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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240503T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240503T180000
DTSTAMP:20240502T164000Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T164000Z
UID:73117-1714752000-1714759200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:POSTPONED: 2023-24 Colloquium: "Fuel to My Fire; You Can’t Stop Desire"
DESCRIPTION:UPDATE: This event has been postponed. Stay tuned for the new date.\n\nMay 3\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce Hall 306\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 3\, 2024 for a colloquium with E. M. Hernandez. The talk will take place in Royce Hall 306 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nFuel to My Fire; You Can’t Stop Desire\n  \nTrans existence has been plagued by two different explanations: a natural\, “born this way\,” necessity and a social\, often-thought perverted\, choice. These contrasting explanations of necessity and choice create an explanatory false dichotomy and political catch-22. This talk constructs an alternative explanation for why people transition\, one that centralizes the role of desire while recognizing the necessity of choice that arises from that desire. Toward this end\, I present a moral psychology of desire. An explanation that recognizes the role desire plays\, not just in our actions\, but in our perception. This desire is made apparent when one perceives the option to transition as a salient possibility for themself. Once this desire is recognized\, it functions as what Bernard Williams calls a categorical desire; a desire that partly constitutes one’s ethical identity\, making the satisfaction of that desire a matter of ethical necessity. I argue that this explanation eschews the explanatory false dichotomy and evades the political catch-22. \n  \nE. M. Hernandez (they/them) is an independent philosopher who explores issues of race and gender through understanding our moral psychology. They have published both academically and popularly on issues of transgender affirmation\, language\, and experience. They live in Durham\, North Carolina with their dog Canela. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-em-hernandez/
LOCATION:Royce Hall – Room 306
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/E.-M.-Hernandez-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240426T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240426T180000
DTSTAMP:20240426T160932Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T160932Z
UID:72968-1714147200-1714154400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: “Self-Consciousness as Species-Consciousness”
DESCRIPTION:April 26\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan Hall 193\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/96481370381?pwd=S3o0Y1Bpd3l5T0orcUVCVmNjY28rdz09 \nMeeting ID: 964 8137 0381\nPasscode: 648893 \n  \nJoin us on April 26\, 2024 for a colloquium with Karen Ng\, Vanderbilt University. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nSelf-Consciousness as Species-Consciousness\n  \nAlthough self-consciousness has been a central theme in many discussions within post-Kantian philosophy\, this paper aims to understand and defend an undertheorized aspect of Hegel’s account of this theme\, namely\, his claim that self-consciousness is species-consciousness. I approach this problem in three stages. First\, beginning with Hegel’s account of self-consciousness as desire and its connection with life\, I show that Hegel defends a version of the materialist conception of self-consciousness (Cassam) by focusing specifically on what he calls the “self-sufficiency” of living objects and subjects. Second\, I turn to Hegel’s account of the significance of what he calls the “simple universality” of the Gattung or species in relation to self-consciousness. This universality arises as a result of his account of the processes of life\, and here I show that Hegel defends a version of Michael Thompson’s argument about the significance of life-form consciousness for self-consciousness. Finally\, I conclude by reconstructing the central paragraphs 172-173 from the Phenomenology of Spirit where Hegel describes self-consciousness as the species or Gattung for itself\, and draw out several consequences and problems of Hegel’s account. Among these include the idea that self-consciousness is an achievement\, alongside the idea that our self-conscious form of life that Hegel calls Geist exists as a living species among other living species. \n  \nKaren Ng is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University. She specializes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European philosophy\, focusing in particular on Hegel\, German idealism\, Marx\, and Frankfurt School critical theory. Between 2023 and 2025\, she will be an Alexander von Humboldt senior research fellow at the Center for Post-Kantian Philosophy at the University of Potsdam. Her first book\, Hegel’s Concept of Life: Freedom\, Self-Consciousness\, Logic\, was published with Oxford in 2020 and was awarded the Journal of the History of Philosophy Book Prize. \n  \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-karen-ng-vanderbilt-university/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Karen-Ng-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240308T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240308T180000
DTSTAMP:20240308T193254Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240308T193254Z
UID:72957-1709913600-1709920800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Kant Under the Bodhi Tree? Anti-Individualism in Kantian Ethics"
DESCRIPTION:March 8\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce 314 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97394083916?pwd=bmhReEZQVURFKzl0Y2hXZDR4Mm8ydz09 \nMeeting ID: 973 9408 3916 \nPasscode: 026985 \n  \nJoin us on March 8\, 2024 for a colloquium with Karl Schafer\, UT Austin. The talk will take place in Royce 314 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nKant Under the Bodhi Tree? Anti-Individualism in Kantian Ethics\n  \nA common complaint about Kantian ethics today is that it cannot do full justice to the social or intersubjective dimensions of human life – that\, unlike Fichte\, Hegel\, or Marx\, Kant remains trapped within a fundamentally individualistic perspective on practical or moral questions. In this talk\, I will argue that such critiques of Kant rest on a natural\, but fundamental mischaracterization of where the most serious problems for Kant lie in this region. Far from being too individualistic\, I will argue that the real worry about Kantian moral theory is in fact that it may not be individualistic enough. As we will see\, this has potentially profound implications for how we understand Kant’s legacy in practical philosophy. Indeed\, if this is right\, from a certain perspective\, it might be Kant who is the most ethically radical of these philosophers. \n  \nKarl Schafer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. Previously he was Professor of Philosophy at University of California\, Irvine and Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. He works primarily in the history of modern philosophy (esp. Hume and Kant)\, ethics\, and epistemology. \n  \n  \n\n\n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-karl-schafer-ut-austin/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Wordpress-Image-Karl-Schafer-v3.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240216T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240216T180000
