

Belief De Re

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and understand dependence in the sense appropriate to predicates. We find:

Statement	Truth value	Depends on	F	G	FG	$F \vee G$
$Fa \cdot Ga$	true	$F, G, FG$	tr	tr	tr	TW
$Fa \vee Ga$	true	$F, G, FG, F \vee G$	tr	tr	tr!	tr
$Fb \cdot Gb$	false	$F, G, FG$	tr	fs	fs	TW
$Fb \vee Gb$	true	$F$	tr	TW	TW	TW!!
$Fc \cdot Gc$	false	$F, G, FG, F \vee G$	fs	fs	fs	fs!
$Fc \vee Gc$	false	$F, G, F \vee G$	fs	fs	TW	fs

' $Fb \vee Gb$ ' fails to count as true about the extension of ' $F \vee G$ ' because that statement depends on the extension of 'G' no more than (1) depends on Boston. And the idea is that a statement should depend on each of the several classes whose Boolean combination it depends on.<sup>21</sup> ' $Fa \vee Ga$ ' depends on (the extension of)  $FG$ , because any change in predicates that will change truth value will change the intersection by removing  $a$  therefrom. Similarly, ' $Fc \cdot Gc$ ' depends on the union  $F \vee G$ ; for that union lacks  $c$ , and reconstrual of the predicates must put  $c$  in the new union if it is to yield a truth.

The task of mutual adjustment of general principles with intuitions may be even greater for predicates than it was for names.

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### BELIEF DE RE \*

INTEREST in *de re* belief during this half-century was kindled by W. V. Quine, who focused inquiry on the problem of quantification into belief contexts.<sup>1</sup> In some respects this focus was unfortunate in that the difficulties, real and imagined, that arose in interpreting quantification tended to suggest that *de re*

<sup>21</sup>No doubt the result cited about ' $Fb \vee Gb$ ' will seem to some readers to be good reason for questioning the idea that spawned it; but, as the reader may verify, a more suitable "basic requirement for Boolean combinations" is hard to come by.

\* I have benefited from discussion with Philippa Foot on the topic of section II, David Kaplan on section III, and Keith Donnellan on section IV. I am grateful for support from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

<sup>1</sup>"Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes, this JOURNAL, LIII, 5 (March 1, 1956): 177-187; reprinted in his *The Ways of Paradox* (New York: Random House, 1966).

belief needs to be explained in terms of what came to seem the clearer and more basic notion—*de dicto* belief. The imposition of the methods of modal logic on belief sentences abetted the suggestion by embroiling them in disputes over transworld identity. In fact, *de re* belief is in important ways more fundamental than the *de dicto* variety; and this can be seen if one attends to its role in basic cognitive activities. So I shall argue.

I shall not be discussing the interpretation of quantification. Interesting problems do surround the application conditions of *de re* locutions; but a range of clear-cut, core cases of *de re* belief can, I think, be taken for granted. Problems with the less central cases of belief will stay backstage here. Independently of the problems of quantification, certain epistemic viewpoints have led to the assumption that *de dicto* belief is the fundamental notion. I shall indicate in sections III and IV why these viewpoints do not warrant the assumption. A subsidiary goal will be to show (in section IV) how idealizations stemming from Frege, which were designed to explain intensional phenomena, blur epistemic distinctions that are crucial to explicating the conceptual elements in belief. Some of the arguments I rely on will be familiar. My purpose is to advance a viewpoint which as a whole provides a shift of perspective on *de re* attitudes, and on intensional phenomena generally.

## I

Historically, the *de re/de dicto* distinction is more firmly rooted in the logical tradition than in epistemology. The earliest treatments of it all distinguish valid deductions from fallacies. Most of these bear on modality, but some pertain to knowledge. Aristotle's examples were from the beginning subject to misunderstanding and controversy. But, by the middle ages, the grammatical structure relevant to clarifying the examples had been sufficiently articulated to render them beyond reasonable dispute.<sup>2</sup>

As applied to necessity, the grammatical distinction is that between applying the predicate 'is necessary' to a proposition (*dictum*, what is said) and applying a predicate modally—in a qualified way, necessarily—to an entity or entities, typically individuals (*res*). Thus there is a grammatical distinction between

- (1) The proposition that every man who steps on the moon steps on the moon, is necessary.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 30a15-23; *De Interpretatione* 21b26-22a13; *De Sophisticis Elenchis* 166a23-3a; William of Sherwood, *Introduction to Logic*, Norman Kretzmann, trans. and ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), ch. I, secs. 21-27; W. Kneale, "Modality De Dicto and De Re," in E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski, eds., *Logic, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science* (Stanford, Calif.: University Press, 1962), pp. 622-633.

and

- (2) Every man who steps on the moon is such that he necessarily steps on the moon.

The distinction clearly affects truth value [(1) is true; (2), on most interpretations of 'necessarily', is false] and, hence, the soundness of inferences.

In epistemic contexts, the grammatical distinction is between belief in a proposition and belief *of* something that it is such and such. Many examples, here as in necessity contexts, are ambiguous. But some are not. Thus

- (3) Orcutt believes the proposition that someone is a spy.  
 (4) Someone in particular is believed by Orcutt to be a spy.

So illustrated, the *de re/de dicto* distinction should be uncontroversial. Although there has been some doubt about the very meaningfulness of *de re* locutions, such doubt would be more fruitfully applied to certain explanations of their significance. With respect to modality, the relevant explanation holds that some properties of individuals are necessarily (essentially) had by them, whereas others are had accidentally; that the essential properties are not universal or trivial properties; and that necessity thus resides in the way the world is rather than in the way we talk or think about it. In my view (and contrary to a widespread opinion) the issue over the acceptability of this explanation, with its attendant talk of properties and the way the world is, is not settled or even prejudged by noting the grammatical distinction and defending the truth of certain statements of *de re* modality. Our subject here is belief. But here too it is not the meaningfulness of the grammatical distinction, but the explication of it that is philosophically important.

The surface-level grammatical distinction is the traditional one. But Russell's proposal about the structure of propositions shows that the grammatical distinction does not provide a sufficient condition for drawing the intuitive *de re/de dicto* distinction. (It has never been a necessary condition, on account of ambiguities.) Russell held that sentences containing logically proper names expressed propositions whose components *included* the individuals named by those names. Since he introduced this notion of proposition specifically to account for the notion of *de re* knowledge, I think we should agree that a statement that says that this sort of proposition is necessary, or is believed, is not *de dicto*, but *de re*. Less esoterically, we sometimes say "He believes the proposition that this is red." Such sayings are *de re*.

Since Quine's discussion, it has been customary to draw the distinction in terms of a substitutivity criterion. In attributing a *de re* belief about a given object, one is free to substitute any correct description of the relevant object. For example, suppose Alfie believes *de re* that the piano is ugly. Then we could characterize Alfie's attitude by substituting any correct description of the piano—say, 'the 1893 Steinway Grandpa bought for a song'—regardless of whether Alfie could describe the piano in that way. The intuition is that our ascription relates Alfie directly to the piano, without attributing any particular description or conception that Alfie would use to represent it. Quantified cases are analogous. If we say that Alfie believes *de re* something to be ugly, we imply that one existential instantiation is as good as any other that picks out the same entity. By contrast, if we say that Alfie believes *de dicto* (i) that 2 squared is 4, we may refuse to say that Alfie believes (ii) that the only even prime squared is 4. A belief ascription is *de dicto*, on this view, if at every place in the content clause coextensional substitution may fail. Belief *de dicto* essentially involves the believer's conception of the issue at hand, and Alfie may not realize that 2 is the only even prime number. Even if he does, we would say that his believing (i) is one thing, and his believing (ii) another.

