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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250226T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250226T190000
DTSTAMP:20250225T232318Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250225T232318Z
UID:74799-1740589200-1740596400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "A Molyneux Problem for Automated Science" - Kathleen Creel\, Northeastern University
DESCRIPTION:February 26\, 2025 | 5:00PM – 7:00PM\nDodd Hall 248 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Wednesday\, February 26\, 2025 in Dodd Hall 248 for a talk by Kathleen Creel\, Northeastern University\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nA Molyneux Problem for Automated Science\n\n  \nAutomated science is the attempt to use a combination of machine learning and robotics to perform experiments\, build new models\, postulate new laws\, and design new experiments on the basis of what is observed to be the result of previous experiments. The comparison between the learning problems faced by automated machine learning and the learning problems faced by human scientists sheds light on a subtle measurement problem which I will call the Molyneux Problem for Science.  The Molyneux problem asks whether a newly sighted person could recognize objects previously known by touch. I generalize the Molyneux problem to all forms of data and characterize the problem as a special form of scientific learning. The Molyneux Problem for Science exists whenever identity must be recognized across perceptual modalities or data streams of different types without the aid of causal or correlational information.  After distinguishing the scientific Molyneux problem from inverse problems and problems of causal discovery\, I will use the case of early radio telescopy to demonstrate that scientific Molyneux problems arise in traditional sciences. Finally\, I argue that Molyneux problems for science will vex automated science especially\, but that automated science has solutions unavailable to the Molyneux learner. \n  \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-kathleen-creel-northeastern-university/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 248
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Kathleen-Creel-HPASS-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250218T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250218T180000
DTSTAMP:20250218T172438Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250218T172438Z
UID:74930-1739894400-1739901600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Velleity Without Wishful Thinking: Aquinas and the Weakness of Will" - Andrea Aldo Robiglio (University of Louvain/KU Leuven)
DESCRIPTION:February 18\, 2025 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd Hall 275\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on February 18\, 2025 in Dodd Hall 275 for a talk by Andrea Aldo Robiglio\, University of Louvain/KU Leuven. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nIf you are unable to attend in person\, here is the Zoom info to attend remotely: \n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/94157070976?pwd=NYZZ6qBbrx3Bh0uiW60VPnGjSrVe4I.1 \nMeeting ID: 941 5707 0976\nPasscode: 396012 \n  \n  \nVelleity Without Wishful Thinking: Aquinas and the Weakness of Will\n  \nAndrea Aldo Robiglio\nProfessor of the History of Philosophy \nUniversity of Louvain/ KU Leuven \nVan Dyck Chair\, 2023-2024 \n  \nThe late medieval understanding of the human mind as a system of internal acts and dispositions—where multiple acts could coexist within the same faculty—marks a significant development in pre-modern philosophy. This nuanced conceptualization revises ancient accounts of the mind and introduces a more intricate vision of the Self. Within this framework\, medieval debates on incontinence (incontinentia) resonate with Aristotle’s exploration of weakness of will (akrasia) in Nicomachean Ethics\, Book VII. However\, 13th-century thinkers also introduced a novel concept\, velleity (velleitas)\, to describe a distinctive internal conflict: the possibility of choosing what is impossible to realize or achieve\, a choice that nonetheless carries moral significance. This innovation departs from Aristotle by recognizing the moral significance of choices involving the impossible. Over time\, the original meaning of velleity—as a vital aspect of moral action\, with positive connotations in thinkers like Aquinas—was largely diminished. Later philosophers\, such as Suárez\, Malebranche\, and Leibniz\, reduced it to wishful thinking; Locke associated it with uneasiness\, and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche dismissed it as mere vanity or fleeting feeling. Revisiting the original conception of velleity thus offers a compelling opportunity to recover its overlooked philosophical and moral significance. \n  \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n\n\nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/velleity-without-wishful-thinking-aquinas-and-the-weakness-of-will-andrea-robiglio-university-of-louvain-ku-leuven/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 275
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Robiglio-1.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250207T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250207T180000
DTSTAMP:20250109T011350Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250109T011350Z
UID:74318-1738944000-1738951200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Contractualism and Intuitionism" - T. M. Scanlon (Harvard University)
DESCRIPTION:February 7\, 2025 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce Hall 314\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on February 7\, 2025 in Royce Hall 314 for a colloquium with T. M. Scanlon\, Harvard University. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \n  \nContractualism and Intuitionism\n  \nA reexamination of the contractualist theory of right and wrong put forward in What We Owe to Each Other and subsequent papers\, considering the reasons for finding the view appealing as well as important problems with it\, including overdemandingness\, the charge of circularity\, and the wholesale exclusion of interpersonal aggregation. A new account of aggregation is proposed. \n  \nT. M. Scanlon is Alford Professor of Natural Religion\, Moral Philosophy\, and Civil Polity\, emeritus at Harvard University. He has written on many topics in moral and political philosophy\, including the nature of morality\, moral responsibility\, rights\, and equality. His books include What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard\, 1998) and\, most recently\, Why Does Inequality Matter? (Oxford\, 2018). Morality and Responsibility\, a collection of his essays\, will be published by Polity Press in early 2025. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n\n\nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-t-m-scanlon-harvard-university/
LOCATION:Royce Hall\, Room 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/T.-M.-Scanlon-Wordpress-Image-v2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250124T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250124T180000
DTSTAMP:20250110T233906Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250110T233906Z
UID:73367-1737734400-1737741600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Sweet Spots in Modal Metaphysics" - Stephen Yablo (MIT)
DESCRIPTION:January 24\, 2025 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM PT\nZoom\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \nJoin us on January 24\, 2025 for a virtual colloquium with Stephen Yablo\, MIT. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM PT on Zoom. \n  \nSweet Spots in Modal Metaphysics\n  \n\n\n\nDe re modal plenitude holds that all transworld modal profiles are exemplified. Where this table sits\, there are a bazillion other things categorically indiscernible from it but taking different paths through logical space. Five metaphysical puzzles are (re)examined through plenitudinarian spectacles. They’re to do with identity over time (the Ship of Theseus puzzle)\, identity across worlds (Chisholm’s paradox)\, how coincidents come by their different profiles (the grounding problem)\, things’ curious tendency to be found at their “modal sweet spot\,” bang in the middle of their zone of tolerance (the centrality problem)\, and how properties definitive of a thing can be losable (the problem of contingent non-accidents). Plenitudinarianism is presented less as a panacea than a theoretical option not to be overlooked. \n  \nStephen Yablo works in metaphysics\, epistemology\, philosophical logic\, and the philosophy of language and math. Older papers are collected in Thoughts and Things (Oxford\, 2009-10). Aboutness (Princeton\, 2014) develops a truthmaker-based theory of sentential subject matter\, and casts about for applications. He gave the Hempel Lectures at Princeton (2008)\, the Lockes at Oxford (2012)\, and the Whitehead Lectures at Harvard (2016). Recent work (some in progress/regress) includes “The Bandersnatches of Dubuque\,” “Leverage: A Model of Cognitive Significance\,” “Relevance without Minimality\,” “Fine-Grained Evidence\,” and “Tangled up in Grue.” \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-stephen-yablo-mit/
