Sydney Shoemaker replies to my criticisms in ‘Memory and Persons’ of his and Derek Parfit’s attempts to reduce personal identity to continuities among psychological states.\(^1\) Locke had seemed to invoke memory to analyze personal identity. Butler claimed that such analysis is circular because the concept of memory presupposes connection to past states of the same person. Imaginatively, Shoemaker and Parfit introduced a concept of quasi-memory that avoids the presupposition. I argued that although they avoid Butler’s charge of definitional circularity, they incur explanatory circularity.

The circle takes this form. Shoemaker and Parfit attempt to explain constitutively what it is to be a person in terms of a certain preservational power, what they call ‘quasi-memory’. The point of the explanation is to avoid appeal to memory in the explanation. For memory constitutively involves a presumption of sameness of person (between the rememberer and the individual whose psychological states—perceptions, thoughts, and so on—are remembered). But if quasi-memory is to function at all in an individual, it must do so in an individual that also uses memory. And it is memory that makes it possible for there to be an individual who exercises quasi-memory. Memory plays a role in constitutive explanation of the psychological individuality of the individual that is necessarily prior to any (putative) role for quasi-memory. So quasi-memory cannot ground a reductive explanation of personal identity.\(^2\)

Shoemaker thinks that I beg the question against his and Parfit’s views. I believe that his reply is mistaken.

*Quasi-memory* of a past event is ‘representing it in a way that is as much like remembering it as is compatible with the person having the quasi-memory not being identical with the person whose experience of the past event caused it’ (87).

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\(^1\) Sydney Shoemaker, ‘Careers and Quareers: A Reply to Burge’, *The Philosophical Review* 118 (2009), 87–102. Citations of passages by page numbers will occur in parentheses in the text.

\(^2\) I am not proposing a reductive constitutive explanation of personal identity in terms of memory. I think that memory and psychological/personal identity are constitutively inter-dependent. One could not be an individual with a psychology and lack memory; indeed, memory is part of what constitutively marks a psychology as an individual’s psychology. On the other hand, memory, as Butler noted, is constitutively what it is by virtue of preserving psychological states of a given individual.
Memory is supposed to be a special case of quasi-memory. Shoemaker summarizes his strategy in this passage:

Someone who wants to define personal identity in terms of memory continuity... can hold that the persistence of a person over time consists in the occurrence of a series of events linked by quasi-memory, where the series is nonbranching. Because of the nonbranching provision, the quasi-memories will turn out to satisfy the identity requirement on memory, and so will be memories. But the notion of memory is not invoked in the analysis, so there is no circularity. If one has the more promising project of construing the persistence of persons as consisting in psychological continuity, of which memory continuity is just a part, one can use the same strategy to avoid circularity. (87)

Shoemaker describes imaginary persons, whom he calls ‘Parfit people’. He notes that these beings may be metaphysically impossible. He presents his fiction, however, as conceptually possible. These persons’ lives begin as ours do. At age twenty-one, there occurs an episode of fission. In fission, ‘a person’s body divides into two exactly similar bodies, and each of the bodies is the body of a person psychologically continuous with the original person’ (88). If both products of a fission lived on, each would grow increasingly different psychologically. But in this society, one fission product is killed shortly after fission occurs. The surviving creature takes the name of the original person, and for all practical purposes lives a life continuous with the original person’s. Shoemaker postulates that the surviving person is a distinct person who has quasi-memories from the original person’s life, and lives out the remainder of what Shoemaker calls a ‘quareer’. A quareer is as much like a person’s career as is compatible with a later quasi-rememberer’s not being identical with the person whose past is quasi-remembered.

3 Parfit does not clarify his attitude toward the two-person continuants. It is certainly natural to take them as entities with representational powers. I will track this issue in my discussion.

4 Shoemaker believes that persons after the fission event are not identical with pre-fission persons—even persons that they share quareers with. I think that given how he describes the case, this belief is not obviously true. Shoemaker argues, ‘Because identity is transitive, both products of the fission cannot be identical with the original person, and there is nothing that can pick out one of them rather than the other as identical with him or her—the killing of one of them cannot retroactively make the other someone that he or she earlier was not’ (89). This is not a decisive argument. Shoemaker assumes that once fission occurs, the two products of fission are not identical with one another, and that there is no ground for identifying one rather than the other with the person that underwent the fission. So by transitivity, neither product of fission is identical with the original person. Shoemaker argues that since neither of products of fission is identical with the original person, the one that continues to live cannot be identical with the original person “retrospectively”, once the short-lived product of fission is gone. But the assumption that neither product of fission is identical with the original person is not obviously true. Identity is timeless. Looked at timelessly, the fact that one product of fission continues the original person’s life, and the other does not, and is killed shortly after the fission event, seems some ground to identify the surviving product with the original person. The eliminated fission product might be considered a mutant outgrowth on the career of the original person. The fact that it is chosen randomly does not seem to me to matter. On metaphysical issues that deal with cases as far from actual cases—and probably possible cases—as this one is, I think that there is little point in arguing. So I will accept Shoemaker’s view of the matter for the sake of argument. It is
On Shoemaker’s analysis, persons are beings with non-branching psychological continuities established by such capacities as quasi-memory. Shoemaker uses his fiction to try to rebut my argument that his and Parfit’s attempts to explain personal identity in terms of such capacities as quasi-memory are explanatorily circular. He thinks that since quasi-memory does not involve first-person *de se* elements, as memory does, the explanation is not circular.

The gist of my argument was as follows. Being a person requires capacities to have and successfully realize intentions, to use his or her own perceptual experience, and to make inferences in argument. All these capacities either involve or presume *de se* capacities that function intra-individually to preserve contents of the person’s psychological states over time. An individual’s intention to do something has a content that is made successful only by the individual’s carrying out the intention. An individual cannot use his or her perceptual experiences unless the use is an application of the individual’s own retained experience. An individual cannot draw an inference, unless the reinvoked premises preserve the individual’s warrants for attitudes with the representational content of the premises, from when the premises are first used in the inference. These competencies, and norms governing their exercise, require preservation in memory of the individual’s own states. Such preservation is either marked *de se* or is apriori associated with *de se* attitudes. *De se* markers apply only if the individuals’ preservational competencies are keyed to the individual’s own history or future. A person’s having quasi-memory and other such quasi-capacities is explainable only by reference to the person’s also having *de se* preservational powers. I wrote, ‘...quasi-memories can exist only in a system that depends for its representational functions on memories, with *de se* presumptions...’. Since *de se* preservational powers *in persons* entail assumptions of personal identity, and since explaining persons’ having quasi-powers requires appeal to the persons’ having such *de se* powers, explanation of what a person is in terms of quasi-powers is circular.

The circularity does not lie in the point that in defining ‘quasi-memory’, Shoemaker makes reference to memory. (Quasi-memory is like memory except that...) The circularity lies in the fact that being an individual that exercises quasi-memory depends on being an individual that exercises memory. Memory is constitutively the basic psychological kind. Constitutively, to have quasi-memory at all and to be an individual with a psychology at all, an individual must utilize memory. The contrary is clearly not true: to be an individual with obvious that one can allow the two products of fission to live out full lives. In that case, one would have strong ground to claim that there are three people, not one or two.