DTSTAMP:20240216T194404Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240216T194404Z
UID:73167-1708099200-1708106400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Radical Chains: Marx and the Dialectical Compatibilism of Freedom and Determinism"
DESCRIPTION:February 16\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/99929612695?pwd=d1I4UUMvRFB4eEhlTHI4Y2E5MHZNZz09 \nMeeting ID: 999 2961 2695 \nPasscode: 579432 \n  \nJoin us on February 16\, 2024 for a colloquium with Vanessa Wills\, George Washington University. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nRadical Chains: Marx and the Dialectical Compatibilism of Freedom and Determinism\n  \nIf Marx’s economic determinism requires that individual human beings always only behave just as the “laws of history” unavoidably compel them to\, then the practice of assigning moral praise and blame is no more appropriately applied to people than it is to inanimate objects dropped from heights. Numerous interpreters of Marx\, presuming that historical materialism does entail a strict\, mechanistic determinism\, have gone on to reason that Marx’s theory is therefore inhospitable to morality. However\, historical materialism does not entail this. \n  \nIn this talk\, I argue that Marx should be understood as advancing a “dialectical compatibilism” of freedom and determinism. I use the term “dialectical compatibilism” to invoke both the ways in which Marx’s approach to freedom and determinism is in conversation with traditional analyses of this pairing\, and also the ways in which it is fundamentally divergent from them. This position moves beyond the views typically arrayed along the axes of determinist or libertarian\, compatibilist or incompatibilist. \n  \nHuman freedom is itself a human product\, developing out of human beings’ goal-directed interactions with their natural and social environment. There is no inconsistency in Marx describing fairly lawlike\, deterministic regularities of human behavior on the one hand and speaking of a flourishing of human freedom\, individuality\, and creative potential on the other. If determinism is the negation of real human agency\, then human freedom is the negation of that negation\, one that can emerge only in the course of history. \n  \nVanessa Wills is Associate Professor of Philosophy at The George Washington University. Her areas of specialization are moral\, social\, and political philosophy\, nineteenth century German philosophy (especially Karl Marx)\, and the philosophy of race. Her research is importantly informed by her study of Marx’s work\, and focuses on the ways in which economic and social arrangements can inhibit or promote the realization of values such as freedom\, equality\, and human development. Her monograph\, Marx’s Ethical Vision\, is set to be released in April 2024. \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-vanessa-wills-george-washington-university/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Vanessa-Wills-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240119T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240119T180000
DTSTAMP:20240119T172717Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240119T172717Z
UID:73434-1705680000-1705687200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Conceivability and Possibility in Avicenna"
DESCRIPTION:January 19\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/93109412131?pwd=VFcrbHl2MEViVkg3dzUrZEV0NTN2QT09 \nMeeting ID: 931 0941 2131 \nPasscode: 279424 \n  \nJoin us on January 19\, 2024 for a colloquium with Jari Kaukua\, University of Jyväskylä. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nConceivability and Possibility in Avicenna\n  \nIn his theory of science\, Avicenna seems to commit to a very demanding concept of concept (taṣawwur): only the intellect’s adequate conceptions of real essences are concepts in the strict sense. This lands him the task of explaining what it is that we are doing when we think of things that are never realised\, such as phoenixes or counterfactual states of affairs. I suggest that his solution relies on a nuanced distinction\, grounded in his psychology\, between a descriptive and a normative concept of concept. Unrealised\, and consequently impossible\, things are not conceivable in the strict sense of the word (they do not have real concepts)\, but they may be conceived as conjunctions of real concepts that are instantiated in mental images construed by our imagination. Such conjunctions may be epistemically indistinct from real concepts\, which raises interesting questions concerning the metaphysical or scientific consequences of conceivability. Thus\, I conclude with the suggestion that Avicenna would not have appreciated conceivability as a sign of metaphysical possibility. \n  \nJari Kaukua is Professor of philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä. He is the author of Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy (CUP\, 2015) and Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism (Brill\, 2022)\, as well as many articles on classical and post-classical Islamic philosophy. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-jari-kaukua-university-of-jyvaskyla/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Jari-Kaukua-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231103T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231103T180000
DTSTAMP:20231103T181850Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231103T181850Z
UID:72945-1699027200-1699034400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Generics Favor Stability"
DESCRIPTION:November 3\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97634448928?pwd=RnhYeklPTlhIMEhVaTI0SFd3NVdkdz09 \nMeeting ID: 976 3444 8928 \nPasscode: 016526 \n  \nJoin us on November 3\, 2023 for a colloquium with Katherine Ritchie\, UC Irvine. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Shostak Terrace to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nGenerics Favor Stability\n  \nWe are creatures that seek to predict\, explain\, and control our environments. Generalizations—like those expressed by “birds have hollow bones” and “cigarettes cause cancer”—provide one resource to facilitate these tasks. In this paper (collaborative work with Ny Vasil) we develop a psychological account of the acceptability judgments of generic statements rooted in the psychological functions of generalizations. We argue that a notion of stability based on Woodward’s work on causation provides the basis for a unified account of generics. Generics that are taken to be stable are favored over those that are not. The account coheres with the function of generics\, while providing a unifying account of judgments about both causal and categorical generics. Moreover\, it can accommodate generics with both essentialist and structural explanatory commitments by recognizing the ways generics can express generalizations with relatively unrestricted scope and generalizations that are covertly contextually restricted to situational “bubbles”. Overall\, the account unifies an apparently diverse range of generics\, fits with a plausible account of the function of generalization in human psychology\, and provides a framework ripe for further empirical and theoretical investigation. \n  \nKatherine Ritchie is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at UC Irvine. Her research lies at the intersection of inquiry into linguistic and mental representation and the social world. She has written on the nature of social groups (e.g.\, teams\, committees\, races\, genders)\, the semantics of terms that pick out groups (e.g.\, plurals\, collective nouns\, slurs\, generics)\, and the ways we mentally represent groups. One central thread in her current research is to investigate how insights from metaphysics and from the ways we represent can help inform viable social-political projects. Her work has been published in Ethics\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, Cognition\, Cognitive Psychology\, Mind & Language\, and other journals and volumes. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-kate-ritchie-uc-irvine/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Kate-Ritchie-Wordpress-image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231020T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231020T180000