LOCATION:On Zoom
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Stephen-Yablo-Wordpress-Image-1.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250108T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250108T190000
DTSTAMP:20250108T193732Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250108T193732Z
UID:74693-1736355600-1736362800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "On the Constitutive Aims of Science" - Josh Hunt\, Syracuse University
DESCRIPTION:January 8\, 2025 | 5:00PM – 7:00PM\nZoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \n***Due to the current Palisades fire\, this talk will take place over Zoom only.***  \n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/96707253505?pwd=78HXYt9Sq6rI3LBPlE8ZpHIcIVM7LV.1 \nMeeting ID: 967 0725 3505\nPasscode: 026407 \n  \nJoin us on Wednesday\, January 8\, 2025 over Zoom for a talk by Josh Hunt\, Syracuse University\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nOn the Constitutive Aims of Science\n  \nI recast the debate between scientific realists and antirealists as a dispute over the constitutive aims of science. Drawing on accounts of epistemic normativity\, I propose a general method for identifying the constitutive aims of an activity\, understood as minimal criteria for success. Applying this method\, I argue that the constitutive aim of science is to solve problems concerning physical phenomena\, leading in the limit to an aim I call “ideal planning adequacy.” For non-logically omniscient agents like us\, planning adequacy requires determining a theory’s inferential structure\, i.e. what suffices or is needed to apply the theory. Clarifying a theory’s inferential structure requires considering its various formulations\, thereby making theory reformulation a constitutive aim of science. By remaining neutral on what it takes to solve a scientific problem—be it truth\, empirical adequacy\, understanding\, etc.—I provide  a framework that both realists and antirealists can endorse. \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-talk-josh-hunt-syracuse-university/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Josh-Hunt-HPASS-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241204T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241204T190000
DTSTAMP:20241120T194624Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241120T194624Z
UID:74677-1733331600-1733338800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "Truth\, Approximate Truth\, and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction" - Foad Dizadji-Bahmani\, Cal State LA
DESCRIPTION:December 4\, 2024 | 5:00PM – 7:00PM\nDodd Hall 247 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Wednesday\, December 4\, 2024 in Dodd Hall 247 for a talk by Foad Dizadji-Bahmani\, Cal State LA\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nTruth\, Approximate Truth\, and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction\n  \nThe scientific realism debate is a longstanding one in the philosophy of science. One of the most important arguments in the anti-realist’s armory is the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI). As is well known\, PMI purportedly shows that the history of science undermines realism. PMI has two guises: an inductive argument for the conclusion that current scientific theories are not true (PMIi) or a reductio ad absurdum against the idea that one can take the empirical and predictive success of a theory as reason to think that it is true (PMIr). I argue that once attention is paid to the logical difference between truth (which is categorical) and approximate truth (which is a matter of degree) it can be shown that the argument\, in each guise\, is fallacious. Specifically\, heeding this distinction\, it can be shown\, first\, that PMIi is either conceptually incoherent or self-defeating\, and second that PMIr is not sound. These results do not\, in and of themselves\, vindicate scientific realism. In order to do so\, the realist must\, inter alia\, further develop and defend the notion of approximate truth by recourse to which her position is formulated. In the last part of the paper\, I give an outline of a proposal to that end. \n  \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-talk-foad-dizadji-bahmani-cal-state-la/
LOCATION:Dodd 247\, 390 Portola Plaza\, Los Angeles\, CA\, 90095\, United States
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Foad-Dizadji-Bahmani-HPASS-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241122T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241122T180000
DTSTAMP:20241024T183100Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241024T183100Z
UID:74310-1732291200-1732298400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Bias: Some Surprising Truths" - Thomas Kelly\, Princeton University
DESCRIPTION:November 22\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd Hall 167 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on November 22\, 2024 for a colloquium with Thomas Kelly\, Princeton University. The talk will take place in Dodd Hall 167 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nBias: Some Surprising Truths\n  \nIn this talk\, I’ll argue for three claims about bias that many people find deeply counterintuitive if not obviously false: (i) Externalism about bias: a person can count as biased because of their social environment\, even if all of their internal cognitive processes are functioning impeccably; (ii) Rationality requires bias: in some cases\, rationality can require a person to be biased\, in a pejorative sense of ‘bias\,’ and the only way to escape being biased is to be irrational; (iii) Introspection is necessarily unreliable: the empirically well-documented fact that introspection is a highly unreliable way to tell whether we’re biased isn’t a contingent fact about our psychologies.  Rather\, it’s something that holds of necessity: even God could not have made us highly reliable detectors of our own biases by way of introspection \n  \n\nThomas Kelly is a Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University\, where he has taught since 2004.  Prior to coming to Princeton\, he was a Junior Fellow in the Society of Fellows at Harvard University\, where he received his PhD\, writing a dissertation under the supervision of Robert Nozick\, Derek Parfit\, and James Pryor. He works primarily in epistemology and has addressed topics such as the significance of disagreement\, the nature of evidence\, and the relationship between theoretical and practical rationality. His book Bias: A Philosophical Study appeared from Oxford University Press in 2023. \n\n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-thomas-kelly-princeton-university/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 167
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Thomas-Kelly-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241120T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241120T190000
DTSTAMP:20241107T193609Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241107T193609Z
UID:74672-1732122000-1732129200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "Against Self-Location" - Emily Adlam\, Chapman University
DESCRIPTION:November 20\, 2024 | 5:00PM – 7:00PM\nDodd Hall 247 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Wednesday\, November 20\, 2024 in Dodd Hall 247 for a talk by Emily Adlam\, Chapman University\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nAgainst Self-Location\n  \nIn this talk\, I will make a distinction between pure self-locating credences and superficially self-locating credences\, and then argue that there is never any rationally compelling way to assign pure self-locating credences. I will first argue that from a practical point of view\, pure self-locating credences simply encode our pragmatic goals\, and thus pragmatic rationality does not dictate how they must be set. I will then use considerations motivated by Bertrand’s paradox to argue that the indifference principle and other popular constraints on self-locating credences fail to be a priori principles of epistemic rationality\, and critique some approaches to deriving self-locating credences based on analogies to non-self-locating cases. Finally\, I will consider the implications of this conclusion for various applications of self-locating probabilities in scientific contexts\, arguing that it may undermine certain kinds of reasoning about multiverses\, the simulation hypothesis\, Boltzmann brains and vast-world scenarios. \n  \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-against-self-location-emily-adlam-chapman-university/