5 Indeed, an individual’s having a representational mind requires having lower-level analogs of the first two of these capacities; and having propositional attitudes requires the third.

6 ‘Memory and Persons’, *The Philosophical Review* 112 (2003), 327; 444 in this volume.
memory it is not necessary at all, much less constitutively necessary, to have quasi-memory.

Shoemaker’s reply does not engage with the argument. Some of the reply imputes to me positions that I do not hold. Some of it fails to confront the argument’s key claim—that an individual’s having quasi-memory-type powers is explainable only by reference to the individual’s having de se preservational powers.

I begin by disclaiming some positions that Shoemaker’s reply imputes to me.

First he holds that I believe that ‘there can’t be quareers that are not careers’ (99, 100). I believe that the quareers that begin with the original person and continue with a different person after a fission event are not careers. I think that quareers are necessarily made up of one or more careers,7 but quareers that cross the relevant fission events are not careers.

Second, he imputes to me the view that his fictional beings are not conceivable (101). I find them quite conceivable, and nowhere intimate that I do not.

Third, he holds that to make my case, I would have to argue ‘that the differences between the Parfit people and us are such that they lack representational minds, or at least that they could not preserve knowledge and warranted belief over periods of time that span episodes of fission . . . ’ (93). All the claims here are mistaken. I am quite willing to take pre- and post-fission persons in Shoemaker’s scenario to have representational minds. I think that the two-person continuants in the scenario probably also have representational minds. I also believe that, in a perfectly good sense, the persons and the two-person continuants preserve knowledge and warranted belief across fission episodes. Except in cases in which knowledge or belief has de se content, each post-fission person can have, through the postulated causal connections, knowledge and warranted belief with the same content that the pre-fission person’s states had. Two-person continuants can also retain knowledge and warranted belief across fission episodes.

My view is that the representational minds of pre- and post-fission persons can be coherently understood only by taking them also to have the de se preservational competencies cited earlier. Their cross-personal competencies—for example, quasi-memories—augment a core of de se intra-personal competencies. It is these latter that are constitutive of the relevant individuals, as psychological beings. Specifically, each pre-fission and post-fission person has de se intentions.

7 One might be inclined to think that this is all that Shoemaker means by his attribution to me that all quareers are careers. However, he himself makes the distinction, and mistakenly attributes to me the view that ‘there cannot be quareers that are not careers’ (100), while holding that ‘quareers that are not themselves careers are made up of careers’ (101).
and capacities to preserve them in actional representations, *de se* perceptions and *de se* capacities to preserve the perceptions in memory for using the perceptions, and competencies to engage in inference that presuppose *de se* preservation in memory of premises that are reinvoked in the inference. These powers are fundamental to understanding the persons as persons, indeed any individuals with propositional attitudes. In fact, the powers that allow cross-personal preservations can function as representational powers at all, only by being employed by individuals with these *de se* preservational powers. Shoemaker’s reductive explanations of what it is to be these individuals is explanatorily circular, because they tacitly presuppose for their coherence that the individuals employ the ordinary *de se* preservational powers—ordinary memory.

Let us say that quasi-memories, and other similar psychological capacities that allow cross-individual realization, are *de se* preservational capacities. In Shoemaker’s scenario, the function and content of *de se* preservational capacities are unspecific as to whether states that they connect to are the person’s own states or those of a person on the other side of a fission.

In addition to the core intra-personal *de se* competencies, persons in Shoemaker’s scenario have *de se* cross-personal powers—quasi-intentions-to or quasi-memories, for example—that can extend to another person across a fission event. Having these *de se* powers cannot prevent persons from having *de se* competencies that are constitutive of their being persons.

Similarly, I think that the continuants consist in the pre- and post-fission-event persons are conceivable. But they can be coherently understood as having representational minds only because they are understood either as being individuals with *de se* powers, or as being group minds—two-person minds—consisting in the individual persons that have *de se* preservational capacities as well as cross-personal *de se* capacities.

Having intentions, using perception, and engaging in inference are constitutive of persons. These powers are associated with diachronic, intra-personal *de se* capacities to preserve representational contents of the person’s own

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8 I leave open whether the continuants have *de se* powers. Nothing in my discussion hinges on how one regards the continuants. I take no position on this metaphysical issue, partly because the issue does not even concern a clear possibility.

If the two-person continuants are persons or other individuals with representational minds, they have *de se* powers. They would then also have cross-individual *de se* powers, because they would have powers to connect directly to the minds of other individuals—in particular the minds of the shorter-lived persons that are co-terminus with periods in the continuant’s existence on the other side of a fission event. If the continuants are not individuals, they cannot strictly have cross-individual capacities. But they can have capacities that connect directly to persons with whom the continuants are not identical. Such capacities enable them to have “internal” psychological connections, analogous to quasi-memory, into the psychologies of persons—the shorter-lived persons which quareers join—with whom they are not identical. If the continuants are not individuals, then it is less clear exactly how to describe and explain their minds, granting that they have minds. But I suppose that their minds would be explained in terms of relations among the psychological powers of the shorter-lived persons—in something like the way we describe the socially constituted minds of organizations or groups.
psychological states. Persons in Shoemaker’s scenario have de se* powers only because they have such de se preservational powers.

I make three claims, then, about the Shoemaker’s scenario. First, I claim that the individual persons in the scenario have these de se preservational competencies. Second, I claim that these de se competencies ground explanation of the cross-personal “quasi”, de se* powers that the persons also have. Third, I claim that the de se competencies are partly constitutive of the persons that occur in the scenario—and that whatever competencies the continuants have are ultimately explainable in terms of de se competencies of either the continuants themselves or of the shorter-lived persons.

I will develop these three claims together. But I will lead with the first. Consider a post-fission person who is continuous with but distinct from a pre-fission person. As an individual person, this individual has his or her own point of view. The person can preserve this point of view by retaining recent perceptions, intending to do things, and carrying out inferences. The person can and does use short-term de se memory indexed to his or her own needs and perceptions, from the first moments of the person’s career. Part of what makes the person an individual is having needs, perceptions, and preservational capacities that figure in the individual’s actions—actual and potential. Perceptions are used, via de se preservational memory, to serve the person’s needs through action. The person has intentions that bear on his own future; those intentions are indexed to that person. Exercise of those intentions utilizes de se preservational powers. The person can engage in inferences that reinvoke premises that that person established earlier in an argument. The preservational powers that operate in reasoning are typically relatively short-term, since inferences typically do not extend over long periods of time (though they may). Their use presumes de se preservational powers. Analogous points apply to the pre-fission-event person. In each case, being an individual representer requires having de se capacities to preserve the individual’s point of view for the individual’s own needs and activities.