The substitutivity criterion has typically been applied to surface-level sentences of natural language. So applied, it does not adequately draw the *de re/de dicto* distinction. The problem is that there are sentences where substitutivity fails at the surface level, but which are nevertheless *de re*. For example, we may say, "Alfred believes that the man in the corner is a spy." We may refuse unlimited substitution of terms denoting the man in the corner on the grounds that Alfred's belief involves thinking of the fellow as the man in the corner and not, say, as the firstborn in Kiev in 1942. Yet we may also be intending in our ascription to relate Alfred *de re* to the man to whom we refer with the expression 'the man in the corner'. In short, the term 'the man in the corner' may be doing double duty at the surface level—both characterizing Alfred's conception and picking out the relevant *res*.<sup>3</sup> It would be ill considered to count this simply a case of *de dicto* belief. [Cf. (6) below.] Even if one wanted to hold that the example is both *de re* and *de dicto*, an interpretation I will urge against in section III, the

<sup>3</sup> The point was first made (though not in this form) by Hector-Neri Castañeda, "Indicators and Quasi-indicators," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, iv, 2 (April 1967): 85–100; see also Brian Loar, "Reference and Propositional Attitudes," *Philosophical Review*, LXXX, 1 (January 1972): 43–62.

criterion by itself does nothing to explain why the example is partly *de re*.

It should be clear by now that an adequate criterion for drawing the *de re/de dicto* distinction must focus on the meaning, or at least the logical form, of the relevant sentences. Unfortunately, since philosophical issues come thick and fast at the level of logical form, any such criterion is bound to be more controversial than the intuitions it is designed to capture. Instead of a proposing a criterion, I shall represent the distinction from a particular semantical and epistemic viewpoint, and then argue that the chief epistemic threat to this viewpoint is impotent. Representations of (3) and (4) (tense ignored) are:

- (3')  $B_d(\text{Ortcutt}, \ulcorner \exists x \text{Spy}(x) \urcorner)$   
 (4')  $(\exists x)(B_r(\text{Ortcutt}, \langle x \rangle, \ulcorner \text{Spy}(y) \urcorner))$

where 'B<sub>d</sub>' and 'B<sub>r</sub>' represent *de dicto* and *de re* belief respectively.<sup>4</sup> Alfred's belief about the man in the corner may be represented as

- (5)  $B_r(\text{Alfred}, \langle \text{the man in the corner} \rangle, \ulcorner \text{Spy}(y) \urcorner)$

or as

- (6)  $B_r(\text{Alfred}, \langle \text{the man in the corner} \rangle, \ulcorner \text{Spy}([\ulcorner y \urcorner](\text{Man}(y) \wedge \text{In C}(y))) \urcorner)$

depending on whether we wish to attribute the notion of a man in the corner to Alfred. (6) is a fairly ordinary reading for cases in which Alfred sees the man. And it is this sort of case that motivated rejection of the surface-level substitutivity criterion for the *de re/de dicto* distinction. Proper names are formally analogous to incomplete definite descriptions (singular descriptions containing an indexical element). For example, 'A believes that Moses had a sister' has readings analogous to (5) and (6):

- (7)  $B_r(A, \langle \text{Moses} \rangle, \ulcorner \exists y \text{Sister}(y, x) \urcorner)$   
 (8)  $B_r(A, \langle \text{Moses} \rangle, \ulcorner \exists y \text{Sister}(y, [\ulcorner x \urcorner] \text{Moses}(x)) \urcorner)$ <sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The corner quotes are to be taken literally. For most purposes, however, those who prefer may regard them as a convenience for denoting the proposition, or component of proposition, expressed by the symbols they enclose. The pointed brackets indicate a sequence in the familiar way. Strictly, 'B<sub>r</sub>' does not by itself represent 'believes of' since we do not intend in (4') to be attributing to Ortcutt a belief of a sequence, but rather of a person. 'B<sub>r</sub>' together with the pointed brackets represent 'believes of'. The case of 'B<sub>r</sub>' is analogous to that of 'satisfies', which does not by itself represent the converse of 'is true of'. I trust that the reader is familiar with the reasons for these niceties. One further point. 'Believes true' and 'believes true of' are, strictly speaking, distinct from 'believes' and 'believes of' in that the former are higher-order.

<sup>5</sup> The square brackets in (6) and (8) serve as scope indicators for the demonstrative. They do not bind the free variables. For details of this sort of formalization, see my "Reference and Proper Names," this JOURNAL, LXX, 14 (Aug. 16,

The key to the *de re/de dicto* distinction, as we are representing it, is explicit in these formulations. 'B<sub>d</sub>' applies to what is expressed by a closed sentence; 'B<sub>r</sub>' applies in part to what is expressed by an open sentence and in part to a *res*.

More generally, *purely de dicto attributions make reference to complete propositions*—entities whose truth or falsity is determined without being relative to an application or interpretation in a particular context. *De re locutions are about predication broadly conceived*. They describe a relation between open sentences (or what they express) and objects.

This way of making the distinction captures the intuitions of both the previous criteria. It catches the grammatical distinction between modifying a completely expressed statement (*dictum*—what is expressed) and modifying a predication. (In Russellian propositions, the relevant *res* are not expressed but shown.) It catches the intuition behind the substitutivity criterion: any term in the argument place appropriate to the relevant *res* which represents a surface expression at all, represents one that is subject to the usual extensional operations; terms in the "content" argument place represent expressions in the surface syntax on which extensional substitutions fail.

The representations given so far suggest perhaps that beliefs involving incomplete definite descriptions or proper names are always *de re*. This is not true. For example, beliefs attributed with 'Pegasus' are sometimes not *de re*. Indexical constructions, and so variables, have both deictic and anaphoric uses. Demonstrative constructions may occur in *de dicto* content clauses if they occur anaphorically as pronouns of laziness. If *A* gullibly believes that Pegasus was a (real) horse, the demonstrative implicit in the name occurs anaphorically, perhaps without *A*'s realizing it, taking as antecedent some description, definite or not, in the repertoire of *A* or someone else. The name thus has the flavor of 'that Pegasus (whichever one they are talking about)'. The relevant belief could be represented as

$$B_d(A, \ulcorner \text{Horse } ([x]\text{Pegasus } (x)) \urcorner)$$

where the antecedent of the pronoun '*x*' must be determined by examining a larger containing discourse. Ordinary proper names as well as vacuous names may be expected to occur in *purely de dicto* belief attributions, and with similar explication. Indexicals like

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1973): 425–439; "Demonstrative Constructions, Reference and Truth," *ibid.* LXXI, 7 (Apr. 18, 1974): 205–223; and "Kaplan, Quine, and Suspended Belief," *Philosophical Studies*, xxxi (1977): 197–203.

'this' are to be treated as analogous to proper names, except that they do not express a predicative element. (Cf. notes 5 and 17.)

The importance of logical form is widely ignored in discussions of the *de re/de dicto* distinction. For example, attempts to reduce *de re* locutions to *de dicto* ones sometimes appeal to proper names in the allegedly *de dicto* analysans, without seriously defending the view that proper names express *dicta* sufficiently complete to individuate their denotations.<sup>6</sup> Several philosophers have held that proper names do not express anything, but merely tag objects. I think this view incorrect.<sup>7</sup> But it is similar to the view I hold in treating proper names as commonly involving indexicals. On both views proper names do not ordinarily express anything sufficiently complete to individuate their denotations. And belief ascriptions containing them will normally be *de re*.