LOCATION:Dodd 247\, 390 Portola Plaza\, Los Angeles\, CA\, 90095\, United States
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Emily-Adlam-Wordpress-Image-v2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241018T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241018T180000
DTSTAMP:20241018T174424Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241018T174424Z
UID:74308-1729267200-1729274400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Faith and World" - Anil Gomes\, Trinity College\, Oxford
DESCRIPTION:October 18\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan Hall 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/94936079769?pwd=e0mp6PeBX17pVNnQaJN3LomWqsYZB6.1 \nMeeting ID: 949 3607 9769\nPasscode: 161718 \n  \nJoin us on October 18\, 2024 for a colloquium with Anil Gomes\, Oxford – Trinity College. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall 193 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nFaith and World\n  \nWhat connection\, if any\, is there between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Answers to this question thread through early modern discussions of the mind and then again\, transmuted and transformed\, across different twentieth-century traditions. My aim today is to clarify the question and set out some of the routes by means of which philosophers have attempted to establish a connection. The intent is to make salient two points: first\, the relevance to the question of Lichtenberg’s enigmatic remarks on the ‘I think’\, and second\, the role that faith and practice play in answering it. \n  \nAnil Gomes is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Trinity College\, Oxford\, and a Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Oxford. He has written on a range of topics in the philosophy of mind\, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant\, and the work of Iris Murdoch. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n\n\n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-anil-gomes-oxford-trinity-college/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Anil-Gomes-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240610T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240610T150000
DTSTAMP:20240607T155111Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240607T155111Z
UID:74104-1718024400-1718031600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:CANCELED: Thomas Icard (Stanford University): "Resource Rationality and Cognitive Costs"
DESCRIPTION:UPDATE: This event has been canceled.\n\nJune 10\, 2024 | 1:00PM – 3:00PM\nDodd Hall 399\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on June 10\, 2024 for a talk by Thomas Icard (Stanford University). The talk is called\, “Resource Rationality and Cognitive Costs.” It will take place in Dodd Hall 399 (and via Zoom) from 1:00PM – 3:00PM. \n  \nIf you are not able to join us in person\, here is a Zoom link to join remotely: \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/94825315773?pwd=NWt2bmhJR1RKOGJHRTFocGVvYkszUT09 \nMeeting ID: 948 2531 5773 \nPasscode: 350657 \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/thomas-icard-stanford-university-resource-rationality-and-cognitive-costs/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall – Room 399
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240503T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240503T180000
DTSTAMP:20240502T164000Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T164000Z
UID:73117-1714752000-1714759200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:POSTPONED: 2023-24 Colloquium: "Fuel to My Fire; You Can’t Stop Desire"
DESCRIPTION:UPDATE: This event has been postponed. Stay tuned for the new date.\n\nMay 3\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce Hall 306\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 3\, 2024 for a colloquium with E. M. Hernandez. The talk will take place in Royce Hall 306 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nFuel to My Fire; You Can’t Stop Desire\n  \nTrans existence has been plagued by two different explanations: a natural\, “born this way\,” necessity and a social\, often-thought perverted\, choice. These contrasting explanations of necessity and choice create an explanatory false dichotomy and political catch-22. This talk constructs an alternative explanation for why people transition\, one that centralizes the role of desire while recognizing the necessity of choice that arises from that desire. Toward this end\, I present a moral psychology of desire. An explanation that recognizes the role desire plays\, not just in our actions\, but in our perception. This desire is made apparent when one perceives the option to transition as a salient possibility for themself. Once this desire is recognized\, it functions as what Bernard Williams calls a categorical desire; a desire that partly constitutes one’s ethical identity\, making the satisfaction of that desire a matter of ethical necessity. I argue that this explanation eschews the explanatory false dichotomy and evades the political catch-22. \n  \nE. M. Hernandez (they/them) is an independent philosopher who explores issues of race and gender through understanding our moral psychology. They have published both academically and popularly on issues of transgender affirmation\, language\, and experience. They live in Durham\, North Carolina with their dog Canela. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-em-hernandez/
LOCATION:Royce Hall – Room 306
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240426T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240426T180000
DTSTAMP:20240426T160932Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T160932Z
UID:72968-1714147200-1714154400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: “Self-Consciousness as Species-Consciousness”
DESCRIPTION:April 26\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan Hall 193\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/96481370381?pwd=S3o0Y1Bpd3l5T0orcUVCVmNjY28rdz09 \nMeeting ID: 964 8137 0381\nPasscode: 648893 \n  \nJoin us on April 26\, 2024 for a colloquium with Karen Ng\, Vanderbilt University. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nSelf-Consciousness as Species-Consciousness\n  \nAlthough self-consciousness has been a central theme in many discussions within post-Kantian philosophy\, this paper aims to understand and defend an undertheorized aspect of Hegel’s account of this theme\, namely\, his claim that self-consciousness is species-consciousness. I approach this problem in three stages. First\, beginning with Hegel’s account of self-consciousness as desire and its connection with life\, I show that Hegel defends a version of the materialist conception of self-consciousness (Cassam) by focusing specifically on what he calls the “self-sufficiency” of living objects and subjects. Second\, I turn to Hegel’s account of the significance of what he calls the “simple universality” of the Gattung or species in relation to self-consciousness. This universality arises as a result of his account of the processes of life\, and here I show that Hegel defends a version of Michael Thompson’s argument about the significance of life-form consciousness for self-consciousness. Finally\, I conclude by reconstructing the central paragraphs 172-173 from the Phenomenology of Spirit where Hegel describes self-consciousness as the species or Gattung for itself\, and draw out several consequences and problems of Hegel’s account. Among these include the idea that self-consciousness is an achievement\, alongside the idea that our self-conscious form of life that Hegel calls Geist exists as a living species among other living species. \n  \nKaren Ng is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University. She specializes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European philosophy\, focusing in particular on Hegel\, German idealism\, Marx\, and Frankfurt School critical theory. Between 2023 and 2025\, she will be an Alexander von Humboldt senior research fellow at the Center for Post-Kantian Philosophy at the University of Potsdam. Her first book\, Hegel’s Concept of Life: Freedom\, Self-Consciousness\, Logic\, was published with Oxford in 2020 and was awarded the Journal of the History of Philosophy Book Prize. \n  \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-karen-ng-vanderbilt-university/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Karen-Ng-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240308T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240308T180000