In addition to their de se psychological states, and de se preservational capacities, the persons in Shoemaker’s scenario also have de se* capacities (like quasi-memories) that allow cross-personal quasi-memories, quasi-intentions, and the like. Our ability to conceive a fiction in which such capacities operate cross-personally provides no ground at all for thinking that the persons in the fiction lack the de se psychological states and intra-individual preservative powers that lie at the heart of psychological understanding of persons as individuals.9

9 *De se* attributions are basic in the various psychological sciences, not just in ordinary common-sense discussions. See the discussion of ego-centric indexes in my *Origins of Objectivity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), in chapters 9 and 10. Ego-centric indexes are non-conceptual instances of de se representation. They are representational contents that occur for example in the perceptual and actional systems of pre-conceptual animals and in pre-conceptual (pre-propositional) aspects of the psychologies of beings with propositional attitudes.
Shoemaker’s scenario description tends to distract from these straightforward points. He describes the persons in the scenario as theorists that regard the surviving fission products as “as good as identical” with the original persons and treat them as such in all their social practices. Among other things, they regard the beliefs of the fission products as inheriting the warrant those beliefs acquired from the reasoning and experiences of the original person... and assign the same status to memories, or quasi-memories, of things done or experienced prior to the fission as they do to memories not separated from the remembered events by episodes of fission. (89)

The persons on either side of a fission event are by hypothesis not identical—whatever ‘as good as identical’ is taken to mean. Shoemaker sometimes writes as if their not caring about the difference between persons on either side of fission events has some effect on whether they have de se capacities (89). But the fact that the persons in his scenario do not care much about the non-identity does not cancel it. Members of groups may subordinate their interests to the group in their ‘social practices’. It does not follow that they lack individual needs, interests, goals, and motivations. By hypothesis, the persons on either side of a fission event are distinct. So they have their own needs, interests, and points of view. They have de se preservational powers that serve those needs, interests, goals, and motivations.10

Given that there are persons in a scenario, our understanding of them uses concepts for actual natural psychological kinds, including de se kinds. A sound methodology for considering non-actual, possible situations (or as in Shoemaker’s case, conceivable situations that may not be possible), requires determining whether the competencies that underlie actual psychological kinds are present. De se kinds are easily found in Shoemaker’s scenario.

De se aspects of psychological powers are an absolutely fundamental natural psychological kind. No individual with a representational psychology can lack them. Such powers realize fundamental functions in any individual’s representational psychology—including a person’s. Powers to realize these functions are part of what marks an individual with a mind as an individual. I emphasize here two such functions.

One is to exercise sensitivity to the individual’s own needs, goals, and perspective as privileged in a way that is distinct from those of others. Every individual’s psychology functions to privilege its own needs and perspectives. A second function is to provide the representational basis for serving the individual’s own needs—doing things for him- or herself—from the individual’s own

10 Shoemaker’s scenario is set up to obviate conflicting interests among beings in the scenario as far as possible. By killing one of the post-fission beings, Shoemaker eliminates actual post-fission conflict of interests (at least once the post-fission being is dead!). But since, by hypothesis, there are at least two persons in each quareer—not to mention the continuant—there is the potential for conflict in needs and interests. There is even potential for conflict in needs and interests between a shorter-lived person and the continuant that exists at the same time. There are certainly differences in needs and interests.
motivations or other representational powers. The unity of persons consists partly in having primitive representational powers that unify and distinguish their individual psychologies by fulfilling these two functions. Having \textit{de se} functions, \textit{de se} representational states, and \textit{de se} preservational powers is partly constitutive of being an individual with a representational psychology, hence of being a person.\footnote{See ‘Some Origins of Self’, this volume.}

These points do not derive from introspecting a property of mineness.\footnote{Shoemaker sometimes writes as if the opposition is committed to such a view. See (98).} Individuals need not be able to discriminate introspectively the intra-individual operation of \textit{de se} preservational capacities from that of \textit{de se}* preservational capacities. Where there are individuals with minds, however, there are sensitivities to and privileging of individual needs; and there are powers to serve those needs. Representational states and processes with these sensitivities and powers have \textit{de se} representational content, which marks those aspects of the psychological states and processes. Similarly, as I argued, individuals with minds must have \textit{de se} powers that function to preserve those sensitivities and privilegings in serving the individual’s needs, projects, and functions. What makes persons in the scenario individual persons is their having these powers.

The two functions that I have emphasized, and the \textit{de se} states and \textit{de se} preservational powers that realize them, can be expected to be present in the individuals in Shoemaker’s scenario, since those individuals are (plausibly) specified as individuals with representational psychologies. And in fact, there is not the slightest ground for thinking that the individuals in the scenario lack such functions and powers. Like any other individuals, they have powers to be sensitive to their own needs and projects, and to use representational capacities to serve them.

The pre-fission persons have many memories and no quasi-memories with respect to the post-fission person.\footnote{It might be argued that if continuants are individuals, a shorter-lived pre-fission person can have cross-individual \textit{de se}* intentions that would be fulfilled before fission by the simultaneously existing continuants. I do not object to such a view. But it depends on the \textit{de se}* preservations riding piggyback on simultaneously occurring \textit{de se} preservations that occur in the shorter-lived pre-fission person or in the pre-fission continuant. I think that Shoemaker is not thinking of \textit{de se}* capacities of these kinds. Unclearly on these issues derives partly from the oddities of the fiction, and from the lack of obviousness that there really are two pre- and post-fission persons in the scenario. (See note 2.) There are certainly differences in needs and interests between the longer-lived continuant and the shorter-lived persons.} They have \textit{de se}* intentions that are unspecific as to whether they are to be fulfilled by themselves or by the post-fission counterpart. But these powers are vastly outnumbered, and are certainly undergirded, by ordinary \textit{de se} intentions to do things. Such intentions, especially short-term intentions that fix \textit{de re} on immediate actions and do not span the fission events, hold their daily, individual lives together. Analogous points apply to the post-fission persons. They have many \textit{de se} intentions, and no \textit{de se}* intentions that could be fulfilled by their pre-fission counterpart. Their
quasi-memories are additional to a large core of *de se* intra-personal memories, especially short-term *de re* memories that function to retain particular near-term events in the rememberer’s history, events that as a matter of fact, could not have been experienced by anyone else.

Trying to *dispense* with person-specific *de se* concepts, in understanding the persons in the scenario, in favor of concepts that have no actual explanatory use and that apply to no known psychological kinds, would be a serious conceptual and methodological mistake. The capacities that ground *de se* notions are clearly present in the persons in the scenario. The idea that the persons in the scenario lack short-term memories and short-term *de se* intentions has no justification. We can intelligibly attribute *de se* powers to them. But it would be a mistake to think that such attributions block them from also having *de se* powers, states, and processes.

Shoemaker makes this mistake.\(^{14}\) He takes the persons in his scenario to lack *de se* psychological states and to have only *de se*\(^{\ast}\) psychological states (94, 92, 101). He does not argue for, or even highlight, this view, even though it is essential to his position.\(^ {15}\)

Shoemaker does write,\(^ {14}\)

Functionally *de se*\(^{\ast}\) forms are just as efficacious as *de se* forms in satisfying needs and furthering the achievement of goals—bearing in mind that in the case of the Parfit people the satisfaction conditions of needs and goals have to do with effects on their quareers rather than with effects on their careers. (93)

This claim may seem pertinent to whether *de se*\(^{\ast}\) psychological states can be regarded as replacing all *de se* psychological states in the scenario. The non-individualized description of needs and goals fudges the issue, however. The *de se*\(^{\ast}\) psychological states can indeed further needs and goals held in common between the two persons whose lives make up a quareer. They can further needs and goals that are unspecific as to whether they are those of an individual person, those of the other person in the continuant quareer, or those of the two person continuant. But these are cross-personal needs and goals. They are analogous to one individual’s having the goal that a philanthropic foundation be established, where the intention is unspecific as to whether that individual, his son, or some group of which they are members establishes the foundation. *De se*\(^{\ast}\) states cannot have the function of serving needs and goals specific to individual persons.