The surface-level grammatical distinction illustrated in (1) (2) and (3) (4) should be innocent of controversy. But our represen-

<sup>6</sup> Alvin Plantinga, "De Dicto et De Re" *Noûs*, III, 3 (September 1969): 235–258. Examples similar to the one from Plantinga occur in the discussion in Quine, *op. cit.*, and Kaplan, "Quantifying In," in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, eds., *Words and Objections* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969). For discussion of these examples, see sec. III below and my "Kaplan, Quine, and Suspension of Belief," *op. cit.*, secs. II/III.

<sup>7</sup> For the "tag" view, see Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," in R. C. Marsh, ed., *Logic and Knowledge* (New York: Capricorn, 1971), pp. 245/6; John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, Book I, Ch. II, No. 5; Keith Donnellan, "Speaking of Nothing," *Philosophical Review*, LXXXIII, 1 (January 1974): 3–31, esp. pp. 11/2; Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" in Davidson and Harman, eds., *Semantics for Natural Language* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), e.g., p. 322. At least two difficulties beset this sort of view. One is Frege's paradox of identity, which I discuss in section IV. As is fairly widely known, this problem seriously undermines the claim made by Russell at one time and articulated by Donnellan: that ordinary proper names make no other contribution to a proposition (what is said or believed) than to import their denotation into it. (Cf. note 17 below.) Russell later restricted his view to "names" of sense data because of this kind of problem. The remarks by Mill and Kripke seem to be similarly affected; but, since they are vague, it is less clear that this is so. Other "tag" views less radical than Russell's are imaginable. One assimilates proper names to demonstratives—claiming that neither "expresses" anything, but that contextually different uses of names (or demonstratives) which refer to a given entity may succeed, in some yet to be specified way, in producing different belief contents. I shall espouse a variant of this view in section IV, although I oppose full assimilation of proper names to demonstratives.

The second basic problem for the "tag" view is that proper names function as predicates, as is indicated by the fact that 'Aristotle is an Aristotle' is a logical truth, modulo an existence assumption. Cf. my "Reference and Proper Names," *op. cit.* There are, of course, various senses of proper names as predicates—metaphorical uses, aliases, nicknames, "blood names" (as when Greenberg is a Rothschild because he is descended in the right way) and demonstrative senses (as when we say "Teddy is a Kennedy" and mean "Teddy is one of those, contextually delimited, Kennedys"). Mixing these senses to get falsehoods does not suffice to show that proper names are not predicates.



tation of its logical form in (3') (4') will be regarded by some as more noxious. There are two viewpoints—one semantic, one epistemic—from which the representations are controversial. The first is the view characteristic of modal and doxastic logics that modal statements or epistemic statements have the logical form of attaching an operator to a sentence, open or closed, rather than that of attaching a predicate to a term denoting a proposition, or component of a proposition. The predicate view is that in terms of which *de re* and *de dicto* were traditionally distinguished. Partly for that reason, the distinction is most naturally explicated from that viewpoint. Although the distinction could be discussed in terms of the operator approach, the discussion would be more complicated, since the analogies between the operator approach and the traditional view are not well established or agreed upon.

The epistemic viewpoint from which (3') and (4') may be disputed as representations of the grammatical distinction bears on the relative priority of *de re* and *de dicto* locutions. It has been held that all *de re* locutions may be defined or adequately represented in terms of *de dicto* locutions. I shall be criticizing this view in section III. I tentatively believe that (3) is ultimately best represented in terms of 'B<sub>r</sub>' as a variant on (4').<sup>8</sup> But I suspect that the differences between this representation and the present one are not conceptually deep.

I have expressed the intuitive *de re/de dicto* distinction in terms of the logical form of ascriptions of belief. Before concluding this section, I want to say a word about the intuitive epistemic basis for the distinction. The rough epistemic analogue of the linguistic notion of what is expressed by a semantically significant expression is the notion of a concept. Traditionally speaking, concepts are a person's means of representing objects in thought. For present purposes we may include as concepts other alleged mental entities that the empiricist tradition did not clearly distinguish from them—for example, perceptions or images—so long as these are viewed as types of representations of objects. From a semantical viewpoint, a *de dicto* belief is a belief in which the believer is related only to a completely expressed proposition (*dictum*). *The epistemic analogue is a belief that is fully conceptualized.* That is, a correct ascription of

<sup>8</sup> The first to propose the semantical viewpoint we favor was John Wallace, "Belief and Satisfaction," *Noûs*, vi, 2 (May 1972): 85–95; cf. also Marc Temin, "The Relational Sense of Indirect Discourse," this JOURNAL, LXXII, 11 (June 5, 1975): 287–306. Stephen Schiffer pointed out that someone who held that *de dicto* locutions are basic could accept representations (3') and (4'), if he (unlike me) regarded them as a step toward a further analysis.

the *de dicto* belief identifies it purely by reference to a “content” all of whose semantically relevant components characterize elements in the believer’s conceptual repertoire.

The analogy between this epistemic characterization of *de dicto* belief and our characterization in terms of logical form is *prima facie* threatened by certain (possibly deviant) ascriptions of belief. If Alfie says, “The most powerful man on earth in 1970 (whoever he is) is a crook,” not having the slightest idea who the most powerful man is, a friend of the potentate may say to him, “Alfie believes that you are a crook.” The example, if accepted, may seem to present a case in which the belief ascription related Alfie to both an open sentence and the potentate—thus fulfilling the semantical characterization of *de re* belief—even though Alfie’s epistemic state depends completely on concepts in his repertoire—thus fulfilling the epistemic characterization of *de dicto* belief. The way to treat such examples is to take the demonstrative pronoun ‘you’ as not purely deictic. It is at least partly anaphoric, acting as a pronoun of laziness for the description ‘the most powerful man on earth’. The logical form of the discourse should reflect this, so that the ascription will ultimately relate Alfie to a closed sentence. Similar remarks apply to cases of “exportation” of definite descriptions like ‘the shortest spy’ based purely on the premise that the description denotes. Counting such cases *de re* because of referential occurrence of the surface-level terms ‘you’ or ‘the shortest spy’ would mark no epistemically interesting distinction. There is no ascription of a peculiarly *de re* (*en rapport*) attitude. At most, there is a *de re* ascription of a *de dicto* attitude.

What is the appropriate epistemic characterization of *de re* belief? I think one should explicate the notion simply in terms of *the negation of our epistemic characterization of de dicto belief*. But in deference to an issue that will dominate section III, the notion may be explicated more positively, if more vaguely: A *de re* belief is a belief whose correct ascription places the believer in an appropriate nonconceptual, contextual relation to objects the belief is about. The term ‘non-conceptual’ does not imply that no concepts or other mental notions enter into a full statement of the relation. Indeed, the relation may well hold between the object and concepts, or their acquisition or use. The crucial point is that the relation not be merely that of the concepts’ being concepts *of* the object—concepts that denote or apply to it. For example, although concepts may inevitably enter into the acquisition of a perceptual belief, the believer’s relation to the relevant object is not merely that he

conceives of it or otherwise represents it. His sense organs are affected by it. Perceptual contact is, of course, not present in every *de re* belief. But it illustrates the sort of element independent of semantical or conceptual application that is essential to the notion.