DTSTAMP:20231020T204847Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231020T204847Z
UID:72941-1697817600-1697824800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Aesthetic Acquaintance in Practice"
DESCRIPTION:October 20\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nZoom link: \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97140529852?pwd=a1NSL1AwVnBrMnF3eStHQTg4RlhDdz09 \nMeeting ID: 971 4052 9852 \nPasscode: 314912 \n  \nJoin us on October 20\, 2023 for a colloquium with Nick Riggle\, University of San Diego. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Shostak Terrace to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nAesthetic Acquaintance in Practice\n  \nThe Acquaintance Principle (AP)—the claim that aesthetic beliefs must be based on first-hand engagement and not on testimony—used to be “well-entrenched” in aesthetics. But today there is a near consensus that it fails in the light of a range of apparent counterexamples. Even pessimists about aesthetic testimony who believe in the spirit of AP reformulate its letter to accommodate these counterexamples. I will argue that when AP is correctly understood\, a position opens up that accommodates both pessimism and optimism. AP is not a principle to which there are counterexamples but rather a practice-governing rule to which there are legitimate exceptions. As such\, the so-called counterexamples do little to diminish the rule. The view results\, in part\, from appreciating how the norms of aesthetic valuing require us to apply AP not merely to the hearer but also to the speaker: one must base one’s aesthetic beliefs on one’s own engagement with their objects\, and not only must aesthetic testimony not be accepted\, it must not be offered. The exceptions to AP allow aesthetic knowledge to pass around under special circumstances but do nothing to minimize AP’s importance and force\, which can be justified by appeal to central features of the social practice of aesthetic valuing. The result is a more thoroughgoing Unusability Pessimism nestled within a novel communitarian theory of aesthetic value. If this is right\, then the decades-long debate between optimists and pessimists dissolves. \n  \nNick Riggle is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Diego. He completed his BA in philosophy at UC Berkeley\, earned his PhD at NYU\, and has been teaching at USD since 2015. Riggle’s work is primarily in aesthetics\, though his publications draw on and contribute to a range of fields in philosophy\, including the philosophy of language\, value theory\, social philosophy\, and the history of philosophy. He writes for both public and academic audiences\, and his work has appeared in The Philosophical Review\, The Philosophical Quarterly\, Philosophers’ Imprint\, The New York Times\, Aeon\, Penguin Books\, McSweeney’s Internet Tendency\, and many other outlets. His most recent book\, This Beauty: A Philosophy of Being Alive\, explores the existential significance of valuing beauty. \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-nick-riggle-uc-san-diego/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Nick-Riggle-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230526T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230526T180000
DTSTAMP:20230526T224820Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230526T224820Z
UID:72020-1685116800-1685124000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: "Art as a Shelter from Science"
DESCRIPTION:May 26\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce 314\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99826733700?pwd=cGUvN1ZzdXdrZmVibElaVVRTZnJTZz09\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 26\, 2023 for a colloquium with C. Thi Nguyen\, University of Utah. The talk will take place in Royce 314 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Royce Patio (3rd floor) to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nArt as a Shelter from Science\n  \nAesthetic judgment is different from scientific judgment. For many\, a key difference is that aesthetic judgment does not proceed via inferences. We cannot infer the existence of an aesthetic property based on the application of a rule. We must see for ourselves if some arrangement of lines and colors is\, in fact\, graceful. But we also give\, exchange\, and demand of each other reasons for our judgments about aesthetic properties. What kind of property could be non-inferential\, but\, at the same time\, subject to reasons? I would like to present a new solution: that non-inferentialism about aesthetic properties is not a some mysterious metaphysical feature of aesthetic properties\, but is rather a norm of a social practice. When we accept this rule\, the activity of aesthetic appreciation goes better in a few ways. First\, it drives the appreciator’s attention towards looking at particular details in a work\, rather than looking for recurring statistical regularities or abstract principles. This prevents a purely scientific approach to aesthetic judgment\, and drives the appreciator towards a detail-oriented perception of a work’s particularities. It drives conversants to continue to sensuously attend to works\, rather than shifting to more abstract methods of inquiry such as the philosophical search for first principles\, or the scientific study of aggregate regularities in perception. Second\, it sculpts a particular kind of interaction: open-ended exchanges of reasons which motivate the conversants to return to attending to the work. The value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation turns out to be quite distinct from that of\, say\, science. The goal is not the accumulation of true knowledge\, but fostering engagement in a particular valuable human activity. Perhaps we don’t disagree about art to get to the truth\, but we construct our artworks and art practices to foster endless\, satisfying disagreement.  \n  \nC. Thi Nguyen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. His research concerns aesthetics and social epistemology; he has written about trust\, games\, echo chambers\, cultural appropriation\, and the ethics of transparency. His first book is Games: Agency as Art (OUP). \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-c-thi-nguyen-university-of-utah/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Thi-Nguyen.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230512T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230512T180000
DTSTAMP:20230512T205018Z
CREATED:20230316T172758Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230512T205018Z
UID:72389-1683907200-1683914400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23: Colloquium: Does Institutional Racism Presuppose Racist Ideology?