\(^{14}\) Shoemaker’s assumption that only *de se*\(^{\ast}\) powers occur in his scenario is an illusion born of focusing on novel psychological elements in the case and neglecting the familiar elements. In fact, having a novel power that crosses a single temporal divide for each of the persons in the scenario provides no ground for thinking that the standard natural psychological kinds—the *de se* kinds—are inapplicable in the scenario.

\(^{15}\) Shoemaker writes, generically, of *de se*\(^{\ast}\) states ‘doing the work’ of *de se* states (94). But they cannot do all the work, for the reasons given earlier. They cannot mark capacities that realize the two basic functions of *de se* aspects of competencies—functions to mark off and serve the individual’s needs, goals, and perspective.
A being is not an individual person unless he or she has such needs and goals, and can serve them.

The following passage also bears on whether scenario persons have *de se* powers:

Except for personal beliefs and other present tense mental state ascriptions that carry no implications about the past or future, attitudes whose verbal expression would involve their “I” will not strictly speaking be *de se* attitudes. But they will be very much like *de se* attitudes. We can call them *de se*\(^*\) attitudes. Instead of being indexed to the possessor of the attitude, or to the possessor’s career, they are indexed to the possessor’s quareer. So, for example, the intention to do X will be a *de se*\(^*\) attitude whose satisfaction condition will be a *de se*\(^*\) attitude whose satisfaction condition is the doing of X at some future point in the quareer of the intender (90).\(^{16}\)

This passage contains a number of unargued claims that evince serious underestimation of the role of *de se* attitudes in persons’ psychologies, including the psychologies in the scenario.

It is not clear what Shoemaker means by ‘personal beliefs’. I take him to mean ordinary first-person (hence *de se*) self-ascriptions of mental states. He concedes attitudes involving such *de se* self-ascriptions, but claims that they have no implications for the past or the future. But it is unclear why he thinks the persons cannot retain those self-ascriptions in at least short-term memory, and why he thinks that they cannot use them in forming *de se* intentions to do things. I believe that the view that they can have such *de se* intentions, but not retain them in memory or use them to set up future use—in action for example—is incoherent. Having the first-person conceptual *de se* representational capacity is not a point-event. Having such a capacity requires abilities to preserve such *de se* capacities for use. These are *de se*, diachronic abilities.

This issue regarding implications of present-tensed mental-state self-ascriptions is not the basic one. Present-tensed mental-state self-ascriptions are constitutive to persons, and persons must have *de se* powers to preserve them. But *de se* powers that are constitutive to persons—indeed to all individuals with representational psychologies—go well beyond the self-ascriptions that Shoemaker cites.

\(^{16}\) Just prior to this passage, Shoemaker holds that the analogs of first-person pronouns in the language spoken in his scenario cannot be translated as our “I”, for they count as true the judgment ‘I did A’, when A was done not by the speaker but by the “ancestral self” of the speaker, that is, the person whose fission had the speaker as its surviving fission product. (90) Although Shoemaker disclaims relying on points about linguistic usage (94), he commonly appeals to such points, both in the present article and in the articles that I discuss in ‘Memory and Persons’. I think that psychological issues, not linguistic issues, are basic; and he seems to agree. In any case, I believe that the claim just quoted is mistaken. I think that in natural readings of the scenario, utterances of sentences containing the word-form ‘I’ cannot be translated uniformly in the way that Shoemaker suggests. In utterances of ‘I did A’ that express short-term realizations of *de se* intentions—and there will be many such realizations—occurrences of ‘I’ should be translated as our ‘I’. Some occurrences can, I agree, be translated differently.
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‘Memory and Persons’ elicited ways in which de se indexing enters into subconceptual capacities that are the ancestral psychological core of conceptual self-consciousness. For example, all perceptions and perceptual beliefs are indexed de se. De se psychological states index the possessor of those states in a way that makes them ego-relevant—by linking them directly to the needs, goals, and intra-individual representational functions of the states’ possessor. To have de se status, the states must be preservable in memory, for at least short periods of time. That is a condition on their having any content at all. Shoemaker has given no reason to believe that the persons in his scenario lack de se indexes on their perceptions, perceptual beliefs, and intentions, and on retentions in memory of such states.

Whether or not the individual persons (or the two-person continuants) in the scenario notice or care about the point, there are many individual proprietary needs and goals—most obviously short-term ones—that are not shared between the two persons in a quareer. For example, given that the person before a fission event does not exist any longer, that person does not need the breakfast that the person after the event needs. The pre-fission person does not have the goal of eating it, and may never have foreseen it. (Suppose that the breakfast occurs in the ripe old age of the second person.) The post-fission person certainly has a de se indexed goal. The goal can be fulfilled only by the post-fission person who has the goal.17

Let us look at intentions of pre-fission persons. Consider again Shoemaker’s remark,

So, for example, the intention to do X will be a de se* attitude whose satisfaction condition will be a de se* attitude whose satisfaction condition is the doing of X at some future point in the quareer of the intender. (90) 18

Shoemaker assimilates the intention-like attitudes of pre-fission persons to de se* attitudes whose satisfaction condition is ‘the doing of X at some future point’ in the existence of either that person or the person on the other side of the fission event. But few intentions are so indefinite. The overwhelming majority of the intention-like attitudes of pre-fission persons will have definite, de re, short-term timing conditions. These attitudes function specifically to serve the needs and goals of the pre-fission person. They are constitutively de se.

Consider an example. If at age 14 a pre-fission shorter-lived person had no such intentions as the intention to raise his or her arm with a relatively immediate,

17 It is acceptable to claim that the two-person continuant needs the breakfast. But the continuant’s needing the breakfast and the second person’s needing the breakfast are different matters. They are different beings, assuming that the continuant is a being; and their needs are indexed to the different beings that have the need. (See note 5.)

18 Shoemaker’s remark, ‘the intention to do X will be a de se* attitude’ is a clear error. An intention to do X—by the plain meaning of the locution ‘intention to do X’—is not fulfilled unless the intender fulfills it. It would have been more accurate to have written ‘intentions* to do X’. Intentions to do X are de se.
de re, short-term, future timing indication, then there would be no pre-fission person to reach the age of 21 and go out of existence through fission. Most intentions have de re timing constraints in their contents. Intentions to move body parts, like the 14-year-old’s intention to raise his arm, nearly always have a short-term timing specification in their contents. Thus, many pre-fission intentions will not cross the fission time-line. They will function specifically to serve the needs of the pre-fission person, not just the needs of one or other of the beings in a quareer. Without such intra-personal, de se intentions, there can be no persons.

Analogous points apply to the preservational capacities involved in uses of perceptual beliefs. A core of de se memories and intentions, most of them short-term, underlies those de se* capacities that function to span a fission event, or that function in such a way as not to be specific as to whether their fulfillment spans a fission event.