DTSTAMP:20240308T193254Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240308T193254Z
UID:72957-1709913600-1709920800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Kant Under the Bodhi Tree? Anti-Individualism in Kantian Ethics"
DESCRIPTION:March 8\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce 314 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97394083916?pwd=bmhReEZQVURFKzl0Y2hXZDR4Mm8ydz09 \nMeeting ID: 973 9408 3916 \nPasscode: 026985 \n  \nJoin us on March 8\, 2024 for a colloquium with Karl Schafer\, UT Austin. The talk will take place in Royce 314 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nKant Under the Bodhi Tree? Anti-Individualism in Kantian Ethics\n  \nA common complaint about Kantian ethics today is that it cannot do full justice to the social or intersubjective dimensions of human life – that\, unlike Fichte\, Hegel\, or Marx\, Kant remains trapped within a fundamentally individualistic perspective on practical or moral questions. In this talk\, I will argue that such critiques of Kant rest on a natural\, but fundamental mischaracterization of where the most serious problems for Kant lie in this region. Far from being too individualistic\, I will argue that the real worry about Kantian moral theory is in fact that it may not be individualistic enough. As we will see\, this has potentially profound implications for how we understand Kant’s legacy in practical philosophy. Indeed\, if this is right\, from a certain perspective\, it might be Kant who is the most ethically radical of these philosophers. \n  \nKarl Schafer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. Previously he was Professor of Philosophy at University of California\, Irvine and Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. He works primarily in the history of modern philosophy (esp. Hume and Kant)\, ethics\, and epistemology. \n  \n  \n\n\n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-karl-schafer-ut-austin/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Wordpress-Image-Karl-Schafer-v3.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240216T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240216T180000
DTSTAMP:20240216T194404Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240216T194404Z
UID:73167-1708099200-1708106400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Radical Chains: Marx and the Dialectical Compatibilism of Freedom and Determinism"
DESCRIPTION:February 16\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/99929612695?pwd=d1I4UUMvRFB4eEhlTHI4Y2E5MHZNZz09 \nMeeting ID: 999 2961 2695 \nPasscode: 579432 \n  \nJoin us on February 16\, 2024 for a colloquium with Vanessa Wills\, George Washington University. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nRadical Chains: Marx and the Dialectical Compatibilism of Freedom and Determinism\n  \nIf Marx’s economic determinism requires that individual human beings always only behave just as the “laws of history” unavoidably compel them to\, then the practice of assigning moral praise and blame is no more appropriately applied to people than it is to inanimate objects dropped from heights. Numerous interpreters of Marx\, presuming that historical materialism does entail a strict\, mechanistic determinism\, have gone on to reason that Marx’s theory is therefore inhospitable to morality. However\, historical materialism does not entail this. \n  \nIn this talk\, I argue that Marx should be understood as advancing a “dialectical compatibilism” of freedom and determinism. I use the term “dialectical compatibilism” to invoke both the ways in which Marx’s approach to freedom and determinism is in conversation with traditional analyses of this pairing\, and also the ways in which it is fundamentally divergent from them. This position moves beyond the views typically arrayed along the axes of determinist or libertarian\, compatibilist or incompatibilist. \n  \nHuman freedom is itself a human product\, developing out of human beings’ goal-directed interactions with their natural and social environment. There is no inconsistency in Marx describing fairly lawlike\, deterministic regularities of human behavior on the one hand and speaking of a flourishing of human freedom\, individuality\, and creative potential on the other. If determinism is the negation of real human agency\, then human freedom is the negation of that negation\, one that can emerge only in the course of history. \n  \nVanessa Wills is Associate Professor of Philosophy at The George Washington University. Her areas of specialization are moral\, social\, and political philosophy\, nineteenth century German philosophy (especially Karl Marx)\, and the philosophy of race. Her research is importantly informed by her study of Marx’s work\, and focuses on the ways in which economic and social arrangements can inhibit or promote the realization of values such as freedom\, equality\, and human development. Her monograph\, Marx’s Ethical Vision\, is set to be released in April 2024. \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-vanessa-wills-george-washington-university/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Vanessa-Wills-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240119T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240119T180000
DTSTAMP:20240119T172717Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240119T172717Z
UID:73434-1705680000-1705687200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Conceivability and Possibility in Avicenna"
DESCRIPTION:January 19\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/93109412131?pwd=VFcrbHl2MEViVkg3dzUrZEV0NTN2QT09 \nMeeting ID: 931 0941 2131 \nPasscode: 279424 \n  \nJoin us on January 19\, 2024 for a colloquium with Jari Kaukua\, University of Jyväskylä. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nConceivability and Possibility in Avicenna\n  \nIn his theory of science\, Avicenna seems to commit to a very demanding concept of concept (taṣawwur): only the intellect’s adequate conceptions of real essences are concepts in the strict sense. This lands him the task of explaining what it is that we are doing when we think of things that are never realised\, such as phoenixes or counterfactual states of affairs. I suggest that his solution relies on a nuanced distinction\, grounded in his psychology\, between a descriptive and a normative concept of concept. Unrealised\, and consequently impossible\, things are not conceivable in the strict sense of the word (they do not have real concepts)\, but they may be conceived as conjunctions of real concepts that are instantiated in mental images construed by our imagination. Such conjunctions may be epistemically indistinct from real concepts\, which raises interesting questions concerning the metaphysical or scientific consequences of conceivability. Thus\, I conclude with the suggestion that Avicenna would not have appreciated conceivability as a sign of metaphysical possibility. \n  \nJari Kaukua is Professor of philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä. He is the author of Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy (CUP\, 2015) and Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism (Brill\, 2022)\, as well as many articles on classical and post-classical Islamic philosophy. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-jari-kaukua-university-of-jyvaskyla/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Jari-Kaukua-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231103T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231103T180000
DTSTAMP:20231103T181850Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231103T181850Z
UID:72945-1699027200-1699034400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Generics Favor Stability"