DESCRIPTION:May 12\, 2023 | 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM PT\nKaplan 193 (and Zoom)\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/98656610498?pwd=TkRXeUMvdDVkRDlPY1piQVVxZ2gydz09\n  \nJoin us on May 12\, 2023 for a colloquium with Alberto Urquidez\, St. Olaf College. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall Room 193 from 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM with a light reception on the Shostak Terrace in front of Murphy Hall to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nDoes Institutional Racism Presuppose Racist Ideology?\n  \nWhat is racism? Standard definitions depict racism as a personal phenomenon thereby inviting questions about personal responsibility. A common definition analyzes racism as a cognitive phenomenon\, as in the belief that race R1 is superior to race R2. A nonstandard version of the cognitive approach centers widely held beliefs (rather than mere individual belief) and\, for purposes of moral assessment\, stresses social consequences (not mere cognitive contents). This approach is typically put in the service of explaining the persistence of racial inequality/injustice. Tommie Shelby defends a version of the nonstandard cognitive approach. For him\, racism is racist ideology. Roughly\, racist ideology consists in a widely held set of racial beliefs that misrepresent racial oppression and that function\, through this distortion\, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations. One alleged virtue of the nonstandard cognitivist approach is that it explains institutional racism. In this talk\, I will argue that at least one kind of institutional racism cannot be explained in terms of racist ideology. While I will not advocate rejecting Shelby’s analysis\, I will underscore the limitations of his analysis as a general theory of racism \n  \nAlberto G. Urquidez is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at St. Olaf College. He will be an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religion at James Madison University in Fall 2023. Urquidez works primarily on the nature of racism\, drawing on the tools of analytic philosophy in conjunction with interdisciplinary insights to understand racism in connection with various topics\, such as the problem of white identity politics\, moral responsibility for racial oppression\, and the relationship of individual racism to institutional racism. His aim is to develop an empirically-informed\, comprehensive\, structuralist analysis of racism as a system of racial oppression. He is the author of (Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis (Palgrave Macmillan 2020). \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-alberto-urquidez-st-olaf-college/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Alberto-Urquidez.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230508T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230508T133000
DTSTAMP:20230508T163300Z
CREATED:20230316T172758Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T163300Z
UID:72604-1683547200-1683552600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23: Colloquium: Hume on Economic Inequality
DESCRIPTION:May 8\, 2023 | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM PT\nKaplan 193 and Zoom\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99674975385\n  \nOn May 8\, 2023\, the Philosophy Dept. History Occasional Colloquium will host a talk by and discussion with Professor Margaret Schabas (UBC) on “Hume and Economic Inequality.” The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall Room 193 from 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM.  \nHere is the Zoom link if you would like to join virtually: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99674975385 \nRSVP HERE\n  \nHume and Economic Inequality\n  \nIn his essay “Of the Original Contract\,” Hume endorsed the longstanding belief in “how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force\, and even in their mental powers and faculties\, till cultivated by education.” Although not an egalitarian\, Hume\, I will argue\, sought to reduce economic inequality of income though not necessarily of wealth. Two central goals of his economic philosophy were to raise the standard of living of the lower classes and to expand the so-called “middle station.” Above all\, Hume opposed the “utility of poverty” doctrine as a hindrance to economic growth. His position was motivated by utilitarian ends: a more prosperous laboring class would result in a happier nation\, not only because of the larger basket of goods in the household but also because citizens would tend to become more law-abiding and thus promote political stability. As Hume observed\, “a too great disproportion among the citizens weakens any state.” Finally\, Hume sought to enrich poorer nations and thereby reduce economic inequality between nations\, primarily as a means to foster peace. \n  \nProfessor Schabas (FRSC) works primarily in the History and Philosophy of Science\, with a focus on Economics.  Her first book\, A World Ruled by Number (Princeton\, 1990) addressed the transformation of economics into a mathematical science; her second book\, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago\, 2005) addressed the concept of the economy since the early modern period; her third and most recent book is on Hume’s economics (A Philosopher’s Economist Chicago\, 2020).  She has also co-edited a book on Hume’s economics and another entitled Oeconomies in the Age of Newton. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-hume-on-economic-inequality/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Margaret-Schabas.jpg
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230428T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230428T180000
DTSTAMP:20230428T193233Z
CREATED:20230316T171935Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230428T193233Z
UID:72385-1682697600-1682704800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Colloquium: Against Philosophy\, Against Inquiry