Where there is a difference in individuals with representational minds, there is a potential for difference in need, goal, and function of attitude. Whether or not there is an actual difference, the difference in the being that has a perception, need, or goal is indexed—for a core of psychological states—in the being’s psychologies. Perceptions, needs, and goals of a being are indexed to that being. Given that the individual persons are different, their having shared needs or goals does not prevent even those shared needs and goals from being indexed severally to each of the shorter-lived persons. Each being has de se preservational capacities that function to preserve the contents and modes of de se states. (See note 5.)

De se psychological states function to index and preserve perceptions, needs, goals, intentions, and other aspects of the perspectives of individuals. De se* psychological states lack these functions. De se* notions are blind to states and preservational capacities that function intra-individually. Given that there are distinct individual persons, as there are in Shoemaker’s scenario, there are intra-personal perceptions, needs, goals, perspectives, and intra-individual preservational capacities. These are de se capacities. The individual persons must have de se states and preservational capacities to be individuals. Where the individuals are persons, the de se psychological states are functionally connected to capacities to use a first-person concept, and to self-ascribe mental states.

I believe that I have said enough to establish my first claim—that the persons in Shoemaker’s scenario have de se psychological states and de se preservational capacities.

Shoemaker appeals to the psychological and epistemic beliefs of persons in his scenario. He presents these beliefs as supporting his own view that these persons lack de se preservational capacities. He says that the persons in the scenario treat the different persons before and after fission events as, for practical purposes, ‘as good as identical’. On Shoemaker’s own account, they are not identical. We must evaluate their beliefs in light of that fact. Their beliefs have no special authority. The issue is whether the beliefs are true.
I have already argued for my first claim—that the persons in the scenario do have \textit{de se} preservational powers, as well as \textit{de se}\textsuperscript{*} states. I will sharpen it by evaluating the beliefs of the individuals in Shoemaker's scenario (which are really Shoemaker's own beliefs).

Shoemaker gives two descriptions of the self-conception of the persons. I quote both.

They regard the beliefs of the fission products as inheriting the warrant those beliefs acquired from the reasoning and experiences of the original person, regard them as knowing the things the original persons learned before the fission and which the fission products believe, and assign the same status to memories, or quasi-memories, of things done or experienced prior to the fission as they do to memories not separated from the remembered events by episodes of fission. (89)

[They think] that the warrant of beliefs is preserved across episodes of fission, that there is preservative memory across such episodes, that seeming memories from the inside of a thing done or experienced prior to an episode of fission can have as good a right to count as knowledge as seeming memories from the inside that are not separated from the remembered events by episodes of fission, that actions done after an episode of fission can count as executions of intentions formed prior to it. Burge is committed to holding that if my imaginary creatures are possible at all, they are radically mistaken in thinking these things. (91)

Let us go through these views one by one.

(1) They regard themselves as knowing and being warranted in believing things across fission events that their predecessors also knew.

Via quasi-memory, post-fission persons can both know and be warranted in believing propositional contents known and believed by pre-fission persons, except for any \textit{de se} elements in the propositional contents. For example, they can have cross-personal singular \textit{de re} knowledge (based on quasi-memory) of the things that the pre-fission person experienced.\textsuperscript{19} Post-fission persons can meet

\textsuperscript{19} Shoemaker thinks (96ff.) that I may deny [the possibility of] singular \textit{de re} quasi-memories. I do not. The locutions in 'Memory and Persons' that misled him were highlighting the fact that in ordinary specifications of quasi-memory it is left open which and how many individuals one has quasi-memory relations to. I take it that in any given use each such relation is singular and \textit{de re}.

There is a minor disagreement over interpretation of Parfit's account of quasi-memory. In the passages in \textit{Reasons and Persons} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) that I focused on, Parfit writes of individual subjects' seeming to remember having an experience. This locution \textit{entails}, in plain English, that the individual subjects' seem to remember their (\textit{de se}) having the experience. Shoemaker points out (97 n5) that, in an essay thirteen years before, Parfit states that [on his interpretation of his own usage] it does not follow from my seeming to remember having an experience that part of what I seem to remember about the experience is that “I, the person who now seems to remember it, am the person who had this experience”. I think that Shoemaker is right that this is a denial that quasi-memories have \textit{de se} content. But although Parfit states that having \textit{de se} content does not follow from seeming to remember having an experience, in fact it \textit{does} follow. So in 1971 his locution does not capture the meaning that he intended. I concede that in 1971 Parfit did not believe that quasi-memories have \textit{de se} content. But Parfit does not repeat this gloss on his use of words in \textit{Reasons and Persons}. Parfit's account is what he writes down. Since the words mean what they mean, Parfit's account in 1984 is committed to quasi-memories' having \textit{de se} content, even if
standards of epistemic good-use and reliability, and thus be epistemically warranted, in using their *de se* cross-personal powers.

(2) They assign the same status to quasi-memories of things done or experienced prior to the fission as they do to memories not separated from remembered events by episodes of fission.

It is not clear what ‘assigning the same status’ amounts to. The scenario beings may not care about the difference. But memory and quasi-memory are different types of psychological capacity. Memory has the representational function of preserving the contents of psychological states within an individual’s psychology. Quasi-memory does not. Its function allows cross-individual operations. Memory is a *de se* preservational capacity. Quasi-memory is not. That is, since memory is an intra-personal capacity, it can preserve both the referent and the representational content of *de se* occurrent applications; quasi-memory cannot. Trivially, a person cannot preserve another person’s referent and representational content, when the other person uses the first-person concept *I* (or other *de se* elements) to self-refer. Moreover, even laying the *de se* elements aside, knowledge that rests on an initial quasi-memory of what a pre-fisson person experienced is inevitably new knowledge for the quasi-rememberer. By contrast, knowledge associated with initial memories of what an individual previously experienced is commonly a reactivation of knowledge that the rememberer already had.

Let me illustrate some of these points with an example. Suppose that a pre-fission person at age 18 has a perception. All perceptions are *de se*. Suppose that the person forms a warranted *de se* perceptual belief from that perception. The belief inherits the *de se* framework of the perception. That person can preserve the *de se* belief in memory. (Pre-fission persons, in the scenario that Shoemaker sets out, do not even have quasi-memory, though one could alter the case so that they do.) Preserving *de se* belief in memory requires preserving the reference and *de se* representational content of the *de se* element. The post-fission person is a distinct person. This person (necessarily) has no power to preserve both the referent and the *de se* representation content of the pre-fission person’s belief. In this sense, trivially, the post-fission person cannot have the *de se* content that the pre-fission person had in beliefs acquired through quasi-memory.

Through quasi-memory, the post-fission person can obtain the non-*de se* aspects of the content of the pre-fission person’s perception and perceptual belief. These aspects are preserved through a causal chain. But they are not preservations within the post-fission person’s psychology. For the post-fission person, quasi-memory of events that the pre-fission person experienced is acquisition of new content and new knowledge, although it is the same non-*de se* content that Parfit himself (and perhaps Parfit’s account) in 1971 were not committed to that view. What Parfit himself believed in 1984 is unclear.
the pre-fission person had. So even the non-*de se* aspects of content constitute new belief and new knowledge for the post-fission person. In this respect, as I suggested in ‘Memory and Persons’, quasi-memories are more like perceptions than memories. They are like perceptions of past events through the instrument of another person’s perceptual experience. The post-fission person’s quasi-memories, and beliefs based on quasi-memories, are anchored in the post-fission person’s own *de se* perspective. The post-fission person has *de se* memory capacities to preserve states, including quasi-memories, within that perspective.