DESCRIPTION:November 3\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97634448928?pwd=RnhYeklPTlhIMEhVaTI0SFd3NVdkdz09 \nMeeting ID: 976 3444 8928 \nPasscode: 016526 \n  \nJoin us on November 3\, 2023 for a colloquium with Katherine Ritchie\, UC Irvine. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Shostak Terrace to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nGenerics Favor Stability\n  \nWe are creatures that seek to predict\, explain\, and control our environments. Generalizations—like those expressed by “birds have hollow bones” and “cigarettes cause cancer”—provide one resource to facilitate these tasks. In this paper (collaborative work with Ny Vasil) we develop a psychological account of the acceptability judgments of generic statements rooted in the psychological functions of generalizations. We argue that a notion of stability based on Woodward’s work on causation provides the basis for a unified account of generics. Generics that are taken to be stable are favored over those that are not. The account coheres with the function of generics\, while providing a unifying account of judgments about both causal and categorical generics. Moreover\, it can accommodate generics with both essentialist and structural explanatory commitments by recognizing the ways generics can express generalizations with relatively unrestricted scope and generalizations that are covertly contextually restricted to situational “bubbles”. Overall\, the account unifies an apparently diverse range of generics\, fits with a plausible account of the function of generalization in human psychology\, and provides a framework ripe for further empirical and theoretical investigation. \n  \nKatherine Ritchie is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at UC Irvine. Her research lies at the intersection of inquiry into linguistic and mental representation and the social world. She has written on the nature of social groups (e.g.\, teams\, committees\, races\, genders)\, the semantics of terms that pick out groups (e.g.\, plurals\, collective nouns\, slurs\, generics)\, and the ways we mentally represent groups. One central thread in her current research is to investigate how insights from metaphysics and from the ways we represent can help inform viable social-political projects. Her work has been published in Ethics\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, Cognition\, Cognitive Psychology\, Mind & Language\, and other journals and volumes. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-kate-ritchie-uc-irvine/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231020T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231020T180000
DTSTAMP:20231020T204847Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231020T204847Z
UID:72941-1697817600-1697824800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Aesthetic Acquaintance in Practice"
DESCRIPTION:October 20\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nZoom link: \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97140529852?pwd=a1NSL1AwVnBrMnF3eStHQTg4RlhDdz09 \nMeeting ID: 971 4052 9852 \nPasscode: 314912 \n  \nJoin us on October 20\, 2023 for a colloquium with Nick Riggle\, University of San Diego. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Shostak Terrace to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nAesthetic Acquaintance in Practice\n  \nThe Acquaintance Principle (AP)—the claim that aesthetic beliefs must be based on first-hand engagement and not on testimony—used to be “well-entrenched” in aesthetics. But today there is a near consensus that it fails in the light of a range of apparent counterexamples. Even pessimists about aesthetic testimony who believe in the spirit of AP reformulate its letter to accommodate these counterexamples. I will argue that when AP is correctly understood\, a position opens up that accommodates both pessimism and optimism. AP is not a principle to which there are counterexamples but rather a practice-governing rule to which there are legitimate exceptions. As such\, the so-called counterexamples do little to diminish the rule. The view results\, in part\, from appreciating how the norms of aesthetic valuing require us to apply AP not merely to the hearer but also to the speaker: one must base one’s aesthetic beliefs on one’s own engagement with their objects\, and not only must aesthetic testimony not be accepted\, it must not be offered. The exceptions to AP allow aesthetic knowledge to pass around under special circumstances but do nothing to minimize AP’s importance and force\, which can be justified by appeal to central features of the social practice of aesthetic valuing. The result is a more thoroughgoing Unusability Pessimism nestled within a novel communitarian theory of aesthetic value. If this is right\, then the decades-long debate between optimists and pessimists dissolves. \n  \nNick Riggle is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Diego. He completed his BA in philosophy at UC Berkeley\, earned his PhD at NYU\, and has been teaching at USD since 2015. Riggle’s work is primarily in aesthetics\, though his publications draw on and contribute to a range of fields in philosophy\, including the philosophy of language\, value theory\, social philosophy\, and the history of philosophy. He writes for both public and academic audiences\, and his work has appeared in The Philosophical Review\, The Philosophical Quarterly\, Philosophers’ Imprint\, The New York Times\, Aeon\, Penguin Books\, McSweeney’s Internet Tendency\, and many other outlets. His most recent book\, This Beauty: A Philosophy of Being Alive\, explores the existential significance of valuing beauty. \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-nick-riggle-uc-san-diego/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Nick-Riggle-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230526T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230526T180000
DTSTAMP:20230526T224820Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230526T224820Z
UID:72020-1685116800-1685124000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: "Art as a Shelter from Science"
DESCRIPTION:May 26\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce 314\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99826733700?pwd=cGUvN1ZzdXdrZmVibElaVVRTZnJTZz09\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 26\, 2023 for a colloquium with C. Thi Nguyen\, University of Utah. The talk will take place in Royce 314 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Royce Patio (3rd floor) to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nArt as a Shelter from Science\n  \nAesthetic judgment is different from scientific judgment. For many\, a key difference is that aesthetic judgment does not proceed via inferences. We cannot infer the existence of an aesthetic property based on the application of a rule. We must see for ourselves if some arrangement of lines and colors is\, in fact\, graceful. But we also give\, exchange\, and demand of each other reasons for our judgments about aesthetic properties. What kind of property could be non-inferential\, but\, at the same time\, subject to reasons? I would like to present a new solution: that non-inferentialism about aesthetic properties is not a some mysterious metaphysical feature of aesthetic properties\, but is rather a norm of a social practice. When we accept this rule\, the activity of aesthetic appreciation goes better in a few ways. First\, it drives the appreciator’s attention towards looking at particular details in a work\, rather than looking for recurring statistical regularities or abstract principles. This prevents a purely scientific approach to aesthetic judgment\, and drives the appreciator towards a detail-oriented perception of a work’s particularities. It drives conversants to continue to sensuously attend to works\, rather than shifting to more abstract methods of inquiry such as the philosophical search for first principles\, or the scientific study of aggregate regularities in perception. Second\, it sculpts a particular kind of interaction: open-ended exchanges of reasons which motivate the conversants to return to attending to the work. The value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation turns out to be quite distinct from that of\, say\, science. The goal is not the accumulation of true knowledge\, but fostering engagement in a particular valuable human activity. Perhaps we don’t disagree about art to get to the truth\, but we construct our artworks and art practices to foster endless\, satisfying disagreement.  \n  \nC. Thi Nguyen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. His research concerns aesthetics and social epistemology; he has written about trust\, games\, echo chambers\, cultural appropriation\, and the ethics of transparency. His first book is Games: Agency as Art (OUP). \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-c-thi-nguyen-university-of-utah/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Thi-Nguyen.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230512T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230512T180000
DTSTAMP:20230512T205018Z
CREATED:20230316T172758Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230512T205018Z
UID:72389-1683907200-1683914400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23: Colloquium: Does Institutional Racism Presuppose Racist Ideology?