## II

A sufficient condition for a belief context to be *de re* (on the vague, "neutral" epistemic construal, as well as on our favored semantical and epistemic construals) is for it to contain an indexical expression used deictically. The first sentences that children actually use or understand are invariably keyed to their immediate, perceptually accessible surroundings.<sup>9</sup> Attitudes that accompany such assertions are clearly *de re*. These developmental matters are closely related to the question of conditions for attributing language use and understanding. I shall argue that if an entity lacks *de re* attitudes, we would not attribute to it the use or understanding of language, or indeed propositional attitudes at all.

It is hard to imagine how one could learn a language without being exposed to sentences whose truth value changed over relatively short periods of time. If the truth value of certain sentences were not keyed to salient and changeable aspects of the immediate environment, the neophyte would have no means of catching on to the meaning of the sounds he hears—no means of correlating those sounds with an independently identifiable parameter. Attitudes acquired in the process of understanding such sounds are *de re*. Still, whereas we ourselves come to understand language only by understanding indexical sentences, it might be thought that some organism or robot could be programmed to understand an indexical-free language, without our attributing any *de re* attitudes to it. The thought is, I think, mistaken.

It would be widely agreed that current machines that are programmed with indexical-free (mathematical) language do not autonomously use or understand language. What is missing? A major part of what is missing is evidence that the manipulation of symbols is anything more than a mechanical, purely syntactical exercise for the machine. That is, such machines do nothing to indicate that the symbols have any semantical, extralinguistic significance. To indicate this, they should be able, at least sometimes, to recognize and initiate correlations between symbols and what they symbolize. Such correlations may involve nonlinguistic practical activity (finding a ball when someone says he/she wants

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Roger Brown, *A First Language: The Early Stages* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1973), e.g., pp. 220ff; also Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), pp. 26–39.

a ball) or linguistic activity appropriate to one's perceptions (saying, 'There's a ball' when one sees one) or some combination. Similarly, if the subject is to be credited with having propositional thoughts, he must indicate some ability to correlate his thoughts with objects those thoughts are thoughts of. Failing evidence of the ability to recognize such correlations, there is no adequate ground for attributing understanding of sentences or propositional attitudes. But any propositional attitudes that accompany such recognition will be *de re*. So attributing an understanding of sentences, or propositional attitudes at all, requires attributing *de re* attitudes.<sup>10</sup>

This argument does not commit one to the view that one must compare a symbol with an entity and come to believe that the symbol applies to the entity. Such a model is implausible for the general case. The recognition should be regarded as a skill rather than a conclusion about the symbol. Further, recognition of a correlation between symbol and entity need not be thought of as a *means* of learning symbols. It needs only be regarded as part of what is entailed by understanding and using symbols. The argument does not in itself commit one to the view that all language users must understand some language that contains indexical elements. What the argument requires is that a language user be able to understand referential use (as opposed to attributive use) of his singular terms—to realize what entities some of them apply to—or that he be able to apply some of his predicates to objects or events that he experiences. Thus the argument places requirements on an individual's abilities, not necessarily on the meaning of the sentences he uses.

The argument that having propositional attitudes requires having *de re* attitudes has as corollary the conclusion that having justified empirical beliefs, hence having empirical knowledge, requires having *de re* beliefs—since having justified belief presupposes propositional attitudes. The same conclusion may be reached by a simple variation on the original argument. Justification of empirical beliefs

<sup>10</sup> I sense a kindred doctrine in Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason* A51 = B75 and A126. Jonathan Bennett, in *Kant's Analytic* (New York: Cambridge, 1966), p. 146, criticizes Kant for suggesting that one could have a concept and utilize it in general judgments without being able to apply it under sensorily favorable circumstances. (Cf. A133 = B172.) But Bennett's stricture is far too narrow. I might be able to explain the difference between two kinds of molecule without being able to distinguish them in any sensory (laboratory) conditions; I do not therefore lack the concept of the relevant kinds. The more plausible view is that if we could not apply some concepts under sensorily favorable circumstances, we would have no concepts. Oddly, Frege criticizes Kant for holding the very view Bennett defends. Cf. *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, J. F. Austin, ed. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern UP, 1968), p. 101. Perhaps Kant's view is not fully clear.

by way of test or evidence depends on having perceptual experiences. But beliefs, “perceptual beliefs,” directly resulting from such experiences are *de re*.

Consider our purely *de dicto* empirical beliefs, where all such beliefs in singular form are nonindexical and where the definite descriptions can be used attributively, but not referentially (and thus are not accompanied by *de re* beliefs). Taken by themselves, these beliefs are clearly lacking in evidential support. The attributively intended singular beliefs have the force of ‘the *F*, whatever object that is, is *G*’. Justification for the belief that there is an *F* or that it is *G* requires some more specific identification. For example, we need to find the *F*, or else experience circumstances that give ground for believing there is an *F*. Many of our *de dicto* beliefs are justified because they are based on authoritative hearsay from others. But then, at a minimum, the “others” must have some *de re* belief in order to ground their authority on the subject. What is more, it is plausible that we must have *de re* beliefs about the person or other source from which we get our information, in order to certify that source as authoritative (or as being in touch with an authoritative source). Intuitively, nonsingular, or general, *de dicto* beliefs are in need of *de re* support in the same way that attributive, nonindexical singular beliefs are.<sup>11</sup>

I claimed at the outset that *de re* belief is in important ways more fundamental than *de dicto* belief. So far, I have argued that having *de re* attitudes is a necessary condition for using and understanding language—in fact for any propositional understanding—and for acquiring empirical knowledge. It remains to argue that having *de dicto* attitudes is not equally necessary to these ends. The most straightforward support for this conclusion is intuitive. To be purely *de dicto* an attitude must be appropriately expressed at bottom by a closed sentence, free of any indexical element. But it does not seem difficult to imagine language users with empirical knowledge whose every attitude contains some such element. One might think that to use a language, one must have general beliefs, counterfactual beliefs, or arithmetical beliefs. But such requirements are compatible with the absence of *de dicto* beliefs. All the relevant generalizations or counterfactuals might be tensed, or restricted by

<sup>11</sup> This last argument has a Russellian, as well as a Kantian flavor. Cf. Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” *op. cit.*; *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), pp. 65ff. (first published 1914). Russell, however, thought that *all* singular beliefs are *de re*—on account of his theory of descriptions. This view I do not hold. I am also uncommitted to Russell’s foundationalism.

some other indexical element; all the arithmetical beliefs might be applied. Similarly, for other “conceptual necessities.” These remarks are, of course, only intuitive. But they do suggest that having *de dicto* beliefs is not essential to understanding or to empirical knowledge. I shall now discuss the chief threat to this conclusion.

### III

The most direct counter to our claims that *de re* beliefs are in certain respects more fundamental than *de dicto* beliefs would be to accept the gist of the arguments given in the previous section, but claim that *de re* beliefs are a mere species of *de dicto*. This claim would be congenial to much that was dear to the British empiricists. It seems to be implicit in views that Frege held. And it has been recently defended by Kaplan, who in fact tried to define *de re* beliefs in terms of *de dicto* ones.<sup>12</sup>

Kaplan represented such sentences as ‘Alfred believes of the piano that it is ugly’ as follows:

$$(\exists \alpha)(R(\alpha, \text{the piano, Alfie}) \wedge \text{Bel}(\text{Alfie}, \ulcorner \alpha \text{ is ugly} \urcorner))$$

As a first approximation ‘ $\alpha$ ’ ranges over names or singular terms. ‘R’ means “represents”.  $\alpha$  represents the piano for Alfie if and only if  $\alpha$  denotes the piano,  $\alpha$  is vivid for Alfie (“plays a significant role in Alfie’s ‘inner story’”), and  $\alpha$  if of the piano in the sense that the piano is a crucial factor in Alfie’s acquisition of  $\alpha$ . The expressions with corners may be thought of as denoting symbols, although it is clear that Kaplan really intends them to denote Fregean senses.  $\alpha$ , though a “name”, need not be linguistic in any ordinary sense.  $\alpha$  may be a “conglomeration of images, names, and partial descriptions”, “suitably arranged and regimented”.  $\alpha$  may not, and often will not, appear in any sentence that ascribes a *de re* belief: it is enough if there be some such  $\alpha$  in the believer’s repertoire.