(3) They believe that beliefs by post-fission persons inherit the warrant that those beliefs acquired from reasoning and experiences of the pre-fission person.

This belief is mistaken. Types of warrant are fitted to types of psychological states and processes. Warrants are standards for epistemic good use of the psychological powers. Different types of powers are subject to different standards, different warrants. Warrants specific to memories that preserve *de se* elements concern how well the memories retain *de se* states intra-individually. Persons that meet those standards have those warrants. A different person cannot preserve those warrants in using different powers, because that person cannot preserve intra-personally the contents of *de se* psychological states of another person. A post-fission person cannot have the same warrants for relying on *de se* memories of the pre-fission person’s perceptual beliefs, because those warrants are standards for intra-personal preservation of the reference and content of those *de se* states. Indeed warrants for quasi-memory are standards for the acquisition of new information, not for intra-individual preservation. As noted, however, beliefs based on quasi-memory can be just as warranted as beliefs based on memory.

(4) They think that actions after a fission episode can count as executions of intentions formed prior to it.

Some intentions are intentions that something be done, or that something be done by one or more specific executors. Such intentions of pre-fission persons can be executed by different post-fission persons. But actions by post-fission persons cannot count as executions of pre-fission persons’ intentions to do something. Pre-fission persons that intend to do something and do not get around to doing it

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20 Although quasi-memories are not *de se* preservational capacities—so that with respect to preservation they are *de se*—they themselves have *de se* markers, just as perceptions do. They are psychological states that mark the perspective of the quasi-rememberer, and that are functionally and directly connected to that person’s needs and goals.

21 Despite its similarities to memory, quasi-memory is representationally more like perception than like memory. Quasi-memory passes through other persons, but is not intra-personally preservational. It differs from ordinary perception in that it goes through another person. But it is like perception and unlike memory in that it is a source of new information for the user. Note that perception too can reach well back into the past (think of perception of distant stars).
before they go out of existence cannot have those intentions executed by other persons. Intentions-to are constitutively de se intentions.

To be persons, both pre- and post-fission persons must intend (de se) to do things. Such intentions can be fulfilled only by the intender. It should be remembered that to be an intention to do something, the intender need not specifically formulate or consider the intention as de se. It is de se by virtue of its role in the person’s psychology, not by virtue of the person’s meta-attitudes toward the intention or its fulfillment. Insofar as the timing on a pre-fission intention is unspecific both about whether it be done before or after the fission event and about whether it be done by the intender or the post-fission person (or by the continuant), such intentions can be executed by others. But as noted in the example of the 14-year-old, the core intentions of both pre- and post-fission persons are de se intentions with specific de re timings to do things conceived of de re. These intentions function to be fulfilled by the intender. To be persons, the pre- and post-fission persons must be able to form such intentions to do things themselves.

I turn now to my second claim—that de se powers ground constitutive understanding of cross-personal de se* powers of the persons in the scenario. I think this claim fairly obvious, once it is recognized why persons in the scenario must have de se preservational powers.

Here again is Shoemaker’s introduction of the notion of quasi-memory: ‘quasi-remembering something is representing it in a way that is as much like remembering it as is compatible with the person having the quasi-memory not being identical with the person whose experience of the past event caused it’ (87).

I note two points about this introduction. First, quasi-remembering is explained in terms of remembering. Our grip on the notion starts with memory and then relaxes its intra-personal de se aspect. I do not say that ‘quasi-memory’ is defined in terms of memory. I say that explaining quasi-memory makes essential use of the notion of memory. Second, the introduction assumes that persons have quasi-memory. Understanding the quasi-, de se* cases rests on assuming that persons are up and running. We understand persons as having de se states, like perception, and de se preservational memory (which preserves perception, intentions, and premises for use). The 14-year-old again illustrates the point.

We use this base of understanding to add special additional de se* powers that enable one person to connect to the psychology of another person. We can also attribute such powers to the two-person continuants. The supposition that some persons in the scenario are fission products and are causally continuous with a pre-fission person should not obscure the fact that we utilize the ordinary notion person with its presupposed de se notions as basis for explaining the quasi-notions and the continuant two-person beings. We augment persons’ intra-personal powers with cross-personal powers. Again, focusing on relatively short-terms needs, memories, uses of perception brings out the prevalence of de se preservational functions and powers in our understanding of the individuality
of the persons involved in cross-personal preservations. Each person has many more intra-personal de se memories, intentions, and so on, than cross-personal or person-unspecific memories, intentions and so on. More importantly, these intra-personal states and powers ground understanding the persons as persons. The existence of a single fission event at age 21 of a person hardly undermines the centrality of standard intra-personal intentions or memories in grounding our understanding of the persons—and continuants—involved.

The explanatory dependence of de se* notions on de se notions is not just an artifact of Shoemaker’s explanation. Explanation of de se* powers is ineliminably parasitic on prior constitutive understanding of de se powers. I think it incoherent to postulate a representational mind that neither has intra-individual de se preservational capacities nor is explained in terms of constituent beings that have de se capacities. Consideration of the timing of intentions, the short-term character of preservation of perceptions for use, and the short-term nature of most inference brings out that attempting to explain an individual mind purely in terms of preservational powers that are functionally unspecific as to whose content is preserved is hopeless. The unity of such a mind would be impossible without capacities with intra-individual functions to preserve content for use. A being that lacked such de se capacities would lack the capacities to represent for its own use and do things for itself. It would lack the capacities integral to being a locus of representation. In understanding representational mind, we perforce rely on assuming that intra-individual de se capacities preserve the mode and representational content of basic representational powers—and to provide the unity that is constitutive of representational mind.

To understand cross-individual de se* capacities, we must assume, as explanatory base, a person with the intra-individual de se preservational powers that are involved in use of perception to meet the individual’s needs, in realization of intentions-to, and in exercise of inference. One cannot make sense of a power that operates across minds (including persons’ minds) unless one can make sense of the individual minds. Making sense of individual minds requires invoking de se notions— notions that apply to intra-individual needs, preservational capacities, and functions.

In ‘Memory and Persons’, I claimed, ‘Memory with its de se presumptions and presuppositions of transtemporal agent identity—deriving from the individuation of basic sorts of agency—is a condition on the possibility of an individual’s having a representational mind’.22 I think that this claim stands. Any attempt to explain personal identity, or the identity of any individual with a representational mind, in terms of de se* powers—powers that are not specific to serving and preserving intra-individually the individual’s perceptions, needs and goals—is doomed to explanatory circularity.