DESCRIPTION:May 12\, 2023 | 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM PT\nKaplan 193 (and Zoom)\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/98656610498?pwd=TkRXeUMvdDVkRDlPY1piQVVxZ2gydz09\n  \nJoin us on May 12\, 2023 for a colloquium with Alberto Urquidez\, St. Olaf College. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall Room 193 from 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM with a light reception on the Shostak Terrace in front of Murphy Hall to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nDoes Institutional Racism Presuppose Racist Ideology?\n  \nWhat is racism? Standard definitions depict racism as a personal phenomenon thereby inviting questions about personal responsibility. A common definition analyzes racism as a cognitive phenomenon\, as in the belief that race R1 is superior to race R2. A nonstandard version of the cognitive approach centers widely held beliefs (rather than mere individual belief) and\, for purposes of moral assessment\, stresses social consequences (not mere cognitive contents). This approach is typically put in the service of explaining the persistence of racial inequality/injustice. Tommie Shelby defends a version of the nonstandard cognitive approach. For him\, racism is racist ideology. Roughly\, racist ideology consists in a widely held set of racial beliefs that misrepresent racial oppression and that function\, through this distortion\, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations. One alleged virtue of the nonstandard cognitivist approach is that it explains institutional racism. In this talk\, I will argue that at least one kind of institutional racism cannot be explained in terms of racist ideology. While I will not advocate rejecting Shelby’s analysis\, I will underscore the limitations of his analysis as a general theory of racism \n  \nAlberto G. Urquidez is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at St. Olaf College. He will be an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religion at James Madison University in Fall 2023. Urquidez works primarily on the nature of racism\, drawing on the tools of analytic philosophy in conjunction with interdisciplinary insights to understand racism in connection with various topics\, such as the problem of white identity politics\, moral responsibility for racial oppression\, and the relationship of individual racism to institutional racism. His aim is to develop an empirically-informed\, comprehensive\, structuralist analysis of racism as a system of racial oppression. He is the author of (Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis (Palgrave Macmillan 2020). \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-alberto-urquidez-st-olaf-college/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Alberto-Urquidez.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230508T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230508T133000
DTSTAMP:20230508T163300Z
CREATED:20230316T172758Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T163300Z
UID:72604-1683547200-1683552600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23: Colloquium: Hume on Economic Inequality
DESCRIPTION:May 8\, 2023 | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM PT\nKaplan 193 and Zoom\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99674975385\n  \nOn May 8\, 2023\, the Philosophy Dept. History Occasional Colloquium will host a talk by and discussion with Professor Margaret Schabas (UBC) on “Hume and Economic Inequality.” The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall Room 193 from 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM.  \nHere is the Zoom link if you would like to join virtually: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99674975385 \nRSVP HERE\n  \nHume and Economic Inequality\n  \nIn his essay “Of the Original Contract\,” Hume endorsed the longstanding belief in “how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force\, and even in their mental powers and faculties\, till cultivated by education.” Although not an egalitarian\, Hume\, I will argue\, sought to reduce economic inequality of income though not necessarily of wealth. Two central goals of his economic philosophy were to raise the standard of living of the lower classes and to expand the so-called “middle station.” Above all\, Hume opposed the “utility of poverty” doctrine as a hindrance to economic growth. His position was motivated by utilitarian ends: a more prosperous laboring class would result in a happier nation\, not only because of the larger basket of goods in the household but also because citizens would tend to become more law-abiding and thus promote political stability. As Hume observed\, “a too great disproportion among the citizens weakens any state.” Finally\, Hume sought to enrich poorer nations and thereby reduce economic inequality between nations\, primarily as a means to foster peace. \n  \nProfessor Schabas (FRSC) works primarily in the History and Philosophy of Science\, with a focus on Economics.  Her first book\, A World Ruled by Number (Princeton\, 1990) addressed the transformation of economics into a mathematical science; her second book\, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago\, 2005) addressed the concept of the economy since the early modern period; her third and most recent book is on Hume’s economics (A Philosopher’s Economist Chicago\, 2020).  She has also co-edited a book on Hume’s economics and another entitled Oeconomies in the Age of Newton. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-hume-on-economic-inequality/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Margaret-Schabas.jpg
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230428T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230428T180000
DTSTAMP:20230428T193233Z
CREATED:20230316T171935Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230428T193233Z
UID:72385-1682697600-1682704800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Colloquium: Against Philosophy\, Against Inquiry
DESCRIPTION:April 28th\, 2023 | 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM PT\nKaplan Hall 193 (and Zoom)\nHosted by Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) at UCLA\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/94960209231?pwd=Q3lLbnRzNXZPRkgxZ3FnOFFEbHVEZz09\n  \nJoin us on April 28th\, 2023 for a colloquium with Dr. Johnathan Flowers\, California State University\, Northridge. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall Room 193 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nNote: ASL interpreters will be available for the duration of the talk. \n  \nAgainst Philosophy\, Against Inquiry\n  \nThis talk will position the current practice of inquiry in philosophy\, colloquially described as “just asking questions\,” as enabling the maintenance of structures of oppression through the ways in which it refuses to grapple with the social\, political\, and cultural realities from which it emerges. This failure allows for the laundering of ableism and transphobia through scholarship that aims to “just ask questions” not just about the nature of gender identity and disability\, but about the very humanity of trans and disabled persons. Finally\, this talk will describe how the conflation of “just asking questions” with contemporary practices of inquiry in philosophy also serve to position objections to this practice of inquiry as “anti-philosophy\,” or opposed to the very nature of philosophy and academia itself. \n  \nJohnathan Flowers is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at California State University\, Northridge. Flowers’s research areas include African American intellectual history\, Japanese Aesthetics\, American Pragmatism\, Philosophy of Disability\, and Philosophy of Technology. Flowers also works in the areas of Science and Technology Studies and Comics Studies\, where he applies insights from American Pragmatism\, Philosophy of Race\, and Disability Studies to current issues in human/computer interaction\, artificial intelligence and machine learning\, and representations of identity in popular culture. His book\, Mono no Aware and Gender as Affect in Japanese Aesthetics and American Pragmatism\, is due out in April. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-dr-jonathan-flowers/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Johnathan-Flowers-v3-1.png
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230421T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230421T180000
DTSTAMP:20230421T194542Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230421T194542Z
UID:72004-1682092800-1682100000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: The Reasons We Cannot Share
