Review
Reviewed Work(s): Meaning, Reference, and Necessity by Simon Blackburn
Review by: Tyler Burge
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025441
symbolic logicians." It is sad that the evil persists, but I find wry
amusement in becoming included among its objects.

One of his moral precepts deplores "the tendency to propose
technical criteria with the aim of excluding approaches that one
dislikes" (410). He notes in illustration that I adopted a criterion
of ontological reduction for no other reason than that it "includes
well-known cases and excludes undesired cases." 21 I protest that
mine was expressly a quest for an objective criterion agreeing with
our intuitive sorting of cases. This is a proper and characteris-
tically philosophical sort of quest, so long as one knows and says
what one is doing.

W. V. QUINE

Harvard University

Meaning, Reference, and Necessity. SIMON BLACKBURN, ed. New

This book contains six essays by young British philosophers of
language. It is closer in focus and method to work in America than
British philosophy is wont to be. But there is no unifying view-
point, apart from concern with meaning and reference. Given their
disparate aims and claims, I shall review the essays individually.

E. J. Craig's "The Problem of Necessary Truth," the most am-
bitious in the group, criticizes certain conventionalist accounts of
necessary truth. Craig begins with two principles he regards as plau-
sible: (A) given the meanings of words and the syntax, the meaning
of a sentence is fixed; (B) necessary truths are those whose meaning
is logically sufficient for their truth. The author remarks, puzz-
lingly, that B does not depend on the claim that all necessary
truths are analytic, and gives no explication of 'is logically suffi-
cient for their truth' that distinguishes the phrase from 'is such
that they couldn't possibly be false'. B may thus be trivial. But it
appears to conflict with the theory that holds that some necessary
truths are neither analytic nor a priori. There are ways of making
B compatible with such a theory; but, without further discussion,
its intent remains unclear. Craig goes on to make the traditional
point that, to be nontrivial, a conventionalist theory of meaning
must claim that word meaning and syntax depend partly on con-

21 He is referring to my "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers,"
Other Essays.*
ventions about sentences which are distinct from conventions about word meanings (cf. A).

Craig focuses on the alleged convention to hold certain arithmetical sentences true, whatever experiences may occur. The relevant conventions about word meanings are taken to relate the numerals to perceptual circumstances under which they are appropriately applied. Craig assumes (following Dummett) that, if the conventions about word meanings and those about sentences are genuinely distinct, they may in principle clash. The point, according to Craig, is not that one could count correctly and get counterarithmetical results, but that one might have the best possible perceptual evidence that one has counted correctly, and yet obtain such results. The bulk of the article then consists of a persuasive argument that this sort of clash is not really possible. Craig concludes that number concepts are completely circumscribed by perceptual criteria for their application.

A weakness in the critique is that there is no apparent reason why the conventionalist should assume that the distinctness of the criteria for numeral application from the conventions about arithmetical sentences depends on admitting that they may clash. Indeed, the conventionalist should reply that Craig’s argument simply follows out the convention to hold arithmetical sentences true come what may. The conventionalist might well also question the independence of perceptual criteria for correct counting from his (alleged) conventions about whole sentences. The criteria might be held to be derived (in some sense) from the conventions. Craig’s article has the substantial merit of seriously focusing on the ground of necessary truth. Most recent discussion of necessity—even under the rubric of essentialism—has contented itself with defending the truth or meaningfulness of de re claims, without the slightest regard for the traditional problem of why they, or their de dicto cousins, are true.

Susan Haack’s “‘Alternative’ in ‘Alternative Logic’” is a rather straightforward introduction to the issue of whether nonstandard logics are rivals to classical logic. After some initial classifications and distinctions, the article centers on criticizing arguments that purport to show that there can be no genuine rival to classical logic. Most of these criticisms are familiar and persuasive. I am inclined to think that there is no good a priori argument that classical quantification theory can brook no rivalry. Indeed, the prospects for an interesting, general characterization of the notion of rivalry seem dim. The issue inevitably comes down to cases. Haack makes inter-
esting remarks on several cases, but leaves the matter in a program-
matic state.

Thomas Baldwin's "Quantification, Modality, and Indirect
Speech" develops Russell's idea of taking propositions to be the
values of functions whose arguments are (sometimes) ordinary ob-
jects. Baldwin proposes to treat contexts for singular terms in
modal contexts as always referentially transparent, by requiring
that a term be rigid to count as singular. This account forces Bald-
win to give a separate treatment of propositional-attitude contexts,
which is less well motivated and relies on the notion of analyticity.
The essay contains several interesting details, but also some errors
of interpretation and argument, of which I will mention the two
most important.

Baldwin says that the standard truth-theoretic interpretation of
relations consists, strictly speaking, of a reduction of n-adic prop-
erties or predicates to monadic ones. The idea is that the bicondi-
tionals really have forms like

\[(1) \text{Sequence } (\alpha, \beta) \text{ satisfies 'the first member of } s \text{ is taller than }
\text{the second member of } s' \text{ if and only if } \alpha \text{ is taller than } \beta.\]
rather than forms like

\[(2) (\alpha, \beta) \text{ satisfies 'x}_1 \text{ is taller than x}_2' \text{ if and only if } \alpha \text{ is taller than } \beta.\]

(70–72). Baldwin goes on to criticize the standard interpretation
as artificial and overly complex. But the claim that the standard
interpretation involves such a reduction is simply mistaken. Satis-
faction is a theoretically introduced relation between sequences
and n-adic predicates (or properties). These latter need not be—or
be reduced to—predicates (or properties) that are true of (or are
"had" by) sequences. "Is taller than" is treated directly as a rela-
tion between objects. Thus 'satisfies' is not simply the converse of
'is true of'. (1) should begin '\(\langle\alpha, \beta\rangle\) satisfies . . .'.