22 ‘Memory and Persons’, 306; 423 in this volume.
The foregoing points justify my third claim. The third claim is that the \textit{de se} capacities involved in using perception, applying intentions, and engaging in inference are constitutive of persons, including persons in Shoemaker’s scenario. I leave open whether \textit{de se}* powers or \textit{de se} powers are constitutive of the two-person continuants that occur in the scenario. That depends on whether the continuants are assimilated to individuals or organized groups. I think it coherent to take the continuants as just as important as the pre- and post-fission persons, for social and other practical purposes. Some might even take them as individuals, or as persons. But explanation of the nature of \textit{de se}* powers is parasitic on explanation that invokes \textit{de se} powers in individuals with representational powers. Shoemaker’s fiction contains such individuals—at least the shorter-lived persons. The fiction is imaginative, thought provoking, and worthy of reflection. But the idea that it provides independent explanatory ground that is more basic than the natural \textit{de se} kinds in terms of which we understand the nature of persons is an illusion.

II

I attended especially to inference in ‘Memory and Persons’. In section VI of his essay, Shoemaker discusses my views on inference. The issues are special cases of those just discussed. They deserve attention anyway.

I argued that a psychological system that does not presuppose intra-individual agent identity cannot carry out inference. I argued this conclusion from three premises:

(1) Inference requires an ability to (re-)invoke representational contents as steps, relying over time on the same warrant that backed these steps when they were first instantiated.
(2) Epistemic norms and warrant attach to the agent of the inference.
(3) Epistemic norms for inference, and the warrant an agent has in a step in an inference, must be explained in terms of epistemologically relevant capacities, acts, experiences, or states of the agent of the inference.\(^\text{23}\)

Suppose that a pre-fission person has a perceptual belief warranted through that person’s having perceptions. A post-fission person cannot use purely preservative memory to reinvoke that belief’s content as a previously established premise, relying on the same warrant that supported the other person’s belief, because the post-fission person did not have those perceptions. So although the post-fission person can be warranted through quasi-memory to rely on a belief based on quasi-memory, the belief would be a new premise. It could not be warranted by reinvoking a past premise. I argued that even if the perceptual belief occurred

\(^{23}\) ‘Memory and Persons’, 314–315; 431–432 in this volume.
in the career of the post-fission person, a quasi-memory capacity that was not specifically an intra-individual competence could not support preservation of warrant from the earlier belief so as to allow a reinvocation of the originally warranted premise. The individual could be warranted in the belief through quasi-memory, but not through the original perceptions. For quasi-memory is not an intra-individual competence, and cannot support intra-individual warrants involved in inference.

Shoemaker responds by objecting to (3). He says that his scenario people accept a ‘slight revision’ of (3): ‘the norms and warrant are explained in terms of epistemologically relevant capacities and so forth of the agent and of earlier occupants of the agent’s quareer’ (96).

Now this is not a slight revision. It evinces the tendency of persons in the scenario to ignore differences between intra-individual capacities and cross-individual capacities (and the attendant epistemological standards or norms for good use of them) that I criticized in section I above. In the first place, the phrase ‘the norms and warrant’ is unspecific on the point at issue. I explicitly avoided doubting that uses of quasi-memory can be warranted. Beliefs that rest on quasi-memory of experiences of other persons in a quareer can be warranted. That point is not in question. What is in question is whether warrants that derive from quasi-memory can support reinvocation of a premise in an inference. My argument that they cannot do so stands. Shoemaker does not address that argument. He simply asserts something that is not in question.

In the second place, although quasi-memory may be ‘very much like inference’, it is not inference. Inference, as I argued, requires intra-individual preservation of warrant. Shoemaker envisions explaining mentation that occurs in the scenario purely in terms of quasi-memory rather than de se preservational memory. This move requires that we give up standard natural psychological kind notions in understanding the scenario, and that we explain the situation entirely in terms of kinds that are not even clearly possible. I think that this move has no merit.

Third, and crucially, attributing quasi-memory to persons in the scenario presupposes that the persons who use such cross-personal capacities have intra-personal preservational capacities. In particular, the persons that use quasi-memories also make ordinary inferences that rely on intra-personal preservational memory, with its de se presumptions. In fact, an overwhelming

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24 Shoemaker claims that the premises are ‘unclear’ (96). He maintains that they must be understood ‘as saying that a warrant, and conformance to a norm, attaches to an agent in virtue of what has occurred during some relevant period in the career of that agent’ (as distinct from the quareer of the agent). But the premises are not unclear. I do not use or need the ‘in virtue of’ location in premise (2), for premise (3) connects norms and agents to capacities, acts, experiences, or states of the agent of the inference. Shoemaker’s response depends on rejecting premise (3), which he does. There is no need for clarification of either premise, and he suggests none for premise (3). Premise (3) connects the reinvocation of steps in inference to past states of the individual—hence to states in the individual’s career, not quareer.
number of clear cases of ordinary intra-individual inference occur in, and func-
tion to occur in, their lives. Nothing that Shoemaker writes comes to grips with
these points. A capacity for inference is constitutive of being a person. A person’s
having additional cross-personal capacities that in certain fictional (but perhaps
impossible) cases can seem ‘very much like inference’ presupposes, for its
intelligibility, thinking of the person as having the intra-personal preservational
powers, including those used in inference, that persons constitutively have.

III

I turn now to Shoemaker’s appeal to the Ramsey procedure to vindicate his view.
I find this invocation unappealing on both general and specific grounds. First, the
general grounds.

I think that the Ramsey procedure is an overused philosophical crutch. It is an
inappropriate tool for illuminating explanatory notions. It purports to replace
theoretical explanatory notions by a massively complex, and usually not fully
explicit, existentially quantified description. Theoretical explanatory notions are
natural kind notions—here notions for psychological natural kinds. Most theor-
etical explanatory notions are name-like. They are like common nouns that name
the kinds. Descriptions are in general not explanatorily equivalent to natural-kind
common nouns that they purport to explicate or be equivalent with.25

There are two general grounds implicit in what I just wrote, for rejecting
Shoemaker’s appeal to a Ramsey-description to replace notions like memory and
de se intention. First, it is too unspecific to be explanatory. It is a mere handwave
toward explanation. An unspecified unity or continuity relation is said to be as
much like the ordinary relations as is compatible with the relations’ being cross-
personal. This is not an explanatory notion comparable to the standard ones.
Shoemaker’s use is worse than the original uses of Ramsey’s procedure, since the
original uses putatively operated on actual scientific theories—quantifying out
the theoretical terms. Shoemaker offers only a handwave toward an actual theory,
since the relevant unity/continuity relations are not specified. No one knows how
to specify them. Second, Ramsey-descriptions make the old mistake of treating
descriptive (in Shoemaker’s case, functional) notions as explanatorily equivalent
to the name-like theoretical notions that they are supposed to replace.

The more specific ground for rejecting Shoemaker’s appeal to Ramsey’s
method to replace notions like de se memory derives from the points made
previously about Shoemaker’s scenario. We understand and apply cross-personal
de se* notions only through presupposing the application of the constitutively
more basic intra-personal (or more broadly intra-individual) de se notions. Any

25 I am relying here on the work of Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1980); and Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. II: Mind, Lan-
Ramsey-description that contains *de se* notions—or functionalist analogs of *de se* notions—is explanatorily posterior to a specification that contains *de se* notions. So the constitutive explanation of the nature of personal identity through the Ramsey form of reduction remains circular.