DESCRIPTION:April 21\, 2023 | 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM PT\nRoyce Hall 243 (and Zoom)\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/98234276234?pwd=ZkpiMFNCSjFvSVNoK1FpWFBJWjkzQT09\n  \nJoin us on April 21\, 2023 for a colloquium with Kyla Ebels Duggan\, Northwestern University. The talk will take place in Royce Hall Room 243 from 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM with a reception on the 3rd floor Royce Patio to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nThe Reasons We Cannot Share\n  \nAccording to political liberals\, a pluralist society should leave each person free to pursue their own conception of the good\, but individuals should bracket these values when engaging in political reasoning with one another.  When reasoning about the basic institutions and fundamental laws that govern the society\, each person should appeal only to so-called public reasons.  Public reasons are considerations that everyone (or at least all reasonable people) can see as reasons\, reasons that we can all share. \n  \nIn the first several sections of the paper\, I explore the ways in which we can and cannot give one another reasons and share reasons that we have.  I compare and contrast the possibilities with respect to reasons for believing\, reasons for valuing\, and reasons for acting.  I then use these distinctions to support the claim that the liberal ideal for relating to others does not require\, and in fact cannot be realized by\, limiting our political reasoning to appeals to shared reasons.  Instead\, I’ll suggest\, it requires regarding others as giving us new reasons to act by valuing and choosing what they do.  When I regard you this way\, I act on reasons that are necessarily different from those on which you act—reasons that we cannot share. \n  \nKyla Ebels-Duggan is Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University.  She specializes in moral and political philosophy and their history\, working in a broadly Kantian tradition. Her work has appeared in Ethics\, The Philosophical Quarterly\, Philosophical Studies and Philosophers’ Imprint.  She is completing a book on valuing attitudes and starting a book on Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy. \n  \n\nRSVP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-kyla-ebels-duggan-northwestern-university/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 243
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Kyla-Ebels-Duggan.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230317T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230317T180000
DTSTAMP:20230309T011049Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230309T011049Z
UID:72358-1679068800-1679076000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: Strong Determinism
DESCRIPTION:March 17\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd 121\n  \nJoin us on March 17th\, 2023 for a colloquium with Eddy Keming Chen\, UC San Diego. The talk will take place in Dodd 121 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \nA strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989)\, “it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed\, according to some precise mathematical scheme\, for all time.” Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in any realistic theory of physics. In this talk\, I show how it can be achieved in a universe like ours. First\, I propose a definition of strong determinism and explain how it differs from standard determinism and super-determinism. Next\, I discuss its attractions\, implications\, and some toy examples. The possibility of strong determinism has interesting consequences for explanation\, causation\, prediction\, and modality. Finally\, I show that Everettian quantum mechanics\, with a new version of the Past Hypothesis\, provides an easy route to strong determinism. On the new theory that I call the Everettian Wentaculus\, the quantum state of the multiverse is a fundamental mixed state with exactly one possible history. As a consequence of physical laws\, the history of the multiverse could not have been different. \nYou are encouraged but not required to read the preprint before attending the talk: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.02886.pdf \n  \n​Eddy Keming Chen is an assistant professor in philosophy at the University of California\, San Diego (UCSD). He works at the intersection of philosophy of physics\, philosophy of science\, and metaphysics. He also has interests in philosophy of mind\, decision theory\, formal epistemology\, philosophy of mathematics\, philosophy of religion\, and Chinese philosophy. He is an associate editor of the journal Foundations of Physics\, a fellow of the John Bell Institute for the Foundations of Physics\, an affiliated faculty member of the UCSD Chinese studies program\, and a member of the interdisciplinary project “Life on the Edge.” He has written about time’s arrow\, laws of nature\, quantum ontology\, physical space\, scientific explanations\, infinitary decision theory\, and temporal self-location. In several recent papers\, he has been developing a new account of time’s arrow in a quantum universe\, called the “Wentaculus.” One of these papers\, published in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science\, was awarded the Popper Prize for “ambitious\, novel contribution to major issues in the foundations of physics” and judged to be the best paper in its 2021 volume. His work on the vagueness of physical laws has been published in The Philosophical Review and featured as a cover story in New Scientist. One of his side interests is using films to popularize philosophical and scientific ideas. Currently\, he is co-writing a screenplay about a time-travel romance. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-strong-determinism/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 121
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Eddy-Chen-feature-image.jpg
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230310T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230310T180000
DTSTAMP:20230308T185506Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230308T185506Z
UID:72322-1678464000-1678471200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: Being Called
DESCRIPTION:March 10\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd 121\n  \nJoin us on March 10th\, 2023 for a colloquium with Una Stojnić\, Princeton University. The talk will take place in Dodd 121 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception in Dodd 399 to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \nIn the context of attempting to explain predicative uses of names—most contemporary theorists\, post Naming and Necessity—whether Millians or Descriptivists—invoke the relation of being called; ‘There are two Annas in my class’ semantically expresses or pragmatically conveys that there are two individuals called ‘Anna’ (or alternatively\, two individuals called Anna) in my class.  What has gone unnoticed is that invoking this relation incurs metaphysical commitments about name individuation that are staggering\, requiring positing indefinitely many ambiguous lexical items\, that are unlike any familiar type of lexical items. \n  \nUna Stojnić is an assistant professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University. Prior to joining Princeton\, she was an assistant professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University\, which she joined after receiving her PhD in Philosophy and Certificate in Cognitive Science from Rutgers University. She was also a Bersoff assistant professor/faculty fellow in Philosophy at NYU and a research fellow in philosophy at the School of Philosophy at ANU. Una’s main research focus is on the philosophical\, linguistic\, and psychological aspects of human communication and linguistic capacities. She also works in philosophical logic and its intersection with natural languages. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-being-called/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 121
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Una-Stojnic-feature-image.jpg
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230303T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230303T180000
DTSTAMP:20230227T073432Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230227T073432Z
UID:72301-1677859200-1677866400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: Examining Social Norms in Animal Cultures