Baldwin gives an argument to show that any truth-theoretic ac-
count of modal constructions must be essentialist. The argument
(86) goes: (1) Any recursive specification of propositions must take
propositions as the values of functions. So (2) any such account
must have the principle: \(\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \text{that } \phi\alpha = \text{that } \phi\beta\). By specifica-
tion from (2): \(\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \text{that } \text{Nec}(\text{that } \psi\alpha) = \text{that } \text{Nec}(\text{that } \psi\beta)\). So
(4) \(\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \text{Nec}(\text{that } \alpha = \beta)\). The unformalized occurrence of 'that'
makes the error difficult to diagnose. But (2) does not follow from
(1). Indeed, few theorists, other than a Russellian, would accept a
formula such as that in (2). Church, for example, takes proposi-
tions to be the values of functions whose arguments are senses. No such essentialist conclusion as (4) can be derived in his system.

Christopher Peacocke's "Proper Names, Reference, and Rigid Designation" attempts to provide a criterion for Kripke's notion of rigid designation without appeal to possible worlds. Roughly, his idea is that \( t \) is a rigid designator of \( x \) in \( L \) iff, for any sentence \( G(t) \) in which \( t \) occurs, the truth condition for \( G(t) \) in \( L \) is that \( (x) \) satisfy \( G() \). The criterion is meant to rule out context-free definite descriptions, since the truth condition for \( G(\text{the } F) \) requires that the denotation of \( \text{the } F \) be not only \( G \) but also \( F \). Although meticulously developed, this proposal, I think, relies on too many controversial and undefended philosophical assumptions to be very useful as a criterion. For example, Peacocke wants demonstrative-governed descriptions, like 'this car', to be rigid. This leads him to assume that 'car' will not enter into the truth conditions of sentences that contain the description. Peacocke says there is every reason to believe this (121), but gives none. The example suggests that the proposal has focused on the wrong feature of Kripke's view to explicate rigid designation—the feature involving the claim that names have no connotation. What seems more important to the notion is that, in modal and related contexts, a term in the surface syntax always be taken in the semantical representation to have referentially transparent position—or Frege's "customary reference." One need not claim that predicative conditions in the term do not contribute to its evaluation. Another example of how the proposal leans on strong assumptions is that, to prevent propositional-attitude contexts from undermining the criterion (so that no term is rigid), Peacocke assumes Davidson's treatment of such contexts. As with Baldwin, these contexts receive relatively little attention.

"Conversational Implicatures" by Ralph C. S. Walker treats substantive and methodological questions surrounding the issue of whether to take expressions like 'if, then', as truth-functional connectives, as Grice suggests, or as having semantically more complex senses. Walker begins by defending Grice's hypothesis against certain criticisms by Cohen and Mackie. He then argues that either hypothesis about the connectives is capable of explaining the agreed-upon data and that the theoretical situation is in principle indeterminate.

My chief reservations are rather general. The relation of sense to conversational implicature becomes crucial early in the essay when, in sketching a Gricean account of the "connection" between antecedent and consequent in "if-then" sentences, appeal is made...
to an implicature that arises from the form of the words themselves. Walker is aware of how close this notion of implicature seems to that of sense and he cites certain distinguishing features (pp. 142/3, 169–177). But no attempt is made to clarify what the notion of sense is intended to explain. My other reservation is that, although Walker makes it pretty plausible that there is no crucial test for determining whether or not the Gricean hypothesis is correct, he says little about more holistic considerations which might be thought to bear on it. Over-all, the essay is attractively written and well worth reading.

Simon Blackburn's "The Identity of Propositions" begins with criticisms of Davidson's theory of indirect discourse and Quine's translation theory. Since the issues here are complex and most of Blackburn's points familiar, I shall not try to evaluate them. Blackburn next investigates whether two functions of the notion of proposition—providing a truth vehicle and providing an "object" of understanding—are compatible. Truth vehicles are said to be things that "put an objective constraint on the way the world is" (198). This constraint seems to be a function of "features of the world" that components of a sentence express. (I find this irritatingly vague.) "Objects" for the attitudes are individuated in terms of substitution in oblique contexts.

Blackburn objects to Dummett's principle, "if someone knows the senses of two words, and the two words have the same sense, he must know that they have the same sense." He holds that one might know the relevant senses, but still wonder whether a widow is a once-married woman whose husband died while married to her and who is not now married—without wondering whether a widow is a widow. (This objection ignores the fact that Dummett's principle applies to two words.) Blackburn notes the metalinguistic rephrasals that have been applied to the sort of claim he makes against Dummett. But he finds them unsatisfactory, primarily because they do not distinguish adequately between what a foreigner might doubt about the meaning of a word and what a native might doubt. The upshot is that Blackburn questions whether truth vehicles are the objects of the attitudes. I am sympathetic with the points about substitution, but Blackburn's doubt about the dual functions of 'proposition' seems to me to need more development.

The book is very well edited except for a major printing error on page 139.

TYLER BURGE

University of California at Los Angeles