The crucial assumption in Kaplan’s analysis that I think mistaken is the view that belief ascriptions containing demonstratives ascribe thought symbols that *denote* the objects demonstrated in the ascription. (I think neither “vividness” nor “ofness” is a necessary condition for *de re* belief, but will not discuss these issues.) Kaplan takes belief contents to be sentence types or abstract meanings. In requiring that the representing name-type denote an object, one

<sup>12</sup> The position is abetted by, but does not depend on, two Lockean views: representational realism, according to which we see physical objects only indirectly by way of sense data; and the view that images, sense data, and the like are certain sorts of concepts (“concrete” ones) eligible for being expressed by a proposition. I shall not be discussing these views. Frege’s position will dominate section IV. Kaplan’s is set out in “Quantifying In,” *op. cit.* It is doubtful that he still holds the view.

requires that the name itself (given its meaning) individuate the object in a context-independent manner. Of course, it is possible that Kaplan did not specifically intend for his term 'denote' to be taken so strictly. One might say that his 'denotes' was tacitly relativized to a context. But this move would amount to foregoing the attempt to reduce *de re* belief to *de dicto* belief. For, insofar as the thought symbol denotes the relevant object only relative to a context, the content of the believer's attitude does not depend purely on what is expressed (*dictum*) by his symbols, or on the nature of his concepts. Rather the content must be partly shown. But under these circumstances the belief is not purely *de dicto* (purely "of" something expressed).

One may, of course, choose to use '*de dicto*' in such a way as to count sentences like (6) and (8), and the examples we give below, *de dicto*. If one did so on the ground that in every case of *de re* belief the believer has *some* means (no matter how sketchy) of representing the relevant *res*, then one would virtually trivialize the reducibility thesis. This trivialization constitutes an objection to the suggested use of '*de dicto*'. Traditionally, it has been assumed that *de re* beliefs are not *de dicto*; the two notions were explained so as to make it appear that their applications are disjoint. But under this liberalized usage, one cannot explain what a *de dicto* belief is without rendering it *obvious* that all or many *de re* beliefs are *de dicto*. All beliefs are *partly* characterizable in terms of the believer's concepts, notions, or *dicta*. To be distinctively *de dicto* a belief should be characterized purely in such terms. Beliefs like those attributed in (6) and (8) are not so characterized or even, sometimes, so characterizable.

Similar objections apply to calling sentences like (6) and (8) *de dicto* as well as *de re* on the following rather mixed criterion: *de dicto* belief ascriptions are those for which surface substitutions fail; *de re* belief ascriptions are those where the believer is taken to be *en rapport* with the relevant *res*. Such a criterion renders it obvious that the categories have considerable overlap, and fails to justify the presumption that indexically infected ascriptions are purely "of" *dicta*.

To maintain then that Kaplan's theory reduces *de re* belief to *de dicto* belief in an interesting sense, one must use 'denote' strictly. But if one uses 'denote' strictly, it is implausible that in all cases of *de re* belief, one of the believer's beliefs contains a thought symbol or individual concept that denotes the *res*. On seeing a man coming from a distance in a swirling fog, we may plausibly be said to believe

of him that he is wearing a red cap. But we do not see the man well enough to describe or image him in such a way as to individuate him fully. Of course, we could individuate him ostensibly with the help of the descriptions that we can apply. But there is no reason to believe that we can always describe or conceptualize the entities or spatiotemporal positions that we rely on in our demonstration. Or consider someone who sincerely says, "I believe of the present moment that it is in the twentieth century," or "It hasn't been this cold in ten years." We cannot assume that the person will always be able to individuate the time or the degree of cold either in some canonical manner or via purely descriptive notions. Even perception under optimal conditions is subject to the point. The perceived object (say, a book) may not be inspected in sufficient detail to distinguish it from all other objects except by reference to spatiotemporal position. And this, as before, will often not be individuable by the perceiver except by context-dependent, nonconceptual methods. Moreover, though it remains true that one believes of the book that it was, say, rust, one's memory of the details of the particular book's appearance fades.<sup>13</sup>

These considerations indicate that there will often be no term or individual concept in the believer's set of beliefs about the relevant object which *denotes* that object. This is not to deny that the believer always has some mental or semantical instrument for picking out the object—a set of concepts, a perceptual image, a demonstrative. But whatever means the believer has often depends for its success partly but irreducibly on factors unique to the context of the encounter with the object, and not part of the mental or linguistic repertoire of the believer.

One might wish to give a Kaplan-type analysis in terms of mental-tokens (e.g., particular sense data) rather than mental-entity types. But this move does not circumvent the point of the preceding paragraphs. For features of the mental entity itself (or *dicta* associated with it) are not always sufficient to pick out the relevant object. Some contextual, not purely conceptual relation between mental entity and represented object must still be relied upon to charac-

<sup>13</sup> This general style of argument is first explicit in Wittgenstein, whose *Investigations* it permeates. Cf., e.g., 689. The argument is also highlighted in P. F. Strawson, *Individuals* (Garden City, N.J.: Anchor, 1963), pp. 6–9 (originally published, 1959). Cf. also Donnellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions" in *Semantics for Natural Language*, *op. cit.*; and Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," *op. cit.* Kaplan's requirement that a *de re* belief involve a vivid name—a "conglomeration of images, names and partial descriptions" that gives the relevant *res* a major role in the believer's "inner story"—may have served as a hedge against these considerations and an implicit defense of the strict use of 'denotes'. Intuitively, the considerations once considered count against the requirement.



terize the attitude. Further, such an analysis has the counter-intuitive consequence that it is in principle impossible for different people to have the same *de re* belief.

In the face of the epistemic argument against defining *de re* belief in terms of *de dicto* belief, there are those in the Frege-Carnap tradition who fix the blame on language. True, they say, we cannot express our complete concept of the present moment or the degree of cold or the approaching man in any ordinary terms; but we *have* such a concept nevertheless. Sometimes these alleged concepts or meanings are titled “nondescriptive.” They are allegedly what we would express if we arbitrarily introduced a name for the relevant *res*. The appeal to incommunicable concepts or meanings here seems to me implausible and obscurantist. There is no intuitive substance to the claim that such names express complete concepts. And there is no likelihood that different believers would “grasp” the same concept expressed by them. Factors which determine the objects about which the believer holds his beliefs but which are not publicly statable (either “in principle” or because they are not practically available to either believer or reporter) are appropriately counted nonconceptual—indeed, in most cases, noncognitive. The view that *de re* belief is semantically independent of *de dicto* belief has the fundamental advantage of avoiding unnecessary appeal to the incommunicable.

The considerations that show that *de re* belief sentences are not definable in terms of *de dicto* sentences are equally potent against the view that for every *de re* belief there is an accompanying *de dicto* belief that fully individuates the object the *de re* belief is about. Thus the conceptual priority of *de re* belief seems vindicated.