DESCRIPTION:April 28th\, 2023 | 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM PT\nKaplan Hall 193 (and Zoom)\nHosted by Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) at UCLA\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/94960209231?pwd=Q3lLbnRzNXZPRkgxZ3FnOFFEbHVEZz09\n  \nJoin us on April 28th\, 2023 for a colloquium with Dr. Johnathan Flowers\, California State University\, Northridge. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall Room 193 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nNote: ASL interpreters will be available for the duration of the talk. \n  \nAgainst Philosophy\, Against Inquiry\n  \nThis talk will position the current practice of inquiry in philosophy\, colloquially described as “just asking questions\,” as enabling the maintenance of structures of oppression through the ways in which it refuses to grapple with the social\, political\, and cultural realities from which it emerges. This failure allows for the laundering of ableism and transphobia through scholarship that aims to “just ask questions” not just about the nature of gender identity and disability\, but about the very humanity of trans and disabled persons. Finally\, this talk will describe how the conflation of “just asking questions” with contemporary practices of inquiry in philosophy also serve to position objections to this practice of inquiry as “anti-philosophy\,” or opposed to the very nature of philosophy and academia itself. \n  \nJohnathan Flowers is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at California State University\, Northridge. Flowers’s research areas include African American intellectual history\, Japanese Aesthetics\, American Pragmatism\, Philosophy of Disability\, and Philosophy of Technology. Flowers also works in the areas of Science and Technology Studies and Comics Studies\, where he applies insights from American Pragmatism\, Philosophy of Race\, and Disability Studies to current issues in human/computer interaction\, artificial intelligence and machine learning\, and representations of identity in popular culture. His book\, Mono no Aware and Gender as Affect in Japanese Aesthetics and American Pragmatism\, is due out in April. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-dr-jonathan-flowers/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Johnathan-Flowers-v3-1.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230421T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230421T180000
DTSTAMP:20230421T194542Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230421T194542Z
UID:72004-1682092800-1682100000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: The Reasons We Cannot Share
DESCRIPTION:April 21\, 2023 | 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM PT\nRoyce Hall 243 (and Zoom)\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/98234276234?pwd=ZkpiMFNCSjFvSVNoK1FpWFBJWjkzQT09\n  \nJoin us on April 21\, 2023 for a colloquium with Kyla Ebels Duggan\, Northwestern University. The talk will take place in Royce Hall Room 243 from 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM with a reception on the 3rd floor Royce Patio to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nThe Reasons We Cannot Share\n  \nAccording to political liberals\, a pluralist society should leave each person free to pursue their own conception of the good\, but individuals should bracket these values when engaging in political reasoning with one another.  When reasoning about the basic institutions and fundamental laws that govern the society\, each person should appeal only to so-called public reasons.  Public reasons are considerations that everyone (or at least all reasonable people) can see as reasons\, reasons that we can all share. \n  \nIn the first several sections of the paper\, I explore the ways in which we can and cannot give one another reasons and share reasons that we have.  I compare and contrast the possibilities with respect to reasons for believing\, reasons for valuing\, and reasons for acting.  I then use these distinctions to support the claim that the liberal ideal for relating to others does not require\, and in fact cannot be realized by\, limiting our political reasoning to appeals to shared reasons.  Instead\, I’ll suggest\, it requires regarding others as giving us new reasons to act by valuing and choosing what they do.  When I regard you this way\, I act on reasons that are necessarily different from those on which you act—reasons that we cannot share. \n  \nKyla Ebels-Duggan is Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University.  She specializes in moral and political philosophy and their history\, working in a broadly Kantian tradition. Her work has appeared in Ethics\, The Philosophical Quarterly\, Philosophical Studies and Philosophers’ Imprint.  She is completing a book on valuing attitudes and starting a book on Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy. \n  \n\nRSVP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-kyla-ebels-duggan-northwestern-university/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 243
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Kyla-Ebels-Duggan.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230317T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230317T180000
DTSTAMP:20230309T011049Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230309T011049Z
UID:72358-1679068800-1679076000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: Strong Determinism
DESCRIPTION:March 17\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd 121\n  \nJoin us on March 17th\, 2023 for a colloquium with Eddy Keming Chen\, UC San Diego. The talk will take place in Dodd 121 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \nA strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989)\, “it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed\, according to some precise mathematical scheme\, for all time.” Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in any realistic theory of physics. In this talk\, I show how it can be achieved in a universe like ours. First\, I propose a definition of strong determinism and explain how it differs from standard determinism and super-determinism. Next\, I discuss its attractions\, implications\, and some toy examples. The possibility of strong determinism has interesting consequences for explanation\, causation\, prediction\, and modality. Finally\, I show that Everettian quantum mechanics\, with a new version of the Past Hypothesis\, provides an easy route to strong determinism. On the new theory that I call the Everettian Wentaculus\, the quantum state of the multiverse is a fundamental mixed state with exactly one possible history. As a consequence of physical laws\, the history of the multiverse could not have been different. \nYou are encouraged but not required to read the preprint before attending the talk: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.02886.pdf \n  \n​Eddy Keming Chen is an assistant professor in philosophy at the University of California\, San Diego (UCSD). He works at the intersection of philosophy of physics\, philosophy of science\, and metaphysics. He also has interests in philosophy of mind\, decision theory\, formal epistemology\, philosophy of mathematics\, philosophy of religion\, and Chinese philosophy. He is an associate editor of the journal Foundations of Physics\, a fellow of the John Bell Institute for the Foundations of Physics\, an affiliated faculty member of the UCSD Chinese studies program\, and a member of the interdisciplinary project “Life on the Edge.” He has written about time’s arrow\, laws of nature\, quantum ontology\, physical space\, scientific explanations\, infinitary decision theory\, and temporal self-location. In several recent papers\, he has been developing a new account of time’s arrow in a quantum universe\, called the “Wentaculus.” One of these papers\, published in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science\, was awarded the Popper Prize for “ambitious\, novel contribution to major issues in the foundations of physics” and judged to be the best paper in its 2021 volume. His work on the vagueness of physical laws has been published in The Philosophical Review and featured as a cover story in New Scientist. One of his side interests is using films to popularize philosophical and scientific ideas. Currently\, he is co-writing a screenplay about a time-travel romance. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-strong-determinism/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 121