DESCRIPTION:March 3\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd 121\n  \nJoin us on March 3rd\, 2023 for a colloquium with Kristin Andrews\, York University. The talk will take place in Dodd 121 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Shostak Terrace (in front of Murphy Hall) to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n\nSocial norms—rules governing which behaviors are deemed appropriate or inappropriate within a given community—are typically taken to be uniquely human. Recently\, this position has been challenged. The view that norms are human unique stems from commitments regarding the psychological capacities required for having them\, and skepticism that animals possess these prerequisites. However\, among norm cognition researchers there is little agreement about the cognitive architecture that underpins social norms in humans. To make progress on the question\, there needs to be a point of agreement–an operationalized account of social norms. Drawing on Westra and Andrews’ (2022) account of a normative regularity–a socially maintained pattern of behavioral conformity within a community–I present three potential cases in primates and discuss the sort of evidence that would be needed to conclude that they qualify as normative regularities. I consider two objections: that social norms involve following rules with deontic content (and animals don’t do that)\, and that having social norms requires punishing non-compliant actors (and animals don’t do that). I conclude with some practical and theoretical implications. \n  \nKristin Andrews is York Research Chair in Animal Minds and Professor of Philosophy at York University\, and she was elected to the College of the Royal Society of Canada in 2015. Her research is at the intersection of philosophy\, social cognition\, moral cognition\, and animal cognition. She is the author of several books\, including most recently How to Study Animal Minds (Cambridge 2020)—an argument for rethinking methods in comparative psychology; and The Animal Mind second edition (Routledge 2020) – a survey of how empirical work on animal minds can help to inform debates in the philosophy of mind.  In recent years\, she has contributed to policy discussions of the status of great apes in US law and digital research infrastructure for animal behavior in Canada. Andrews serves on the Board of Directors for The Borneo Orangutan Society Canada\, which has the mission to promote conservation of orangutans and their habitat and to educate the public. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-examining-social-norms-in-animal-cultures/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 121
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230227T113000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230227T140000
DTSTAMP:20230227T073438Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230227T073438Z
UID:72281-1677497400-1677506400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Kepler and Descartes on Nature and Its Representation
DESCRIPTION:February 27\, 2023 | 11:30AM – 2:00PM\nRoyce 306\n  \nJoin us on Monday\, February 27\, 2023 for lunch and a lecture by Brian Baigrie\, University of Toronto. \nSandwiches will be served at 11:30AM and the talk will begin at 12:00PM. \n  \nRSVP below to save your spot!\n  \nIf you can’t make it to the talk in person\, here is the link to join remotely: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/93382136321?pwd=OWh0bFVJcWQzUkRyQXl3SGpxWFJYZz09 \n  \n\nIn his Ad Vitellionem paralipomena (Additions to Witelo\, 1604)\, Johannes Kepler advanced the remarkable thesis that the act of seeing involves the painting of an inverted picture on the retina\, comparable to the picture that appears on the back of the camera obscura. Kepler’s discovery of the retinal image has been well-documented by historians of the science of optics\, but its impact during the 17th century on the emergence of the mechanical philosophy and a growing recognition of the need for a novel of framework to conceptualize the relationship between nature and its representation is less well-known. This talk will present the central elements of Kepler’s new theory of vision in an attempt to shed light on aspects of its influence on the 17th century twin revolutions in science and philosophy. \n  \nBrian Baigrie is Director of Graduate Studies and Associate Professor at The Institute for the History & Philosophy of Science & Technology\, and cross-appointed to the Institute for Health Policy\, Management & Evaluation (Faculty of Medicine) at the University of Toronto.   His ongoing research (both historical and philosophical) is focussed on evidential reasoning. \n  \n[gravityform id=”58″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/kepler-and-descartes-on-nature-and-its-representation/
LOCATION:Royce Hall – Room 306
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230224T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230224T180000
DTSTAMP:20230223T200607Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230223T200607Z
UID:72288-1677254400-1677261600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: Spinoza on truth
DESCRIPTION:February 24\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd 121\n  \nJoin us on February 24\, 2023 for a colloquium with Karolina Hübner\, Cornell University. The talk will take place in Dodd 121 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception in Dodd 399 to follow. \nRSVP HERE\n  \n\nSurprisingly little has been written about Spinoza’s theory of truth\, and there is no general consensus about how he should be understood. After a period during which he was most often portrayed as a coherence theorist\, today he is usually thought to advance a correspondence theory of truth. In this talk I propose a new account of how Spinoza understands the nature of truth – one that makes a more unified and comprehensive sense  of Spinoza’s doctrines and texts. More specifically\, I propose that Spinoza endorses a version of the identity theory of truth. Very roughly\, on identity theories\, the nature of truth consists in the identity of the truthbearer with the truthmaker. I argue that Spinoza holds an identity conception of truth insofar as\, on his view\, true “ideas” are identical with the “things” they are about. More precisely\, a true Spinozistic idea of a thing is that thing itself\, albeit existing in a distinct – purely mental – manner. This conception of truth\, I show\, grows directly out of Spinoza’s general theory of representation – his theory of what it is for any idea to be about or of something in the first place. On my reading\, Spinoza’s theory of truth also turns out to be inseparable from certain ontological commitments – in particular\, a commitment to a pluralism of ways of having being. Arguably\, then\, the identity conception of truth stands or falls with much of the rest of Spinoza’s metaphysical and epistemological edifice. \n  \nKarolina Hübner is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Sage School of Philosophy\, Cornell University. Her work on the metaphysics\, epistemology\, and philosophy of mind in the early modern period has appeared in such journals as Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, the Philosophical Quarterly\, the Journal of the History of Philosophy and Philosophers’ Imprint. Until 2019\, she was Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. Her 2022 article in the Journal of the History of Philosophy\, “Representation and Mind-Body Identity in Spinoza’s Philosophy\,” is the winner of the JHP’s prize for the best article of 2022. She is the co-editor of the forthcoming Spinoza Cambridge Lexicon\, and the editor of Human (Oxford Philosophical Concepts series). She is currently working on a monograph on Spinoza’s metaphysics of thought. \nRSVP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-karolina-hubner-cornell-university/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 121
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20220520T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20220520T180000
DTSTAMP:20220519T191245Z
CREATED:20210809T200104Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220519T191245Z
UID:70514-1653062400-1653069600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: C. Thi Nguyen\, University of Utah - CANCELLED
DESCRIPTION:Games and Value Capture\nC. Thi Nguyen\, University of Utah Department of Philosophy\nMay 20\, 2022 – CANCELLED
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-c-thi-nguyen-university-of-utah/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20220506T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20220506T180000
DTSTAMP:20220421T190913Z
CREATED:20210731T211011Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220421T190913Z
UID:70492-1651852800-1651860000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium:  Beri Marusic\, University of Edinburgh
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, May 6\, 2022 from 4 pm to 6 pm\n“Interpersonal Reasoning”\nBari Marusic\, University of Edinburgh\nRoyce Hall room 314
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-beri-marusic-university-of-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20211203T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20211203T180000
DTSTAMP:20211116T202535Z
CREATED:20210908T193558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211116T202535Z
UID:70574-1638547200-1638554400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium:  Rosa Cao\, Stanford University
DESCRIPTION:Putting Representations to Use\nRosa Cao\, Stanford University\nFriday\, December 3rd at 4:00 pm\nPublic Affairs Building 1246
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-rosa-cao-stanford/
LOCATION:Public Affairs Building – Room 1246
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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