Two sorts of consideration might lure one into a position like that which I have been criticizing. One arises from reflecting intuitively on our own cognitive attitudes when, on the basis of a present perceptual experience, we assert sentences like ‘That is a piano’ or ‘That piano is ugly’. It is clear that our perception or conception of the piano is in a sense far richer than the meaning expressed by the words ‘That piano’. We view a particular piano of a certain size, shape, and hue, with its idiosyncratic ornaments, scuffs, and scratches. It is easy to conclude that the proposition we believe is conceptually far “richer” than our words themselves suggest. The “richness” intuition can be accounted for by noting that we acquire whole sets of beliefs as the result of perceptual experience—all about the relevant object.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Cf. George Pitcher, *A Theory of Perception* (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1971), pp. 71ff.

## IV

The second consideration backing the view that *de re* is a species of *de dicto* is Frege's theory of sense and reference. I shall assume that *de re* beliefs include beliefs about public objects, such as physical things. Now the relevant Fregean viewpoint is as follows. (1) All thought or belief about public objects is from a conceptual perspective—we always think about them from one of a variety of possible standpoints or in one of a variety of possible ways. (2) When we think about particular public objects, this conceptual perspective determines which object we are thinking about. Our initial assumption together with these two plausible principles may seem to assure that *de re* beliefs about public objects will be *de dicto*.<sup>15</sup> The assurance is cancelled by the kind of argument given in section III. The problem arises with the claim in (2) that the perspective that determines the relevant object is (completely) conceptual. The Fregean viewpoint, however, is worth further discussion, because it bears on the role of *dicta* in *de re* belief.

The first principle is reasonable. Knowledge about public objects is indeed perspectival. Even in direct perception we see physical objects from one side at a time; and so it is in principle possible to fail to realize that an object, when viewed from one perspective is the same object as was just seen from another perspective. Moreover, it is plausible in some loose sense that perceptual beliefs represent the perceived object by means of concepts.

Principle (1) is at the bottom of Frege's basic argument for the postulation of senses—the “paradox” of identity. The “paradox” of identity says that, whereas a statement of the form  $\ulcorner a = a \urcorner$  is uninformative, a statement of the form  $\ulcorner a = b \urcorner$  may be of considerable empirical significance; but ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ are singular terms that refer to the same object; so the difference in the statements must go beyond what is referred to in them. The difference is in the mode with which the denoted object is presented to a thinker by the singular terms ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’. And Frege counted this difference a difference in sense. The paradox of identity is closely related to the failure of substitution of coextensive terms in belief contexts. For the point that  $\ulcorner a = b \urcorner$  may be informative where  $\ulcorner a = a \urcorner$  is not is in effect the point that one may fail to believe that  $a = b$  while believing that  $a = a$ . There is, I think, no denying either of these

<sup>15</sup> The first principle is explicit in Frege's “On Sense and Reference,” in P. Geach and M. Black, eds., *Translations of the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1966), pp. 57/8. Frege suggests that sense is conceptual in character when he says, “The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language” and when he identifies senses with thoughts. The second principle is explicit on p. 58 of the same essay.

points. The counterclaim that, where 'a' and 'b' are proper names, a belief that  $a = b$  is really the same as a belief that  $a = a$  (so one believes both or neither) seems to me completely implausible. I shall therefore ignore it.

Propositions are traditionally postulated as the sort of thing that is believed. And Frege's argument refutes any theory that takes singular propositions about public objects of the form  $Fa$ , where 'a' is a proper name, to consist *simply* of  $a$  and the attribute expressed or denoted by 'F'. (Cf. note 6 above.) But Frege's arguments apply to demonstratives as well as to definite descriptions and proper names.<sup>16</sup> We would find boring a claim of the form "this = this", where 'this' is twice used to refer to some object under the same circumstances (cf. 'this is self-identical'). But we might be surprised by a claim of the form "this = this", where the first 'this' is used with a nod toward a picture of the Hope diamond, and the second with a gesture to a dirty stone. A similar point holds for proper names. If Alfie knows someone in two different walks of life by 'Bertie', but thinks he knows two Berties, he will be interested if we tell him that Bertie (pointing to the person, or picture of him, in one guise) is identical with Bertie (indicating him in another). Obviously, we can embed these statements in belief sentences and attribute informative and uninformative belief contents by varying the context of use and our intentions as reporters.

For reasons of the sort given in section III, these considerations should not lead us to postulate complete concepts (or senses) which are expressed by the different tokens of 'this' or 'Bertie' and which completely individuate the relevant referent in different ways. But the considerations do show that, in giving formal representations to these statements, we should distinguish the informative from the uninformative cases. So we should distinguish the two explicit occurrences of 'this' in the informative version of 'this = this', and the two implicit occurrences of a demonstrative in the informative version of 'Bertie = Bertie'. The formal representations of the two occurrences of 'this' in the informative versions will mark different contexts of use, without specifically expressing any particular concepts or *dicta* associated with those uses.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> This point is due to David Kaplan.

<sup>17</sup> The representations are:  $x_1 = x_2$  and  $[x_1]\text{Cicero}(x_1) = [x_2]\text{Cicero}(x_2)$ , where the variables are specially subscripted to represent indexical constructions. The latter sentence may be parsed by the hybrid, 'That<sub>1</sub> Cicero = That<sub>2</sub> Cicero'. Cf. the works cited in note 5. The considerations in the text count against any attempt to solve Frege's paradox of identity by simply citing the difference in surface terms (or tags) that are used. Russell tried this in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," *op. cit.*, pp. 245/6. Appeal to different term tokens also will not work, since the uninformative identities also have different term tokens flanking the identity sign.

The notion of sense fills three functions in Frege's theory. One (*sense*<sub>1</sub>) is that of representing the mode of presentation to the thinker which is associated with an expression and of accounting for information value. A second (*sense*<sub>2</sub>) is that of determining the referent or denotation associated with the expression: for singular terms, senses serve as "routes" to singling out the unique object, if any, denoted by the term. The third function (*sense*<sub>3</sub>) is that of providing entities to be denoted in oblique contexts.<sup>18</sup>

Kripke criticizes Frege for not distinguishing between two senses of 'sense': meaning and means of fixing the referent. This criticism is *prima facie* related to the distinction between the first two functions of 'sense'. But Kripke's distinction is not really appropriate to any aspect of Frege's notion of sense. Kripke gives three examples of "fixing the referent." The first is that of saying that one meter is the length of stick *S* at time *t*, where *S* is the standard meter bar. The second is that of introducing the name 'Hesperus' as applying to the planet in yonder position in the sky. The third is the statement that  $\pi$  is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter (277 ff).

In the first and third cases, Frege would not allow that the respective definite descriptions gave the sense of 'one meter' and ' $\pi$ ' in *any* sense of 'sense'. For Frege the fundamental test for determining whether senses differ was the informativeness of the relevant identity statement.<sup>19</sup> *But both of these identity statements are informative.* One might reply that they are uninformative *for the introducer*. But Frege did not intend the sense of such expressions as 'meter' or ' $\pi$ ' to vary from person to person. The respective senses of these expressions as used by their introducers are not different from those of the same expressions for others. So the notion of informativeness that is relevant to Frege's test is more "public" than this reply would require. As applied to the examples of 'meter' and ' $\pi$ ',

<sup>18</sup> The three functions emerge in succession in "On Sense and Reference," *op. cit.*, pp. 57/8, 58, 58/9, respectively. On the second function, see also the telescope analogy, p. 60. In connection with the first function, Frege remarks that senses are "grasped" by everyone who understands an expression as it is used in a language. It is not clear how Frege intended to apply this remark to demonstrative constructions, but elsewhere he clearly holds that the sense, mode of presentation, of such constructions varies from thinker to thinker and context to context. (Cf. note 20 below.) Frege's remark has led to the identification of mode of presentation and linguistic meaning. But this identification is not forced by the passage; and in light of Frege's views on demonstrative constructions, the identification is unquestionably mistaken, as I argue below.

<sup>19</sup> Frege believed that the modes of presentation of expressions differed if and only if the relevant individuating features differed. Kripke and I would agree that this biconditional is false. My point is that for Frege the left-right direction is the basic, criterial one for individuating senses.

Kripke's notion of fixing the referent is pragmatic, having little to do with Frege's second function of sense.

The second example is different. Frege did assume that the sense of ordinary proper names varied from person to person. In the context of the introduction, it seems perhaps that the relevant identity is trivial and that the senses of the name 'Hesperus' and the introducing description, on Frege's view, would be the same. The basic weakness of Kripke's criticism of Frege here (and it emerges in the other cases as well) is his widely shared assumption that Fregean sense, in at least the first of its functions, corresponds to the modern notion of linguistic meaning (cf. note 18). The assumption is implausible. In deference to the first function of sense, Frege clearly thought that the sense of a demonstrative like 'this' or 'I', an indexical construction like present tense, or a proper name like 'Aristotle' (even as applied to the philosopher) varied from person to person and context to context. But linguists and philosophers (correctly, I think) regard demonstrative constructions, including proper names, as having a constant meaning, though varying referents. I think it at best rather wooden to regard Frege as simply wrong about this. It is more appropriate to see him as employing a notion close to but distinct from the notion of meaning. Frege was less concerned with linguistic meaning than with how people acquire and pass on knowledge by using language.<sup>20</sup> Thus even though the meaning of 'Hesperus' (if any) and that of the reference-fixing description differs, it remains open whether they differ in sense for the introducer. Nothing Kripke says decides this question.

There is, however, a good objection to Frege's assumption that the first and second functions of the notion of sense coincide—the objection cited in section III.<sup>21</sup> A complete account of the mode in

<sup>20</sup> For the remarks on the variations of sense associated with indexical expressions, see Frege, "The Thought" in E. D. Klemke, ed., *Essays on Frege* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1968), pp. 517–519, 533. Frege repeatedly disavows concern with language, most notoriously in "On Concept and Object" in *Translations*, *op. cit.*, p. 54. And he emphasizes that his primary concern is with knowledge and thought. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 46n, 59, and in "The Thought" *passim*, esp. 534. In this connection, the translation of 'Gedanke' as "Thought" seems more appropriate than as "Proposition."

I am not sure whether Frege would regard the sense of 'Hesperus' for the introducer at the time of the introduction as the same as that of the description. On the one hand, there will be a *feeling* of uninformative-ness in the relevant identity statement. On the other hand, the introducer has means of identifying the planet which are independent of the description (its visual characteristics).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. note 13. The argument from incompleteness of information should be distinguished from the argument (given by numerous people—Wittgenstein, Searle, Donnellan, Kripke) based on the observation that singular sentences whose subject term is a proper name or a demonstrative and whose predicate is

which an object is presented to us—the effect that it has on our cognitive representations or on our store of information—may be insufficient to determine that one object rather than another is the subject of our beliefs or statements. (Appeal to a community of thinkers here clearly does not change matters.) The individuation of the relevant object depends not only on information the thinker has about it but on his nonconceptual contextual relations to it. These wider relations are necessary to characterize the second function of sense, but they go beyond what the thinker “grasps” in thought.

It is time now to consider the third function of Frege’s notion of sense—that of providing an object of reference for expressions in oblique contexts. Motivating this use of ‘sense’ was a powerful theory of language according to which the truth value of any sentence is a function of the denotations of its parts. Here is not the place to defend the principle.<sup>22</sup> I shall simply assume it. It is easy to show that, given this principle, the denotation of expressions in oblique contexts cannot be the denotation they have in transparent contexts. The question then arises whether the oblique denotation (*sense*<sub>3</sub>) should be identified with the mode of presentation (*sense*<sub>1</sub>) or the mode of designation (*sense*<sub>2</sub>), if either.

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an ordinary descriptive expression, are not logical truths. This argument shows that demonstratives and names do not have the same linguistic meaning that definite descriptions have. Its bearing on the notion of sense is more complicated and cannot be discussed here. The “incompleteness” argument should also be distinguished from an unsound argument that proper names and demonstratives lack sense, or linguistic meaning, because they are rigid designators, designating the same object, if any, in all possible circumstances. Cf. Kripke, *op. cit.*, e.g., pp. 276–277. Suppose that proper names were always rigid. The point that they are rigid shows at most that, in necessity contexts, they always have transparent referential position (or from the viewpoint of modal logic, truth conditions analogous to those for definite descriptions with wide scope). But the failures of substitution in belief contexts, show that proper names do not always have transparent reference. And this leaves open the possibility that they have sense (*sense*<sub>1</sub> as well as *sense*<sub>3</sub>). Moreover, the paradox of identity requires that to give an adequate theory of linguistic understanding, one say *something* about mode of presentation (*sense*<sub>1</sub>) beyond mentioning the name’s referent. The rigid designator argument (in contrast to the other arguments) has just as little bearing on meaning as it does on sense. Necessity contexts do not have a definitive position in arguments about either meaning or sense. It is worth noting that the rigid designator argument does not even show that proper names do not have the sense (or even the meaning) of definite descriptions. For a Fregean could reply that the points Kripke cites show only that when the sense of a definite description is expressed by a proper name in a necessity context, the name has its customary reference. It is not hard to think up reasons on behalf of the Fregean as to why this might be the case. But since our subject here is not necessity, I shall not pursue the matter.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” *op. cit.* p. 59ff. Also Kaplan, *op. cit.*, secs. III/IV.

When *A* says, "Aristotle was a philosopher" or "Sam is a violist," and *B* says the same, we sometimes want to remark in indirect discourse that they stated, and believed, the same thing. [Let us assume that the proper names do not have purely transparent position. The attributed statements or beliefs may be either *de dicto* or *de re à la* (8).] If in reporting their respective statements, we are making reference to sense<sub>2</sub>, the mode of designation, we cannot reasonably say that *A* and *B* made the same statement. For the way in which the term 'Aristotle' as uttered by *A* (*B*) picks out the Stagyrte, rather than some other Aristotle, depends on elements in the context of *A*'s (*B*'s) utterance. But since the contexts differ, the modes of designation (senses<sub>2</sub>) differ. So in reporting *A*'s statement or belief as being the same as *B*'s (and making reference to sense<sub>3</sub>), we cannot be making reference to sense<sub>2</sub>.

No such simple argument shows that sense<sub>3</sub> should not be identified with sense<sub>1</sub>. Much depends on precisely how the sense<sub>1</sub> of a name is construed. I think we should ignore suggestions to take the contextual (often "causal") relation between believer and named object as sense<sub>1</sub>. In effect these suggestions amount to reidentifying sense<sub>1</sub> and sense<sub>2</sub>. The suggestions are implausible simply because the relevant relation is ordinarily not part of the cognitive world of the believer, so it cannot provide an account of the information value associated with names. I think it is also clear, for reasons mentioned earlier, that sense<sub>1</sub> should not be identified with linguistic meaning, at least for the general case: 'this is this' or 'Bertie is Bertie' might be informative even though the two occurrences of 'this' have the same linguistic meaning.

