὅταν διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δεικνύωμεν), καὶ ὅτι οὐ

Text 7: 29a11-14(-16), I.6, final remarks of the chapter.

“It is now evident for this figure too when there will or there will not be a syllogism. Also, that when the terms are related as we have said, a syllogism comes about of necessity, and that **if there is a syllogism, then it is necessary for the terms to be so related.**

[It is also evident that all syllogisms in this figure are imperfect, for all of them are perfected by adding some things]” (29a11-16, Striker’s translation).

Φανερόν οὖν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι πότ’ ἔσται καὶ πότ’
οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμὸς, καὶ ὅτι ἐχόντων τε τῶν ὄρων ὡς
ἐλέχθη γίνεται συλλογισμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἂν τ’ ἢ συλλογι-
σμὸς, ἀνάγκη τοὺς ὄρους οὕτως ἔχειν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάν-
15 τες ἀτελεῖς εἰσὶν οἱ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι συλλογισμοί (πάν-
τες γὰρ τελειοῦνται προσλαμβανομένων τινῶν) καὶ ὅτι συλλο-

Text 8: 27a15-18, an empathic remark at I.5, after *Cesare* and *Camestres* have been explored.

“It is evident, then, that a syllogism comes about when the terms are so related, **but not a perfect syllogism, for the necessary is completed [i.e., exhausted] not only from the initial assumptions, but from others as well**”. (27a15-18, Striker’s translation, modified).

ταῦτα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἄγοντας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν ὄρων, φανερόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τέλειος· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἐπιτελεῖται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ *M* παντὸς τοῦ *N* καὶ τοῦ *Ξ* κατηγορηται,

Text 9: 24b18-22, the enlarged definition of syllogism, with clarification about its last clause.

“A syllogism is an argument in which, certain things being posited, something other than what was laid down results by necessity because these things are so. By ‘because these things are so’ I mean that it results through these, and by ‘resulting through these’ I mean that **no term is required from outside for the necessary to come about**”. (24b18-22, Striker’s translation, modified).

“[18] συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐν
[19] ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερον τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαί-
[20] νει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα
[21] συμβαίνειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν τὸ μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν
[22] ὄρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.”

Text 10: 24b22-26, the definitions of perfect and imperfect syllogisms.

“I call a syllogism perfect if it requires nothing beyond the things posited for the necessity to be evident; I call a syllogism imperfect if it requires one or more things that are indeed necessary because of the terms laid down, but that have not been taken among the premises”. (24b22-26, Striker’s translation).

My paraphrase/ translation:

“I call a syllogism perfect if it requires nothing beyond the things posited for displaying what is necessary; I call a syllogism imperfect if **it requires [or lacks] one or more things [sc. for displaying what is necessary], things which are indeed necessary for the terms of the problem,** but that have not been taken among the premises”. (24b22-26, my translation).

ὄρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. τέλειον μὲν οὖν
καλῶ συλλογισμὸν τὸν μηδενὸς ἄλλου προσδεόμενον παρὰ τὰ
εἰλημμένα πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀτελῆ δὲ τὸν προσ-
25 δεόμενον ἢ ἐνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ἀναγκαῖα διὰ τῶν
ὑποκειμένων ὄρων, οὐ μὲν εἴληπται διὰ προτάσεων. τὸ δὲ ἐν

Tables:

Warning: in “CaA”, “C” is the subject, “A” is the predicate, so that the formula means “every C is A” etc.

First Figure

| Forms of the conclusion | Premise-pairs deducing that conclusion | Name of the mood |
|-------------------------|--|------------------|
| CaA | BaA, CaB | Barbara |
| CeA | BeA, CaB | Celarent |
| CaI | BaA, CiB | Darii |
| CoA | BeA, CiB | Ferio |

Second Figure

| Forms of the conclusion | Premise-pairs deducing that conclusion | Name of the mood |
|-------------------------|--|------------------|
| <i>CaA</i> | <i>0</i> | |
| <i>CeA</i> | <i>AeB, CaB</i> | <i>Cesare</i> |
| | <i>AaB, CeB</i> | <i>Camestres</i> |
| <i>CiA</i> | <i>0</i> | |
| <i>CoA</i> | <i>AaB, CoB</i> | <i>Baroco</i> |
| | <i>AeB, CiB</i> | <i>Festino</i> |

Third Figure

| Forms of the conclusion | Premise-pairs deducing that conclusion | Name of the mood |
|-------------------------|--|------------------|
| <i>CaA</i> | <i>0</i> | |
| <i>CeA</i> | <i>0</i> | |
| <i>CiA</i> | <i>BaA, BaC</i> | <i>Darapti</i> |
| | <i>BaA, BiC</i> | <i>Datisi</i> |
| | <i>BiA, BaC</i> | <i>Disamis</i> |
| <i>CoA</i> | <i>BeA, BaC</i> | <i>Felapton</i> |
| | <i>BoA, BaC</i> | <i>Bocardo</i> |
| | <i>BeA, BiC</i> | <i>Ferison</i> |