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Eddy-Chen-feature-image.jpg
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230310T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230310T180000
DTSTAMP:20230308T185506Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230308T185506Z
UID:72322-1678464000-1678471200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: Being Called
DESCRIPTION:March 10\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd 121\n  \nJoin us on March 10th\, 2023 for a colloquium with Una Stojnić\, Princeton University. The talk will take place in Dodd 121 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception in Dodd 399 to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \nIn the context of attempting to explain predicative uses of names—most contemporary theorists\, post Naming and Necessity—whether Millians or Descriptivists—invoke the relation of being called; ‘There are two Annas in my class’ semantically expresses or pragmatically conveys that there are two individuals called ‘Anna’ (or alternatively\, two individuals called Anna) in my class.  What has gone unnoticed is that invoking this relation incurs metaphysical commitments about name individuation that are staggering\, requiring positing indefinitely many ambiguous lexical items\, that are unlike any familiar type of lexical items. \n  \nUna Stojnić is an assistant professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University. Prior to joining Princeton\, she was an assistant professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University\, which she joined after receiving her PhD in Philosophy and Certificate in Cognitive Science from Rutgers University. She was also a Bersoff assistant professor/faculty fellow in Philosophy at NYU and a research fellow in philosophy at the School of Philosophy at ANU. Una’s main research focus is on the philosophical\, linguistic\, and psychological aspects of human communication and linguistic capacities. She also works in philosophical logic and its intersection with natural languages. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-being-called/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 121
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Una-Stojnic-feature-image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230303T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230303T180000
DTSTAMP:20230227T073432Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230227T073432Z
UID:72301-1677859200-1677866400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: Examining Social Norms in Animal Cultures
DESCRIPTION:March 3\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd 121\n  \nJoin us on March 3rd\, 2023 for a colloquium with Kristin Andrews\, York University. The talk will take place in Dodd 121 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Shostak Terrace (in front of Murphy Hall) to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n\nSocial norms—rules governing which behaviors are deemed appropriate or inappropriate within a given community—are typically taken to be uniquely human. Recently\, this position has been challenged. The view that norms are human unique stems from commitments regarding the psychological capacities required for having them\, and skepticism that animals possess these prerequisites. However\, among norm cognition researchers there is little agreement about the cognitive architecture that underpins social norms in humans. To make progress on the question\, there needs to be a point of agreement–an operationalized account of social norms. Drawing on Westra and Andrews’ (2022) account of a normative regularity–a socially maintained pattern of behavioral conformity within a community–I present three potential cases in primates and discuss the sort of evidence that would be needed to conclude that they qualify as normative regularities. I consider two objections: that social norms involve following rules with deontic content (and animals don’t do that)\, and that having social norms requires punishing non-compliant actors (and animals don’t do that). I conclude with some practical and theoretical implications. \n  \nKristin Andrews is York Research Chair in Animal Minds and Professor of Philosophy at York University\, and she was elected to the College of the Royal Society of Canada in 2015. Her research is at the intersection of philosophy\, social cognition\, moral cognition\, and animal cognition. She is the author of several books\, including most recently How to Study Animal Minds (Cambridge 2020)—an argument for rethinking methods in comparative psychology; and The Animal Mind second edition (Routledge 2020) – a survey of how empirical work on animal minds can help to inform debates in the philosophy of mind.  In recent years\, she has contributed to policy discussions of the status of great apes in US law and digital research infrastructure for animal behavior in Canada. Andrews serves on the Board of Directors for The Borneo Orangutan Society Canada\, which has the mission to promote conservation of orangutans and their habitat and to educate the public. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-examining-social-norms-in-animal-cultures/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 121
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230227T113000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230227T140000
DTSTAMP:20230227T073438Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230227T073438Z
UID:72281-1677497400-1677506400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Kepler and Descartes on Nature and Its Representation
DESCRIPTION:February 27\, 2023 | 11:30AM – 2:00PM\nRoyce 306\n  \nJoin us on Monday\, February 27\, 2023 for lunch and a lecture by Brian Baigrie\, University of Toronto. \nSandwiches will be served at 11:30AM and the talk will begin at 12:00PM. \n  \nRSVP below to save your spot!\n  \nIf you can’t make it to the talk in person\, here is the link to join remotely: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/93382136321?pwd=OWh0bFVJcWQzUkRyQXl3SGpxWFJYZz09 \n  \n\nIn his Ad Vitellionem paralipomena (Additions to Witelo\, 1604)\, Johannes Kepler advanced the remarkable thesis that the act of seeing involves the painting of an inverted picture on the retina\, comparable to the picture that appears on the back of the camera obscura. Kepler’s discovery of the retinal image has been well-documented by historians of the science of optics\, but its impact during the 17th century on the emergence of the mechanical philosophy and a growing recognition of the need for a novel of framework to conceptualize the relationship between nature and its representation is less well-known. This talk will present the central elements of Kepler’s new theory of vision in an attempt to shed light on aspects of its influence on the 17th century twin revolutions in science and philosophy. \n  \nBrian Baigrie is Director of Graduate Studies and Associate Professor at The Institute for the History & Philosophy of Science & Technology\, and cross-appointed to the Institute for Health Policy\, Management & Evaluation (Faculty of Medicine) at the University of Toronto.   His ongoing research (both historical and philosophical) is focussed on evidential reasoning. \n  \n[gravityform id=”58″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/kepler-and-descartes-on-nature-and-its-representation/
