'(1) If Socrates is a human being and Socrates is not a human being, then Socrates is human being.   [Simplification]

(2) If Socrates is a human being, then Socrates is a human being or a stone.   [Addition]

(3) If Socrates is a human being and Socrates is not a human being, then Socrates is not a human being.   [Simplification]

Therefore (4) if Socrates is a human being and Socrates is not a human being, then Socrates is a stone.   [Disjunctive Syllogism]

The Third Indemonstrable

Cicero:

Non et est A et non est B
Est A
___

Igitur non est B

Boethius:

Non si est A, non est B
Est A
___

Igitur non est B

Opposites:

Immediate: Sick and well for an animal.   [Exclusive + exhaustive]

Mediate: Black and white for a body.   [Exclusive but not exhaustive]

Non-Mediate: Animal and non-human.   [Exhaustive but not exclusive]

Abaelard:

If a disjunction asserts that one of the disjuncts is so, or that only one of the disjuncts is, then without doubt '*either I am an animal, or I am an ass*' would have to be true.

But this disjunction is shown to be false by the equipollent conditional, that is '*if I am not an animal, then I am an ass*', for from this it follows that *if I am not an animal, then I am an animal*.

Abaelard:

'. . . the only way to construe the proposed disjunction in terms of its probability and resolution into the corresponding conditional is by understanding it to have as its antecedent disjunct a categorical with a disjunctive predicate, as if we are saying *'either this is hot or cold, or it is tepid'*, that is '*either it is one of these, or it is that*', so as to say '*if it is neither of these, then it is that.*'

Melidunenses:

'Every disjunctive . . . is true of which one part is true, and conversely. Likewise of every false disjunction one part is false but not conversely.'

'In the case of disjunctions following from a simple antecedent . . . if one of the two disjuncts follows, then the disjunction does, as in the case of "*if it's human, then its an animal or a stone*"'

Every copulative is true of which each part is true and of every true copulative each part is true, and also from every copulative each part may be inferred necessarily

Montani:

To concede of that of which it is certain that it is human that it is human or a wolf seems frivolous and absurd. It is mere babbling to say that what is only a human being and cannot be an ass is a human being or an ass.

We also say the same in the case of those in which one <predicate> inheres such that the other cannot inhere in the same, as for example rational in Socrates or white in snow. For there is no change of these in them but rather one inheres determinately.

Peter of Spain:

'the ... inference does not hold because it does not destroy "Socrates is a human" which is required if "Socrates is an ass" is to follow when "Socrates is a human or an ass" is true.

This is because the aforementioned contradiction, that is "Socrates is a human and not a human" equally destroys and posits "Socrates is a human". So it no more destroys it than posits it. And for this reason it does not destroy one part of the disjunction..

So the locus from division cannot be appealed to here.'

Robert Kilwardby:

If you are sitting, then you are sitting or you are not sitting.

If you are not sitting, then you are sitting or you are not sitting.

'The disjunctive follows from each of its disjuncts but not in virtue of the same in them, rather in virtue of something different.'