IV

I summarize my main points from a more general perspective. The basic problem for the Shoemaker–Parfit reductionist explanation of personal identity is that it cannot account for the way a person’s being an individual with a mind depends on capacities for self-conception and other forms of *de se* indexing that are constitutive to being a person. I elaborated this point in section XI of ‘Memory and Persons’. I began that section by stating the point in general form:

The central tenet of Shoemaker’s and Parfit’s reductionisms is that the basic explanatory psychological notions do not presuppose individual identity over time. The basic explanatory notions are supposed to be person- and agent-neutral. The notion of an individual person- or agent is to be explained in terms of continuities of states characterized agent-neutraly. . . . Being an agent with a psychology—whether a person or not—requires exercising psychological competencies supported by *de se* memories and memories with *de se* presumptions. The notion of an agent with a psychology is partly individuated in terms of such exercises. Reciprocally, such competencies and their exercises are partly individuated by reference to relations to their agents. Individuation of *de se* aspects of basic psychological acts and states is not agent-neutral.26

Shoemaker replies,

Much the same could be said on my view, although I would replace “*de se*” with “*de se*”. Mine involves a holism about the individuation of mental states, which includes a reciprocal relation between the individuation of the states and what individuals have them. Burge does not say what is meant by a state’s being “agent neutral”—but what the term suggests is something incompatible with such a holism. (101)

This reply vividly illustrates the basic difficulty with the Shoemaker–Parfit reductionist view. *De se* indexes do not refer to the agent that has the states in whose content the *de se* indexes figure. They index states that realize cross-individual powers that serve either the agent’s own perceptions, needs, and goals or another (perhaps specific) agent’s perceptions, needs, and goals. They are in that sense agent neutral: they are not specific to a given agent, or a given agent’s perceptions, needs, goals, premises. They are not specific to which agent’s needs, goals, and perspective the relevant psychological states function to serve.

26 ‘Memory and Persons’, 322; 439 in this volume.
In Shoemaker’s scenario, *de se* indexes are unspecific at least as between indexing the needs and goals of the pre- or post-fission persons. (Nothing in the notion of *de se* indexes limits the individuals connected by quasi-powers to two.) Being an individual with a mind—hence being a person—requires having *de se* indexes that mark the individual, or at least that individual’s perspective—the individual’s perceptions, needs, goals, and so on. To be individuals with minds, individuals must have capacities indexed to their own perceptions, needs, goals; and they must have preservational capacities that function to serve those needs and goals. These capacities are marked by *de se* indexes that single out the individual or that perspective.27

Shoemaker’s approach does invoke a holism that connects states with unity relations. But the unity relations do not coincide with individual agents that he takes to have representational minds. *De se* unities are individual-neutral in that they allow cross-individual preservation and do not specify connection to individual’s perceptions, needs, and goals. His approach fails to account for the individual pre-fission and post-fission persons that the *de se* powers cut across.28 I think that his approach does not even account for the two-person continuants. Suppose, first, that the continuants are themselves persons, or at any rate some type of individual with a representational mind.29 Then the *de se* aspects of their states do not mark them off as individuals. For their *de se* states mark unspecifically both the continuants and the shorter-lived persons that their existence partially overlaps with. To be persons, or other individuals with representational minds, the continuants must be explained in terms of *de se* states and *de se* preservational capacities that mark their proprietary needs, goals, perspective, and functions.

Suppose, second, that the continuants are not individuals, but are organizations of individuals—organizations that consist in relations between the individual persons that make them up. Then they are not individual minds at all. Perhaps then they need not themselves have *de se* states. But their representational states are, again, to be explained in terms of the states of participant individual minds that have *de se* states and *de se* preservational capacities.

Any kind of individual with a mind is that kind of individual partly because of its natural psychological powers. Among these psychological powers are representational powers. Underlying representational contents of states are the representational psychological powers that

27 In the case of persons, there must be a self-concept that specifically indicates the person-agent him- or herself, not just a privileged set of needs and goals that are the agent’s, as might be the case for *de se* indexes in animals that are not persons. For a discussion of this matter, see the first of my Dewey Lectures, ‘Self and Self-Understanding’, Lecture I: ‘Some Origins of Self’.

28 In fact, I believe that in discussions of *de se* preservational powers, Shoemaker’s writing systematically invites confusion as to whether such powers are unity relations for the shorter-lived persons or the continuants. This point comes out clearly in his invocation of his holism.

29 See note 5.
function to mark off itself and to serve its own needs, goals, and representational perspective. These powers are type-individuated partly by \textit{de se} representational contents. To serve its own needs, goals and representational perspective, an individual must have powers that function to retain its representational take on things over time, so that that take can be \textit{used}. Such preservational powers are also \textit{de se}. The core of pre-conceptual \textit{de se} states and preservational powers in \textit{persons} is systematically related to conceptualizations—representational powers that occur as elements in propositional attitudes and underlie inference. In persons, these conceptualizations include the first-person self concept. Thus, at both pre-conceptual and conceptual representational levels, persons have powers with representational contents that mark underlying functions and powers of persons to distinguish themselves and their needs, goals, and perspectives from those of other individuals. They also have powers to preserve states that make such distinctions in uses that serve those needs, goals, and perspectives. \textit{De se} representation is fundamental to having a psychology.

Shoemaker attempts to individuate persons as individuals in terms of (a) psychological \textit{de se} “unity relations” that are not specific to individual persons, and (b) a non-branching condition. The unity relation must not be specific to an individual, if it is to avoid Butler’s circularity objection. But one cannot capture the individuality of \textit{persons} via the non-branching condition. Persons are individuated in terms of their representational competencies. The concept non-branching marks too generic a point about representational competencies to do the work in grounding psychological explanation that \textit{de se} notions do. \textit{De se} notions mark competencies to fulfill fundamental functions in any individual representational psychology: the functions of marking off one’s needs, goals, and perspectives, in contradistinction to those of others, and the functions of doing things to meet those needs and goals that are connected to one’s perspective. The unity of persons consists partly in representational competencies that unify and distinguish their minds by fulfilling functions to serve specifically the persons’ own needs, goals, and perspective. They are individuals with representational capacities partly because they have \textit{de se} representational competencies that distinguish them and unify them as individuals, privileging their own needs, goals, and perspectives. The concept non-branching is not reflexive. It cannot mark the basic psychological representational competencies that individuals (with representational psychologies) constitutively have to mark off their proprietary needs, goals, and perspectives, from those of others. It cannot anchor spatiotemporal representational frameworks, or, more especially, the \textit{de se} ego-related psychological functions and preservational competencies that are necessarily associated with such anchoring.

The Shoemaker–Parfit approach systematically underestimates the centrality of \textit{de se} representation in marking (constitutively, type-individuating) the unity and privileged status of individuals with representational powers—and for each individual, the privileged status of that individual’s needs, functions, and goals. At the level of explaining the natures of individuals with representational powers,
that approach makes fundamentally the same mistake that Butler thought Locke made: thinking that unity relations can be understood in a way that is independent of the *de se* reflexive representation by individuals whose minds are unified. Psychological unity relations that cut across the identities of individuals with representational minds cannot lie at the heart of individuating such individuals. For such relations presuppose the presence of ordinary psychological kinds that constitutively are internal to an individual’s psychology.