LOCATION:Royce Hall – Room 306
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230224T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230224T180000
DTSTAMP:20230223T200607Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230223T200607Z
UID:72288-1677254400-1677261600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: Spinoza on truth
DESCRIPTION:February 24\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd 121\n  \nJoin us on February 24\, 2023 for a colloquium with Karolina Hübner\, Cornell University. The talk will take place in Dodd 121 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception in Dodd 399 to follow. \nRSVP HERE\n  \n\nSurprisingly little has been written about Spinoza’s theory of truth\, and there is no general consensus about how he should be understood. After a period during which he was most often portrayed as a coherence theorist\, today he is usually thought to advance a correspondence theory of truth. In this talk I propose a new account of how Spinoza understands the nature of truth – one that makes a more unified and comprehensive sense  of Spinoza’s doctrines and texts. More specifically\, I propose that Spinoza endorses a version of the identity theory of truth. Very roughly\, on identity theories\, the nature of truth consists in the identity of the truthbearer with the truthmaker. I argue that Spinoza holds an identity conception of truth insofar as\, on his view\, true “ideas” are identical with the “things” they are about. More precisely\, a true Spinozistic idea of a thing is that thing itself\, albeit existing in a distinct – purely mental – manner. This conception of truth\, I show\, grows directly out of Spinoza’s general theory of representation – his theory of what it is for any idea to be about or of something in the first place. On my reading\, Spinoza’s theory of truth also turns out to be inseparable from certain ontological commitments – in particular\, a commitment to a pluralism of ways of having being. Arguably\, then\, the identity conception of truth stands or falls with much of the rest of Spinoza’s metaphysical and epistemological edifice. \n  \nKarolina Hübner is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Sage School of Philosophy\, Cornell University. Her work on the metaphysics\, epistemology\, and philosophy of mind in the early modern period has appeared in such journals as Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, the Philosophical Quarterly\, the Journal of the History of Philosophy and Philosophers’ Imprint. Until 2019\, she was Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. Her 2022 article in the Journal of the History of Philosophy\, “Representation and Mind-Body Identity in Spinoza’s Philosophy\,” is the winner of the JHP’s prize for the best article of 2022. She is the co-editor of the forthcoming Spinoza Cambridge Lexicon\, and the editor of Human (Oxford Philosophical Concepts series). She is currently working on a monograph on Spinoza’s metaphysics of thought. \nRSVP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-karolina-hubner-cornell-university/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 121
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20220520T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20220520T180000
DTSTAMP:20220519T191245Z
CREATED:20210809T200104Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220519T191245Z
UID:70514-1653062400-1653069600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: C. Thi Nguyen\, University of Utah - CANCELLED
DESCRIPTION:Games and Value Capture\nC. Thi Nguyen\, University of Utah Department of Philosophy\nMay 20\, 2022 – CANCELLED
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-c-thi-nguyen-university-of-utah/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20220506T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20220506T180000
DTSTAMP:20220421T190913Z
CREATED:20210731T211011Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220421T190913Z
UID:70492-1651852800-1651860000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium:  Beri Marusic\, University of Edinburgh
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, May 6\, 2022 from 4 pm to 6 pm\n“Interpersonal Reasoning”\nBari Marusic\, University of Edinburgh\nRoyce Hall room 314
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-beri-marusic-university-of-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20211203T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20211203T180000
DTSTAMP:20211116T202535Z
CREATED:20210908T193558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211116T202535Z
UID:70574-1638547200-1638554400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium:  Rosa Cao\, Stanford University
DESCRIPTION:Putting Representations to Use\nRosa Cao\, Stanford University\nFriday\, December 3rd at 4:00 pm\nPublic Affairs Building 1246
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-rosa-cao-stanford/
LOCATION:Public Affairs Building – Room 1246
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20211001T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20211001T180000
DTSTAMP:20210908T185445Z
CREATED:20210731T210703Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210908T185445Z
UID:70490-1633104000-1633111200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium:  Manuel Vargas\, University of California at San Diego
DESCRIPTION:Mexican Existentialism and Ecological Agency\nManuel Vargas\, UCSD\nFriday\, October 1 at 4:00 pm\nRoyce Hall – Room 314
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-manuel-vargas-university-of-california-at-san-diego/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20210205T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20210205T180000
DTSTAMP:20210119T203659Z
CREATED:20200828T234105Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210119T203659Z
UID:69294-1612540800-1612548000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: Christine Korsgaard\, Harvard University
DESCRIPTION:“John Rawls’s Theory of the Good”\nChristine J. Korsgaard\, Harvard University\nFriday\, February 5 at 4:00 pm (ONLINE) \nProfessor Korsgaard’s talk will be presented electronically on February 5\, 2020 at 4:00 pm PST.  For information on how to stream the talk\, please contact Julian Fischer at jfischer@humnet.ucla.edu.