A touchstone for dealing with the relation between sense<sub>1</sub> and sense<sub>3</sub> is consideration of when people are said to share a belief. For example, we often want to say that *A*, *B*, and *C* all believe that Sam Rhodes is a fine fellow, where 'Sam Rhodes' does not have purely transparent position. If the sense<sub>1</sub> of the name in a context of potential use is taken to be the descriptions, images, and so forth that the user would associate with it, then sense<sub>1</sub> and sense<sub>3</sub> must be distinguished. For *A*, *B*, and *C*'s descriptions and so forth may not coincide. We can even imagine that, although *A* and *B* agree on some descriptions, as do *B* and *C*, the descriptions associated with the name by *A* and *C* are for practical purposes disjoint. Imagine that they agree only on 'living, human male'.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Frege was probably willing to deny that *A*, *B*, and *C* share a belief. Cf. "On Sense and Reference," *op. cit.*, p. 58n, and "The Thought," *op. cit.*, pp. 517-519. Russell may have actually urged the denial in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" *op. cit.*, pp. 195/6. But their authority lends little credence to the view.

Thinking of sense<sub>1</sub> as a set of descriptions “abroad” in a community provides some relief from this difficulty. In fact, I think the viewpoint (equipped with a sufficiently subtle notion of community) can contribute a partial account of the cognitive value of proper names, although it must give up any ambition to determine the name’s referent purely on the basis of the relevant descriptions. Such an account of sense<sub>1</sub>, however, would at best be partial. For it dramatically fails to account for the cognitive difference among users of names or demonstratives, which Russell and Frege stressed (cf. note 23). Can the “communal description” account of sense<sub>1</sub> be used to account for sense<sub>3</sub>? I think not. The relevant set of descriptions will change over time, but we will remain willing to ascribe a given belief expressed with the name to people both before and after the change.

Any explication of the informativeness of identity statements is bound to be complex. The account of *public* information will appeal partly to linguistic meaning, partly to communally shared descriptions. The account of an *individual’s* information, which is particularly relevant to the informativeness of statements containing demonstratives and many proper names, must discuss matters psychological. That is, I think this latter part of the account will have to treat idiosyncratic associations and connotations—tokens of which Frege called “ideas.” But none of the aspects of an account of sense<sub>1</sub>, at least the sense<sub>1</sub> of proper names or other demonstrative constructions, is promising as an account of sense<sub>3</sub>.

I think it would be a mistake to postulate a new intensional entity, sense<sub>3</sub>. Such postulation will generate little illumination until we better understand the relations between “sense<sub>1</sub>”, “meaning”, and “sense<sub>3</sub>.” As we have seen, much of the trouble with Frege’s account, and with objections to it, stems from commitment to idealization of intensional notions before the phenomena that these idealizations are supposed to explain are adequately sorted out.

Senses<sub>3</sub> are roughly the *dicta* that are attributed in ordinary talk about *de re* and *de dicto* beliefs. But, as we have seen, cognitive differences in the *de re* belief content (or a *de re* bearer of truth) are sometimes marked not by reference to different concept expressions, but simply by different free variables. (Cf. notes 5 and 17.) Frege’s informative *de re* identities do not demand that a formal representation invoke unapparent concepts or senses that determine the *re*.

Our representation in terms of free variables is flexible as well as spare. We can specify neutral variables for cases in which we want to say that everyone acquainted with Sam believes him to be male (thus attributing a shared *de re* belief). For cases like the surprising



*de re* belief that Bertie is Bertie we can utilize different variables representing the implicit 'that' as it is applied in the different contexts. We can distinguish self-knowledge from knowledge about oneself from the third-person viewpoint by variables representing the first-person demonstrative. (Cf. Castañeda, note 3.) And so on. The particular concepts, percepts, images, insights, irritations, or intimations that an individual has of or from the relevant *res* are left unspecified in these cases. The free variables do no more than indicate the not purely conceptual character of these means of identification and mark differences in the contexts in which they are applied.

Thus, senses<sub>3</sub> are finer-grained than linguistic meanings for the same reason that sense<sub>1</sub> and linguistic meaning are distinct: The linguistic meaning of 'Bertie is Bertie' or 'this is this' is the same whether the sentence is taken as truistic or informative. But one may believe the truism and not believe the informative statement. The different variables in the formal representation mark differences in the context in which the demonstrative construction is used, not differences in linguistic meaning.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, senses<sub>3</sub> sometimes do not characterize (or even involve quantification over) the particular mode of presentation associated with an individual's belief. And in this respect they may be regarded as coarser-grained than senses<sub>1</sub>.

Full treatment of belief contents is the subject for other occasions. Our discussion, however, has placed limits on such a treatment. I have given reason to believe that sense<sub>3</sub> is not in general identifiable with sense<sub>1</sub>, sense<sub>2</sub>, or linguistic meaning, on natural construals of these notions. Improving on Frege's view of belief depends partly on attending to the variety of phenomena that he tried to explain with his single idealization, sense, and partly on recognizing the fundamental character of *de re* attitudes.

The lead role of *de re* attitudes is sponsored by a contextual, not purely conceptual relation between thinkers and objects. The paradigm of this relation is perception. But projections from the paradigm include memory, many introspective beliefs, certain historical beliefs, beliefs about the future, perhaps beliefs in pure mathematics, and so on. There is no adequate general explication of the appropriate nonconceptual relation(s) which covers even the

<sup>24</sup> I discuss senses<sub>3</sub> in "Self-Reference and Translation," in F. Guenther and M. Guenther, eds., in *Translation and Meaning* (London: Duckworth, 1977). I shall discuss the notion further in future papers and will argue that, even in the case of ascriptions of *nonindexical* beliefs, senses<sub>3</sub> should not be identified with linguistic meaning.

most widely accepted projections from the perceptual paradigm. Developing such an explication would, I think, help articulate the epistemic notion of intuition in its broadest, least technical sense, and contribute to our understanding of understanding.

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### BOOK REVIEWS

*Fiktion und Wahrheit: Eine semantische Theorie der Literatur.* GOTTFRIED GABRIEL. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1975. Proble-mata, 51, 140 p.

Concepts like meaning, understanding, and communication have long played a central role both in continental and in Anglo-Saxon philosophy. But with few exceptions there has been little communication between German and British (or American) philosophers. This is to be deplored; it should be fruitful to try to apply some of the insights and distinctions of contemporary analytical philosophy to a number of classic problems in literary theory. In fact, this is what Gottfried Gabriel attempts to do in his latest book, though in my view he is not entirely successful. There are several inherent difficulties in his key definitions and theses, as I shall try to show below. Besides, it appears that he is not familiar with a significant part of the relevant recent analytical literature.

A few years ago the author of the book to be reviewed here wrote a paper on Frege's logic and philosophy of language, in which he discussed Frege's views on the relations between ordinary language, fiction, and science. (A revised version of this paper is printed as an appendix in *Fiktion und Wahrheit*.) The influence of Frege (his conceptual framework, his way of stating problems, etc.) is also clearly discernible in this book, and there is a great deal of concern about what kind of entities, if any, 'Pegasus' and 'dragons' refer to. Gabriel objects (unnecessarily, it seems to me) to some rather innocent formulations by Monroe Beardsley, which apparently imply the existence of fictitious persons, places, and things; then Gabriel discusses the contributions by Meinong, Quine, Ryle, and others on this topic.

However, the main task of the book is to combine the approaches of analytical philosophy (primarily the tradition from Frege and the contemporary speech-act philosophy) with literary