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-christine-korsgaard-harvard/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20201030T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20201030T180000
DTSTAMP:20200902T142601Z
CREATED:20190926T180703Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200902T142601Z
UID:69279-1604073600-1604080800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: Cristina Bicchieri\, University of Pennsylvania
DESCRIPTION:Title: TBA\nCristina Bicchieri\, University of Pennsylvania\nFriday\, October 30 at 4:00 pm\nLocation: TBA
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-cristina-bicchieri-university-of-pennsylvania/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20200403T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20200403T180000
DTSTAMP:20200316T213535Z
CREATED:20190926T180703Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200316T213535Z
UID:68100-1585929600-1585936800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: Richard Moran\, Harvard University
DESCRIPTION:*Please note\, the event has been cancelled.  \nTitle: TBA\nRichard Moran\, Harvard University\nFriday\, April 3 at 4:00 pm\nLocation: TBA
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-richardmoran/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20200306T140000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20200308T131500
DTSTAMP:20200208T013149Z
CREATED:20191216T234216Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200208T013149Z
UID:68427-1583503200-1583673300@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2020 Aristotle's De Anima Workshop on Sean Kelsey's Manuscript
DESCRIPTION:As part of the History Research Cycle\, the Philosophy Department will be hosting the 2020 Aristotle’s De Anima Workshop on Sean Kelsey’s (University of Notre Dame) Manuscript. Featured commentators include Victor Caston (University of Michigan)\, Pano Dimas (University of Oslo)\, Jessica Gelber (University of Toronto)\, David Lefebvre (Sorbonne University)\, Sara Magrin (UC Berkeley)\, Christian Pfeiffer (University of Toronto)\, and Joel Yurdin (Haverford College). Commentators-at-large are Jozef Muller (UC Riverside)\, Lucas Angioni (University of Campinas)\, and John Carriero (UCLA). \nFriday\, March 6\n2:00-4:00pm: Session I\, Chapter 1: David Lefebvre\n4:15-6:15pm: Session II\, Chapter 2: Victor Caston\n\n\nSaturday\, March 7\n11:00am-1:00pm: Session III\, Chapter 3: Joel Yurdin\n2:00-4:00pm: Session IV\, Chapter 4: Jessica Gelber\n4:15-6:15pm: Session V\, Chapter 6: Panos Dimas\n\n\nSunday\, March 8\n9:15-11:15am: Session VI\, Chapter 7: Sara Magrin\n11:15am-1:15pm: Session VII\, Chapter 8: Christian Pfeiffer
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2020-aristotle-deanima/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall – Room 399
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Reception,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20191206T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20191206T180000
DTSTAMP:20191119T201732Z
CREATED:20190926T173118Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20191119T201732Z
UID:68096-1575648000-1575655200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: Monique Wonderly\, UC San Diego
DESCRIPTION:“Forgiving\, Committing\, and Un-forgiving”\nMonique Wonderly\, UC San Diego\nFriday\, December 6 at 4:00 pm\nDodd Hall – Room 146
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-moniquewonderly/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall – Room 146
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20191108T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20191108T180000
DTSTAMP:20190926T181228Z
CREATED:20190926T172745Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190926T181228Z
UID:68093-1573228800-1573236000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: Anton Ford\, University of Chicago
DESCRIPTION:“The Objectification of Agency”\nAnton Ford\, University of Chicago\nFriday\, November 8 at 4:00 pm\nLocation: TBA
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-antonford/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20191018T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20191018T180000
DTSTAMP:20191002T191803Z
CREATED:20190926T172120Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20191002T191803Z
UID:68091-1571414400-1571421600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: Mark Schroeder\, University of Southern California
DESCRIPTION:Conflict\, Discord\, and Strife\nMark Schroeder\, University of Southern California\nFriday\, October 18 at 4:00 pm\nUCLA School of Law – Room 1420
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-markschroeder/
LOCATION:UCLA School of Law – Room 1420
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20190524T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20190527T170000
DTSTAMP:20190523T201430Z
CREATED:20180825T220923Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190523T201430Z
UID:65911-1558690200-1558976400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Inaugural Pan-American Symposium on the History of Logic: Validity throughout History
DESCRIPTION:  \nUCLA Philosophy is pleased to host the inaugural meeting of the Pan-American Symposium on the History of Logic. The symposium is a meeting of international specialists on diverse traditions in the History of Logic. Each meeting of the symposium focuses on a specific topic central to logic\, with the aim of offering a comparative picture of its treatment throughout history. This year’s topic is Validity throughout History. \n\nPan-American Symposium Program (PDF)\nSymposium Papers (attendees only — password protected)\n\nThe Pan-American Symposium on the History of Logic is made possible by the Kaplan Panzer Philosophy Endowment.
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/pan-american-symposium/
LOCATION:Royce Hall – Room 306
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20190405T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20190405T180000
DTSTAMP:20190313T191542Z
CREATED:20190221T210930Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190313T191542Z
UID:67256-1554478200-1554487200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: Japa Pallikkathayil\, University of Pittsburgh
DESCRIPTION:“Free Speech and the Embodied Self”\nJapa Pallikkathayil\, University of Pittsburgh\nFriday\, April 5 at 3:30 pm\nUCLA School of Law – Room 1457
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquim-japa-pallikkathayil-university-of-pittsburgh/
LOCATION:UCLA School of Law – Room 1457
CATEGORIES:Colloquia,Work Shops
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR