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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260515T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260515T180000
DTSTAMP:20260505T185104Z
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SUMMARY:Colloquium: “Why Do Mantras Move Us?” - Elisabeth Camp\, Rutgers University
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, May 15\, 2026\n4:00 – 6:00 PM\nDodd Hall 175\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Friday\, May 15\, 2026\, for a colloquium with Elisabeth Camp\, Rutgers University. The talk will take place from 4:00 – 6:00 PM in Dodd Hall 175 with a reception to follow. \n  \nWhy Do Mantras Move Us?\n  \nWhy do mantras like ‘Boys will be boys’\, ‘Minds are computers’\, and ‘It is what it is’ bear repeating? On their face\, their ubiquitous role in our individual and collective lives is puzzling\, since they so often flirt with vacuity: “syllables for the sake of syllables\, a waste of cognition and breath\,” as Frank Bruni puts it. And yet they can be powerful heuristics for handling situations that threaten to overwhelm us with informational complexity or emotional intensity. I propose that mantras like these function as frames: they encapsulate regulative principles for interpreting their topics by harnessing otherwise disparate thoughts\, images and feelings into an integrated\, intuitive perspective. More specifically\, they exhort us to regulate our attention by focusing on what really matters\, according to a presupposed perspective. Mantras’ schematic evocativeness makes them useful tools for scaffolding interpretive stability across fine-grained variations in assumptions\, attitudes\, and contexts. But they also leave those who don’t ‘get the gist’ out in the interpretive cold. Moreover\, as they are re-deployed across contexts\, mantras tend to lose their intuitive anchoring in rich implicit assumptions\, becoming rigid and empty – just as their critics allege. \n  \nElisabeth Camp is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University\, New Brunswick. She is the author of over forty articles in philosophy of language\, mind\, and aesthetics\, as well as the editor of a volume on philosophical implications of Emily Dickinson’s poetry. Her research focuses on thoughts and utterances that don’t fit a standard model of minds as rule-governed engines for compiling and transforming information and of language as a medium for expressing propositions to share information. Recent publications have addressed nicknames\, social labels\, and sociolinguistic style; stories\, insinuation\, and the heresy of paraphrase; and maps\, concepts\, and structural representations. \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-elisabeth-camp-rutgers-university/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 175
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/CAMP-Wordpress-Image.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260508T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260508T180000
DTSTAMP:20260501T195156Z
CREATED:20251217T180014Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260501T195156Z
UID:75713-1778256000-1778263200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: "Reflection on One’s Interpersonal Self-Consciousness" Lucy O’Brien\, University College London
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, May 8\, 2026\n4:00 – 6:00 PM\nDodd Hall 170\nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \nJoin us on Friday\, May 8\, 2026 for a colloquium with Lucy O’Brien\, University College London. The talk will take place from 4:00 – 6:00 PM in Dodd Hall\, Room 170\, with a reception to follow. \n  \nReflection on One’s Interpersonal Self-Consciousness\n  \nOther people can make us feel self-conscious\, embarrassed\, ashamed\, and proud. In this talk I want to consider how to think about a subject’s reflective relation to their own interpersonal self-consciousness. A self-conscious subject is tasked with both (i) the practical management of their interpersonal self-consciousness\, and (i) normative appraisals of their interpersonal self-consciousness. I will suggest that the latter concern can be thought of in the context of a general problem of rational deference. I suggest that our self-appraisals should be understood as allowing for a kind of rational opacity\, and ambivalence. A subject normatively engaging with her self-conscious life\, and who understands that her self-appraisals are beholden to the appraisals of others\, will realise that her sense of her own value is not only up to her. \n  \nLucy O’Brien is Richard Wollheim Professor of Philosophy at UCL. Her research interests lie in the philosophy of mind and action\, with a particular focus on various forms of self-consciousness\, and self-knowledge. She is writing a book on interpersonal self-consciousness following receipt of a British Academy/Leverhulme Senior Research Fellowship. She has published papers in a range of journals and collections\, she is the author of Self-Knowing Agents (OUP\, 2007) and co-editor\, with Matthew Soteriou\, of Mental Actions (OUP\, 2009). She was awarded a Humboldt Forschungspreis in 2021 and was made a Fellow of the British Academy in 2024. She was co-editor\, with A. W. Moore\, of the journal MIND from 2015-2025. She has been Chair of the Royal Institute of Philosophy since 2020. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/colloquium-lucy-obrien-university-college-london/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 170
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/OBRIEN-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260417T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260417T180000
DTSTAMP:20260406T201540Z
CREATED:20251001T192511Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260406T201540Z
UID:75640-1776441600-1776448800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Colloquium: "Beyond Speech: Pictures and Oppression" - A.W. Eaton (University of Illinois\, Chicago)
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, April 17\, 2026\n4:00 – 6:00 PM\nRoyce Hall 314\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Friday\, April 17\, 2026 for a colloquium with A.W. Eaton\, University of Illinois\, Chicago. The talk will take place from 4:00 – 6:00 PM in Royce 314 with a reception to follow. \n  \nBeyond Speech: Pictures and Oppression\n  \nPhilosophical work on oppressive forms of expression strongly tends to give verbal and written linguistic expression pride of place. When it comes to pictures\, there is a tendency to either treat them as if they were language – one sees this in feminist work on pornography – or worse\, to ignore pictures altogether when the topic at hand least typically pictorial or typically has a significant pictorial dimension – one sees this in Jason Stanley’s work on propaganda. Against this linguisticism\, I argue that central and influential forms of oppressive “speech” are in fact pictorial and that to understand how they do their oppressive work\, we must approach pictures as pictures rather than as forms of spoken or written language. In this paper\, I first examine one glaring case of linguisticism\, then say something about what I think is going on here\, and finally briefly examine examples of oppressive pictures and give the outlines of an explanation of how they do their oppressive work. \n  \nPlease note that I will be discussing pictures that glorify and eroticize rape\, and pictures that mock\, shame\, and demean Black persons. I will also mention pictures of lynchings. I will briefly show some of these pictures\, though not the lynching pictures. I will not leave any pictures up for long because they are triggering or otherwise injurious for many of us. That\, after all\, is part of the point of this paper. I will do my best to give warning before I show or mention these pictures. \n  \nA.W. Eaton is Professor of Philosophy and Associate Dean at University of Illinois Chicago (sometimes known as “Chicago Circle”). She received her PhD in both philosophy and art history from The University of Chicago. She has published on topics such as the relationship between aesthetic and ethical value\, pornography\, erotic art\, fatness\, feminist aesthetics\, aesthetics and race\, and artistic representations of rape. She is currently developing a pragmatic account of pictures and working on various topics related to aesthetic injustice. Eaton has been a Laurence Rockefeller Fellow at Princeton’s Center for Human Values; Senior Research Fellow at Lichtenberg Kolleg\, University of Göttingen; and the Brady Distinguished Visiting Associate Professor\, Northwestern University. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/beyond-speech-pictures-and-oppression-a-w-eaton-university-of-illinois-chicago/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20251107T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20251107T180000
DTSTAMP:20251025T174626Z
CREATED:20251025T174504Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251025T174626Z
UID:75701-1762531200-1762538400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"A Puzzle Concerning Reason and the Emotions" - Ram Neta\, University of North Carolina\, Chapel Hill
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, November 7\, 2025\n4:00 – 6:00 PM\nRoyce Hall 314\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on November 7th\, 2025 for a colloquium with Ram Neta\, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill. The talk will take place from 4:00 – 6:00 PM in Royce 314 with a reception to follow. \n  \nA Puzzle Concerning Reason and the Emotions\n  \nEach of the following theses enjoys some support in recent philosophical discussions. \n\nEmotions\, like judgments and resolutions\, can be exercises of rational agency\, and held in light of various considerations that seem to the agent to support them.\nEmotions\, unlike judgments or resolutions\, cannot constitute our drawing the conclusion of some reasoning.\nAny exercise of rational agency\, held in light of considerations that seem to support it\, can constitute our drawing the conclusion of reasoning from those same considerations.\n\nProponents of thesis (1) (e.g.\, Olivia Bailey\, Rachel Achs) have sought to argue against thesis (2).  Proponents of thesis (2) (e.g.\, Conner Schultz\, Nate Sharadin) have sought to argue against thesis (1).  In this paper\, I defend both theses (1) and (2)\, and give an explanation of why thesis (3) is false.  This explanation will shed light on how inference differs from other forms of reasons-responsiveness.  It will also expose an ambiguity in Hieronymi’s notion of “evaluative control”. \n  \nRam Neta is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina\, Chapel Hill\, where he has taught since 2002.  He is the author of dozens of articles\, primarily in epistemology.  These have been published in The Philosophical Review\, Nous\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science\, and many other venues.  He is also the editor of a number of volumes\, including a forthcoming volume on the Philosophy of John McDowell. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/ram-neta-university-of-north-carolina-chapel-hill/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Neta.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250530T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250530T180000
DTSTAMP:20250522T225040Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250522T225040Z
UID:74326-1748620800-1748628000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Power and Romantic Relationships" - Lucy McDonald (King's College - London)
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, May 30\, 2025\n4:00 – 6:00PM\nDodd Hall 161\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 30\, 2025 for a colloquium with Lucy McDonald\, King’s College – London. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nPower and Romantic Relationships\n  \nRomantic relationships with significant power imbalances are often considered defective. Charlotte Brontë seems to share such intuitions; in Jane Eyre\, the romantic relationship between the novel’s eponymous heroine and Edward Rochester is initially hampered by its power asymmetries\, and only flourishes when the power imbalance is attenuated. Only when partners enjoy something like an equality of power\, Brontë suggests\, can a relationship achieve its full potential. \n  \nIn this talk\, I ask whether Brontë is right that romantic relationships must aim at equality of power. I will taxonomise the different kinds of power relations involved in romantic relationships\, and I will consider a range of arguments for why romantic relationships involving power imbalances might be morally objectionable\, or at the very least morally hazardous. \n  \nLucy McDonald is a lecturer in philosophy at King’s College London. She works in ethics\, feminist philosophy\, and philosophy of language. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-lucy-mcdonald-kings-college-london/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Lucy-McDonald-Wordpress-Image-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250516T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250516T180000
DTSTAMP:20250514T214517Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250514T214517Z
UID:74304-1747411200-1747418400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Maneuvering Agency" - Alisa Bierria (UCLA Gender Studies)
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, May 16\, 2025\n4:00 – 6:00PM\nRoyce Hall 306\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 16\, 2025 in Royce Hall 306 for a colloquium with Alisa Bierria\, UCLA Gender Studies. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nManeuvering Agency\n  \nResearchers have documented patterns in which black women who have experienced sexual or domestic violence are not believed\, perceived\, or supported as survivors. Indeed\, police\, prosecutors\, and other state actors that regulate “crime” and “criminals” often provoke\, exacerbate\, and regulate violence for black survivors\, rationalizing the criminalization of black survivors through manipulating discourses about their agency. In this talk\, I describe several forms of “agency maneuvers” through a discussion about the politics of intention and how action/reaction is rationalized. I will also propose methodological approaches for theorizing agency given this analysis. \n  \nAlisa Bierria is a black feminist philosopher and an assistant professor in the Department of Gender Studies at UCLA. Her forthcoming book\, Inconceivable Agency: Race\, Gender Violence\, & the Carceral Imagination\, proposes a pluralistic\, qualitative philosophical framework for agency that can account for action taken within a matrix of violence. Through focusing on insights from black survivors’ lives\, experiences\, and visions of freedom\, she argues that we must not only ask “how much” agency are subjects allowed within conditions of subjugation\, but also what kinds of agency are projected onto subjects\, and what kinds of agency are formed through acting with the intent to survive. \n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-alisa-bierria-ucla-gender-studies/
LOCATION:Royce Hall Room 306
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250509T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250509T180000
DTSTAMP:20250423T001017Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250423T001017Z
UID:74324-1746806400-1746813600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Evidential Support First\, Probability Second" - Shyam Nair (Arizona State University)
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, May 9\, 2025\n4:00 – 6:00 PM\nRoyce Hall 314\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 9\, 2025 in Royce 314 for a colloquium with Shyam Nair\, Arizona State University. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nEvidential Support First\, Probability Second\n  \n\n\nIs E evidence for H? Is E better evidence for H than E’ is for H’? These questions have been studied by approaches that make use of probabilities. They (i) provide an account of what Pr is intended to represent and (ii) on this understanding of Pr\, claim that E is evidence for H iff Pr(H|E) > Pr(E). Though there are many differences among the approaches\, they are all reductive accounts of evidential support: what it is for E to be evidence for H is understood in terms of whatever the theory says Pr represents where Pr itself is not a representation of evidential support. This talk is about how to accept that E is evidence for H iff Pr(H|E) > Pr(H) while rejecting reductivism and about why this matters. \n\n\n  \nShyam Nair is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University. He is primarily interested in ethics\, epistemology\, and logic. His research concerns issues at the intersection of these fields. \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n  \n\nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-shyam-nair-arizona-state-university/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250411T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250411T180000
DTSTAMP:20250404T204043Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250404T204043Z
UID:74322-1744387200-1744394400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Markets in Cultural Artefacts" - Cécile Fabre (All Souls College\, Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, April 11\, 2025\n4:00 – 6:00PM\nLaw Building\, Room 1447\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on April 11\, 2025 in the Law Building\, Room 1447\, for a colloquium with Cécile Fabre\, All Souls College\, Oxford. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nMarkets in Cultural Artefacts\n  \nCultural artefacts such as paintings\, antiquities\, sculptures\, manuscripts and old musical instruments are routinely bought and sold on open markets. The literature on the moral limits of markets is virtually silent on this kind of markets. One can see why: selling and buying votes\, kidneys\, sex\, and military service seems much more problematic than selling and buy art. Nevertheless\, the relationship between markets and cultural artefacts is not straightforward. Some of those objects are commonly described as priceless notwithstanding the fact that they clearly have a price. Moreover\, some of the practices linked to markets in cultural artefacts elicit moral condemnation: first and foremost\, looting\, but also licitly buying a work of art yet only as an investment and locking it up in a vault never to show it to the public\, and selling artefacts onto global markets with little regard to the adverse impact this may have on the communities to whose culture they are central. This paper provides a qualified moral defence of markets in cultural artefacts. It makes a preliminary case for the defence: it argues that\, as a first cut\, such transactions are morally justified; indeed\, its parties have the right so to transact with one another. It then tackles two objections\, responses to which help refine the case. As we shall see\, markets in cultural artefacts are global markets\, in part characterised by power imbalances between the Global North and Global South. In the light of those concerns\, I mount a defense of an interesting kind of limits on global markets\, to wit\, export restrictions. \n  \nCécile Fabre is Senior Research Fellow in Politics at All Souls College\, Oxford. She holds degrees from La Sorbonne\, the University of York\, and the University of Oxford. Her research interests include theories of distributive justice\, the rights we have over our own body\, and the ethics of foreign policy. Her books include Cosmopolitan War (OUP 2012)\, Cosmopolitan Peace (OUP 2016)\, Economic Statecraft (Harvard UP 2018)\, and Spying Through a Glass Darkly (OUP 2022). Her current project is on the ethics of preserving cultural heritage. She is a member of Academia Europaea and a Fellow of the British Academy. \n  \n\n\nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-cecile-fabre-all-souls-college-oxford/
LOCATION:UCLA Law Building\, Room 1447
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250404T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250404T180000
DTSTAMP:20250404T193702Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250404T193702Z
UID:75166-1743782400-1743789600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:MAP Colloquium: "Structural Racism Within Reason" - Alisa Bierria (UCLA Gender Studies)
DESCRIPTION:Friday\, April 4\, 2025\n4:00 – 6:00PM\nRoyce Hall 314\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin MAP at UCLA on April 4\, 2025 for a colloquium with Alisa Bierria\, UCLA Gender Studies. The talk will take place from 4:00 – 6:00 PM in Royce Hall 314. \n  \nAll are welcome to attend. Dinner will be served at a reception following the talk in Royce 314. \n  \nIf you aren’t able to attend in person\, here are the Zoom details to join remotely: \n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/92522400425?pwd=8PhOzZN9B08IaVfiaLfTQ0rd9dlcOa.1 \nMeeting ID: 925 2240 0425 \nPasscode: 722015 \n  \n  \nStructural Racism Within Reason\n  \nThis talk examines the politics of intention through an analysis of structural racism. Alisa Bierria will discuss two key black feminist critiques of reason — Patricia Hill Collins’ discussion of “controlling images” (2000) and Michelle Cliff’s concept of the “mythic mind” (1982) — to propose “controlling intentions” as a framework to explore how structural racism produces fictive intentions. She argues that these intentions are constructed to rationalize the criminalization of survival and then justify that outcome as common sense. As an example\, she analyzes how Marissa Alexander’s intentions and intentional actions were replaced by controlling intentions in her 2011 Stand Your Ground hearing to illustrate how reason provides a vehicle through which structural violence becomes naturalized within the law. \n  \n  \n\n\nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/map-colloquium-structural-racism-within-reason-alisa-bierria-ucla-gender-studies/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Alisa-Bierria.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250314T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250314T180000
DTSTAMP:20250312T225141Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250312T225141Z
UID:74690-1741968000-1741975200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "One Kind of Adaptationism" - Rose Novick\, University of Washington
DESCRIPTION:March 14\, 2025 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd Hall 275 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Friday\, March 14\, 2025 in Dodd Hall 275 for a talk by Rose Novick\, University of Washington\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nOne Kind of Adaptationism\n  \nThere is only one kind of adaptationism: explanatory adaptationism. Explanatory adaptationism claims that adaptation is the “big question” in evolutionary biology\, and natural selection is the “big answer”. In recent decades\, philosophers of biology have largely come to agree\, first\, that explanatory adaptationism is only one kind of adaptationism among many (at the high end\, seven) and\, second\, that these kinds are logically independent and so can\, in principle\, be accepted or rejected in any combination. On the surface\, this is true. Beneath the surface\, it is not. When the arguments supporting various forms of allegedly non-explanatory adaptationism are interrogated closely\, each turns out to essentially rely on explanatory adaptationism. The different kinds of adaptationism should be recognized as different ways of understanding the import of explanatory adaptationism. In the end\, every adaptationist is an explanatory adaptationist. \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-one-kind-of-adaptationism-rose-novick-university-of-washington/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 275
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Rose-Novick-Wordpress-Image-v2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250226T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250226T190000
DTSTAMP:20250225T232318Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250225T232318Z
UID:74799-1740589200-1740596400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "A Molyneux Problem for Automated Science" - Kathleen Creel\, Northeastern University
DESCRIPTION:February 26\, 2025 | 5:00PM – 7:00PM\nDodd Hall 248 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Wednesday\, February 26\, 2025 in Dodd Hall 248 for a talk by Kathleen Creel\, Northeastern University\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nA Molyneux Problem for Automated Science\n\n  \nAutomated science is the attempt to use a combination of machine learning and robotics to perform experiments\, build new models\, postulate new laws\, and design new experiments on the basis of what is observed to be the result of previous experiments. The comparison between the learning problems faced by automated machine learning and the learning problems faced by human scientists sheds light on a subtle measurement problem which I will call the Molyneux Problem for Science.  The Molyneux problem asks whether a newly sighted person could recognize objects previously known by touch. I generalize the Molyneux problem to all forms of data and characterize the problem as a special form of scientific learning. The Molyneux Problem for Science exists whenever identity must be recognized across perceptual modalities or data streams of different types without the aid of causal or correlational information.  After distinguishing the scientific Molyneux problem from inverse problems and problems of causal discovery\, I will use the case of early radio telescopy to demonstrate that scientific Molyneux problems arise in traditional sciences. Finally\, I argue that Molyneux problems for science will vex automated science especially\, but that automated science has solutions unavailable to the Molyneux learner. \n  \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-kathleen-creel-northeastern-university/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 248
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Kathleen-Creel-HPASS-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250218T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250218T180000
DTSTAMP:20250218T172438Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250218T172438Z
UID:74930-1739894400-1739901600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Velleity Without Wishful Thinking: Aquinas and the Weakness of Will" - Andrea Aldo Robiglio (University of Louvain/KU Leuven)
DESCRIPTION:February 18\, 2025 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd Hall 275\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on February 18\, 2025 in Dodd Hall 275 for a talk by Andrea Aldo Robiglio\, University of Louvain/KU Leuven. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nIf you are unable to attend in person\, here is the Zoom info to attend remotely: \n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/94157070976?pwd=NYZZ6qBbrx3Bh0uiW60VPnGjSrVe4I.1 \nMeeting ID: 941 5707 0976\nPasscode: 396012 \n  \n  \nVelleity Without Wishful Thinking: Aquinas and the Weakness of Will\n  \nAndrea Aldo Robiglio\nProfessor of the History of Philosophy \nUniversity of Louvain/ KU Leuven \nVan Dyck Chair\, 2023-2024 \n  \nThe late medieval understanding of the human mind as a system of internal acts and dispositions—where multiple acts could coexist within the same faculty—marks a significant development in pre-modern philosophy. This nuanced conceptualization revises ancient accounts of the mind and introduces a more intricate vision of the Self. Within this framework\, medieval debates on incontinence (incontinentia) resonate with Aristotle’s exploration of weakness of will (akrasia) in Nicomachean Ethics\, Book VII. However\, 13th-century thinkers also introduced a novel concept\, velleity (velleitas)\, to describe a distinctive internal conflict: the possibility of choosing what is impossible to realize or achieve\, a choice that nonetheless carries moral significance. This innovation departs from Aristotle by recognizing the moral significance of choices involving the impossible. Over time\, the original meaning of velleity—as a vital aspect of moral action\, with positive connotations in thinkers like Aquinas—was largely diminished. Later philosophers\, such as Suárez\, Malebranche\, and Leibniz\, reduced it to wishful thinking; Locke associated it with uneasiness\, and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche dismissed it as mere vanity or fleeting feeling. Revisiting the original conception of velleity thus offers a compelling opportunity to recover its overlooked philosophical and moral significance. \n  \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n\n\nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/velleity-without-wishful-thinking-aquinas-and-the-weakness-of-will-andrea-robiglio-university-of-louvain-ku-leuven/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 275
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Robiglio-1.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250207T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250207T180000
DTSTAMP:20250109T011350Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250109T011350Z
UID:74318-1738944000-1738951200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Contractualism and Intuitionism" - T. M. Scanlon (Harvard University)
DESCRIPTION:February 7\, 2025 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce Hall 314\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on February 7\, 2025 in Royce Hall 314 for a colloquium with T. M. Scanlon\, Harvard University. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \n  \nContractualism and Intuitionism\n  \nA reexamination of the contractualist theory of right and wrong put forward in What We Owe to Each Other and subsequent papers\, considering the reasons for finding the view appealing as well as important problems with it\, including overdemandingness\, the charge of circularity\, and the wholesale exclusion of interpersonal aggregation. A new account of aggregation is proposed. \n  \nT. M. Scanlon is Alford Professor of Natural Religion\, Moral Philosophy\, and Civil Polity\, emeritus at Harvard University. He has written on many topics in moral and political philosophy\, including the nature of morality\, moral responsibility\, rights\, and equality. His books include What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard\, 1998) and\, most recently\, Why Does Inequality Matter? (Oxford\, 2018). Morality and Responsibility\, a collection of his essays\, will be published by Polity Press in early 2025. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n\n\nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-t-m-scanlon-harvard-university/
LOCATION:Royce Hall\, Room 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/T.-M.-Scanlon-Wordpress-Image-v2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250124T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250124T180000
DTSTAMP:20250110T233906Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250110T233906Z
UID:73367-1737734400-1737741600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Sweet Spots in Modal Metaphysics" - Stephen Yablo (MIT)
DESCRIPTION:January 24\, 2025 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM PT\nZoom\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \nJoin us on January 24\, 2025 for a virtual colloquium with Stephen Yablo\, MIT. The talk will take place from 4:00PM – 6:00PM PT on Zoom. \n  \nSweet Spots in Modal Metaphysics\n  \n\n\n\nDe re modal plenitude holds that all transworld modal profiles are exemplified. Where this table sits\, there are a bazillion other things categorically indiscernible from it but taking different paths through logical space. Five metaphysical puzzles are (re)examined through plenitudinarian spectacles. They’re to do with identity over time (the Ship of Theseus puzzle)\, identity across worlds (Chisholm’s paradox)\, how coincidents come by their different profiles (the grounding problem)\, things’ curious tendency to be found at their “modal sweet spot\,” bang in the middle of their zone of tolerance (the centrality problem)\, and how properties definitive of a thing can be losable (the problem of contingent non-accidents). Plenitudinarianism is presented less as a panacea than a theoretical option not to be overlooked. \n  \nStephen Yablo works in metaphysics\, epistemology\, philosophical logic\, and the philosophy of language and math. Older papers are collected in Thoughts and Things (Oxford\, 2009-10). Aboutness (Princeton\, 2014) develops a truthmaker-based theory of sentential subject matter\, and casts about for applications. He gave the Hempel Lectures at Princeton (2008)\, the Lockes at Oxford (2012)\, and the Whitehead Lectures at Harvard (2016). Recent work (some in progress/regress) includes “The Bandersnatches of Dubuque\,” “Leverage: A Model of Cognitive Significance\,” “Relevance without Minimality\,” “Fine-Grained Evidence\,” and “Tangled up in Grue.” \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-stephen-yablo-mit/
LOCATION:On Zoom
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Stephen-Yablo-Wordpress-Image-1.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250108T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20250108T190000
DTSTAMP:20250108T193732Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250108T193732Z
UID:74693-1736355600-1736362800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "On the Constitutive Aims of Science" - Josh Hunt\, Syracuse University
DESCRIPTION:January 8\, 2025 | 5:00PM – 7:00PM\nZoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \n***Due to the current Palisades fire\, this talk will take place over Zoom only.***  \n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/96707253505?pwd=78HXYt9Sq6rI3LBPlE8ZpHIcIVM7LV.1 \nMeeting ID: 967 0725 3505\nPasscode: 026407 \n  \nJoin us on Wednesday\, January 8\, 2025 over Zoom for a talk by Josh Hunt\, Syracuse University\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nOn the Constitutive Aims of Science\n  \nI recast the debate between scientific realists and antirealists as a dispute over the constitutive aims of science. Drawing on accounts of epistemic normativity\, I propose a general method for identifying the constitutive aims of an activity\, understood as minimal criteria for success. Applying this method\, I argue that the constitutive aim of science is to solve problems concerning physical phenomena\, leading in the limit to an aim I call “ideal planning adequacy.” For non-logically omniscient agents like us\, planning adequacy requires determining a theory’s inferential structure\, i.e. what suffices or is needed to apply the theory. Clarifying a theory’s inferential structure requires considering its various formulations\, thereby making theory reformulation a constitutive aim of science. By remaining neutral on what it takes to solve a scientific problem—be it truth\, empirical adequacy\, understanding\, etc.—I provide  a framework that both realists and antirealists can endorse. \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-talk-josh-hunt-syracuse-university/
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Josh-Hunt-HPASS-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241204T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241204T190000
DTSTAMP:20241120T194624Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241120T194624Z
UID:74677-1733331600-1733338800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "Truth\, Approximate Truth\, and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction" - Foad Dizadji-Bahmani\, Cal State LA
DESCRIPTION:December 4\, 2024 | 5:00PM – 7:00PM\nDodd Hall 247 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Wednesday\, December 4\, 2024 in Dodd Hall 247 for a talk by Foad Dizadji-Bahmani\, Cal State LA\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nTruth\, Approximate Truth\, and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction\n  \nThe scientific realism debate is a longstanding one in the philosophy of science. One of the most important arguments in the anti-realist’s armory is the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI). As is well known\, PMI purportedly shows that the history of science undermines realism. PMI has two guises: an inductive argument for the conclusion that current scientific theories are not true (PMIi) or a reductio ad absurdum against the idea that one can take the empirical and predictive success of a theory as reason to think that it is true (PMIr). I argue that once attention is paid to the logical difference between truth (which is categorical) and approximate truth (which is a matter of degree) it can be shown that the argument\, in each guise\, is fallacious. Specifically\, heeding this distinction\, it can be shown\, first\, that PMIi is either conceptually incoherent or self-defeating\, and second that PMIr is not sound. These results do not\, in and of themselves\, vindicate scientific realism. In order to do so\, the realist must\, inter alia\, further develop and defend the notion of approximate truth by recourse to which her position is formulated. In the last part of the paper\, I give an outline of a proposal to that end. \n  \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-talk-foad-dizadji-bahmani-cal-state-la/
LOCATION:Dodd 247\, 390 Portola Plaza\, Los Angeles\, CA\, 90095\, United States
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Foad-Dizadji-Bahmani-HPASS-Wordpress-Image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241122T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241122T180000
DTSTAMP:20241024T183100Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241024T183100Z
UID:74310-1732291200-1732298400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Bias: Some Surprising Truths" - Thomas Kelly\, Princeton University
DESCRIPTION:November 22\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nDodd Hall 167 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on November 22\, 2024 for a colloquium with Thomas Kelly\, Princeton University. The talk will take place in Dodd Hall 167 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nBias: Some Surprising Truths\n  \nIn this talk\, I’ll argue for three claims about bias that many people find deeply counterintuitive if not obviously false: (i) Externalism about bias: a person can count as biased because of their social environment\, even if all of their internal cognitive processes are functioning impeccably; (ii) Rationality requires bias: in some cases\, rationality can require a person to be biased\, in a pejorative sense of ‘bias\,’ and the only way to escape being biased is to be irrational; (iii) Introspection is necessarily unreliable: the empirically well-documented fact that introspection is a highly unreliable way to tell whether we’re biased isn’t a contingent fact about our psychologies.  Rather\, it’s something that holds of necessity: even God could not have made us highly reliable detectors of our own biases by way of introspection \n  \n\nThomas Kelly is a Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University\, where he has taught since 2004.  Prior to coming to Princeton\, he was a Junior Fellow in the Society of Fellows at Harvard University\, where he received his PhD\, writing a dissertation under the supervision of Robert Nozick\, Derek Parfit\, and James Pryor. He works primarily in epistemology and has addressed topics such as the significance of disagreement\, the nature of evidence\, and the relationship between theoretical and practical rationality. His book Bias: A Philosophical Study appeared from Oxford University Press in 2023. \n\n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-thomas-kelly-princeton-university/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall 167
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Thomas-Kelly-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241120T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241120T190000
DTSTAMP:20241107T193609Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241107T193609Z
UID:74672-1732122000-1732129200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:HPASS: "Against Self-Location" - Emily Adlam\, Chapman University
DESCRIPTION:November 20\, 2024 | 5:00PM – 7:00PM\nDodd Hall 247 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on Wednesday\, November 20\, 2024 in Dodd Hall 247 for a talk by Emily Adlam\, Chapman University\, as part of the History\, Philosophy\, and Science of Science (HPASS) speaker series. \n  \nAgainst Self-Location\n  \nIn this talk\, I will make a distinction between pure self-locating credences and superficially self-locating credences\, and then argue that there is never any rationally compelling way to assign pure self-locating credences. I will first argue that from a practical point of view\, pure self-locating credences simply encode our pragmatic goals\, and thus pragmatic rationality does not dictate how they must be set. I will then use considerations motivated by Bertrand’s paradox to argue that the indifference principle and other popular constraints on self-locating credences fail to be a priori principles of epistemic rationality\, and critique some approaches to deriving self-locating credences based on analogies to non-self-locating cases. Finally\, I will consider the implications of this conclusion for various applications of self-locating probabilities in scientific contexts\, arguing that it may undermine certain kinds of reasoning about multiverses\, the simulation hypothesis\, Boltzmann brains and vast-world scenarios. \n  \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n\n  \n  \n  \nJoin our mailing list!\nSign up for our mailing list to stay up-to-date with future UCLA Philosophy events\, conferences\, and colloquia! \nSIGN UP HERE
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/hpass-against-self-location-emily-adlam-chapman-university/
LOCATION:Dodd 247\, 390 Portola Plaza\, Los Angeles\, CA\, 90095\, United States
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Emily-Adlam-Wordpress-Image-v2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241018T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20241018T180000
DTSTAMP:20241018T174424Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241018T174424Z
UID:74308-1729267200-1729274400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"Faith and World" - Anil Gomes\, Trinity College\, Oxford
DESCRIPTION:October 18\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan Hall 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/94936079769?pwd=e0mp6PeBX17pVNnQaJN3LomWqsYZB6.1 \nMeeting ID: 949 3607 9769\nPasscode: 161718 \n  \nJoin us on October 18\, 2024 for a colloquium with Anil Gomes\, Oxford – Trinity College. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall 193 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nFaith and World\n  \nWhat connection\, if any\, is there between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Answers to this question thread through early modern discussions of the mind and then again\, transmuted and transformed\, across different twentieth-century traditions. My aim today is to clarify the question and set out some of the routes by means of which philosophers have attempted to establish a connection. The intent is to make salient two points: first\, the relevance to the question of Lichtenberg’s enigmatic remarks on the ‘I think’\, and second\, the role that faith and practice play in answering it. \n  \nAnil Gomes is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Trinity College\, Oxford\, and a Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Oxford. He has written on a range of topics in the philosophy of mind\, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant\, and the work of Iris Murdoch. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n\n\n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2024-25-colloquium-anil-gomes-oxford-trinity-college/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240610T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240610T150000
DTSTAMP:20240607T155111Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240607T155111Z
UID:74104-1718024400-1718031600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:CANCELED: Thomas Icard (Stanford University): "Resource Rationality and Cognitive Costs"
DESCRIPTION:UPDATE: This event has been canceled.\n\nJune 10\, 2024 | 1:00PM – 3:00PM\nDodd Hall 399\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on June 10\, 2024 for a talk by Thomas Icard (Stanford University). The talk is called\, “Resource Rationality and Cognitive Costs.” It will take place in Dodd Hall 399 (and via Zoom) from 1:00PM – 3:00PM. \n  \nIf you are not able to join us in person\, here is a Zoom link to join remotely: \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/94825315773?pwd=NWt2bmhJR1RKOGJHRTFocGVvYkszUT09 \nMeeting ID: 948 2531 5773 \nPasscode: 350657 \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/thomas-icard-stanford-university-resource-rationality-and-cognitive-costs/
LOCATION:Dodd Hall – Room 399
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240503T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240503T180000
DTSTAMP:20240502T164000Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T164000Z
UID:73117-1714752000-1714759200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:POSTPONED: 2023-24 Colloquium: "Fuel to My Fire; You Can’t Stop Desire"
DESCRIPTION:UPDATE: This event has been postponed. Stay tuned for the new date.\n\nMay 3\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce Hall 306\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 3\, 2024 for a colloquium with E. M. Hernandez. The talk will take place in Royce Hall 306 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nFuel to My Fire; You Can’t Stop Desire\n  \nTrans existence has been plagued by two different explanations: a natural\, “born this way\,” necessity and a social\, often-thought perverted\, choice. These contrasting explanations of necessity and choice create an explanatory false dichotomy and political catch-22. This talk constructs an alternative explanation for why people transition\, one that centralizes the role of desire while recognizing the necessity of choice that arises from that desire. Toward this end\, I present a moral psychology of desire. An explanation that recognizes the role desire plays\, not just in our actions\, but in our perception. This desire is made apparent when one perceives the option to transition as a salient possibility for themself. Once this desire is recognized\, it functions as what Bernard Williams calls a categorical desire; a desire that partly constitutes one’s ethical identity\, making the satisfaction of that desire a matter of ethical necessity. I argue that this explanation eschews the explanatory false dichotomy and evades the political catch-22. \n  \nE. M. Hernandez (they/them) is an independent philosopher who explores issues of race and gender through understanding our moral psychology. They have published both academically and popularly on issues of transgender affirmation\, language\, and experience. They live in Durham\, North Carolina with their dog Canela. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-em-hernandez/
LOCATION:Royce Hall – Room 306
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240426T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240426T180000
DTSTAMP:20240426T160932Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T160932Z
UID:72968-1714147200-1714154400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: “Self-Consciousness as Species-Consciousness”
DESCRIPTION:April 26\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan Hall 193\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/96481370381?pwd=S3o0Y1Bpd3l5T0orcUVCVmNjY28rdz09 \nMeeting ID: 964 8137 0381\nPasscode: 648893 \n  \nJoin us on April 26\, 2024 for a colloquium with Karen Ng\, Vanderbilt University. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nSelf-Consciousness as Species-Consciousness\n  \nAlthough self-consciousness has been a central theme in many discussions within post-Kantian philosophy\, this paper aims to understand and defend an undertheorized aspect of Hegel’s account of this theme\, namely\, his claim that self-consciousness is species-consciousness. I approach this problem in three stages. First\, beginning with Hegel’s account of self-consciousness as desire and its connection with life\, I show that Hegel defends a version of the materialist conception of self-consciousness (Cassam) by focusing specifically on what he calls the “self-sufficiency” of living objects and subjects. Second\, I turn to Hegel’s account of the significance of what he calls the “simple universality” of the Gattung or species in relation to self-consciousness. This universality arises as a result of his account of the processes of life\, and here I show that Hegel defends a version of Michael Thompson’s argument about the significance of life-form consciousness for self-consciousness. Finally\, I conclude by reconstructing the central paragraphs 172-173 from the Phenomenology of Spirit where Hegel describes self-consciousness as the species or Gattung for itself\, and draw out several consequences and problems of Hegel’s account. Among these include the idea that self-consciousness is an achievement\, alongside the idea that our self-conscious form of life that Hegel calls Geist exists as a living species among other living species. \n  \nKaren Ng is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University. She specializes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European philosophy\, focusing in particular on Hegel\, German idealism\, Marx\, and Frankfurt School critical theory. Between 2023 and 2025\, she will be an Alexander von Humboldt senior research fellow at the Center for Post-Kantian Philosophy at the University of Potsdam. Her first book\, Hegel’s Concept of Life: Freedom\, Self-Consciousness\, Logic\, was published with Oxford in 2020 and was awarded the Journal of the History of Philosophy Book Prize. \n  \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]\n 
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-karen-ng-vanderbilt-university/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Karen-Ng-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240308T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240308T180000
DTSTAMP:20240308T193254Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240308T193254Z
UID:72957-1709913600-1709920800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Kant Under the Bodhi Tree? Anti-Individualism in Kantian Ethics"
DESCRIPTION:March 8\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce 314 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97394083916?pwd=bmhReEZQVURFKzl0Y2hXZDR4Mm8ydz09 \nMeeting ID: 973 9408 3916 \nPasscode: 026985 \n  \nJoin us on March 8\, 2024 for a colloquium with Karl Schafer\, UT Austin. The talk will take place in Royce 314 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nKant Under the Bodhi Tree? Anti-Individualism in Kantian Ethics\n  \nA common complaint about Kantian ethics today is that it cannot do full justice to the social or intersubjective dimensions of human life – that\, unlike Fichte\, Hegel\, or Marx\, Kant remains trapped within a fundamentally individualistic perspective on practical or moral questions. In this talk\, I will argue that such critiques of Kant rest on a natural\, but fundamental mischaracterization of where the most serious problems for Kant lie in this region. Far from being too individualistic\, I will argue that the real worry about Kantian moral theory is in fact that it may not be individualistic enough. As we will see\, this has potentially profound implications for how we understand Kant’s legacy in practical philosophy. Indeed\, if this is right\, from a certain perspective\, it might be Kant who is the most ethically radical of these philosophers. \n  \nKarl Schafer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. Previously he was Professor of Philosophy at University of California\, Irvine and Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. He works primarily in the history of modern philosophy (esp. Hume and Kant)\, ethics\, and epistemology. \n  \n  \n\n\n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-karl-schafer-ut-austin/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Wordpress-Image-Karl-Schafer-v3.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240216T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240216T180000
DTSTAMP:20240216T194404Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240216T194404Z
UID:73167-1708099200-1708106400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Radical Chains: Marx and the Dialectical Compatibilism of Freedom and Determinism"
DESCRIPTION:February 16\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/99929612695?pwd=d1I4UUMvRFB4eEhlTHI4Y2E5MHZNZz09 \nMeeting ID: 999 2961 2695 \nPasscode: 579432 \n  \nJoin us on February 16\, 2024 for a colloquium with Vanessa Wills\, George Washington University. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nRadical Chains: Marx and the Dialectical Compatibilism of Freedom and Determinism\n  \nIf Marx’s economic determinism requires that individual human beings always only behave just as the “laws of history” unavoidably compel them to\, then the practice of assigning moral praise and blame is no more appropriately applied to people than it is to inanimate objects dropped from heights. Numerous interpreters of Marx\, presuming that historical materialism does entail a strict\, mechanistic determinism\, have gone on to reason that Marx’s theory is therefore inhospitable to morality. However\, historical materialism does not entail this. \n  \nIn this talk\, I argue that Marx should be understood as advancing a “dialectical compatibilism” of freedom and determinism. I use the term “dialectical compatibilism” to invoke both the ways in which Marx’s approach to freedom and determinism is in conversation with traditional analyses of this pairing\, and also the ways in which it is fundamentally divergent from them. This position moves beyond the views typically arrayed along the axes of determinist or libertarian\, compatibilist or incompatibilist. \n  \nHuman freedom is itself a human product\, developing out of human beings’ goal-directed interactions with their natural and social environment. There is no inconsistency in Marx describing fairly lawlike\, deterministic regularities of human behavior on the one hand and speaking of a flourishing of human freedom\, individuality\, and creative potential on the other. If determinism is the negation of real human agency\, then human freedom is the negation of that negation\, one that can emerge only in the course of history. \n  \nVanessa Wills is Associate Professor of Philosophy at The George Washington University. Her areas of specialization are moral\, social\, and political philosophy\, nineteenth century German philosophy (especially Karl Marx)\, and the philosophy of race. Her research is importantly informed by her study of Marx’s work\, and focuses on the ways in which economic and social arrangements can inhibit or promote the realization of values such as freedom\, equality\, and human development. Her monograph\, Marx’s Ethical Vision\, is set to be released in April 2024. \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-vanessa-wills-george-washington-university/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Vanessa-Wills-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240119T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240119T180000
DTSTAMP:20240119T172717Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240119T172717Z
UID:73434-1705680000-1705687200@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Conceivability and Possibility in Avicenna"
DESCRIPTION:January 19\, 2024 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/93109412131?pwd=VFcrbHl2MEViVkg3dzUrZEV0NTN2QT09 \nMeeting ID: 931 0941 2131 \nPasscode: 279424 \n  \nJoin us on January 19\, 2024 for a colloquium with Jari Kaukua\, University of Jyväskylä. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nConceivability and Possibility in Avicenna\n  \nIn his theory of science\, Avicenna seems to commit to a very demanding concept of concept (taṣawwur): only the intellect’s adequate conceptions of real essences are concepts in the strict sense. This lands him the task of explaining what it is that we are doing when we think of things that are never realised\, such as phoenixes or counterfactual states of affairs. I suggest that his solution relies on a nuanced distinction\, grounded in his psychology\, between a descriptive and a normative concept of concept. Unrealised\, and consequently impossible\, things are not conceivable in the strict sense of the word (they do not have real concepts)\, but they may be conceived as conjunctions of real concepts that are instantiated in mental images construed by our imagination. Such conjunctions may be epistemically indistinct from real concepts\, which raises interesting questions concerning the metaphysical or scientific consequences of conceivability. Thus\, I conclude with the suggestion that Avicenna would not have appreciated conceivability as a sign of metaphysical possibility. \n  \nJari Kaukua is Professor of philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä. He is the author of Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy (CUP\, 2015) and Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism (Brill\, 2022)\, as well as many articles on classical and post-classical Islamic philosophy. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-jari-kaukua-university-of-jyvaskyla/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Jari-Kaukua-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231103T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231103T180000
DTSTAMP:20231103T181850Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231103T181850Z
UID:72945-1699027200-1699034400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Generics Favor Stability"
DESCRIPTION:November 3\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97634448928?pwd=RnhYeklPTlhIMEhVaTI0SFd3NVdkdz09 \nMeeting ID: 976 3444 8928 \nPasscode: 016526 \n  \nJoin us on November 3\, 2023 for a colloquium with Katherine Ritchie\, UC Irvine. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Shostak Terrace to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nGenerics Favor Stability\n  \nWe are creatures that seek to predict\, explain\, and control our environments. Generalizations—like those expressed by “birds have hollow bones” and “cigarettes cause cancer”—provide one resource to facilitate these tasks. In this paper (collaborative work with Ny Vasil) we develop a psychological account of the acceptability judgments of generic statements rooted in the psychological functions of generalizations. We argue that a notion of stability based on Woodward’s work on causation provides the basis for a unified account of generics. Generics that are taken to be stable are favored over those that are not. The account coheres with the function of generics\, while providing a unifying account of judgments about both causal and categorical generics. Moreover\, it can accommodate generics with both essentialist and structural explanatory commitments by recognizing the ways generics can express generalizations with relatively unrestricted scope and generalizations that are covertly contextually restricted to situational “bubbles”. Overall\, the account unifies an apparently diverse range of generics\, fits with a plausible account of the function of generalization in human psychology\, and provides a framework ripe for further empirical and theoretical investigation. \n  \nKatherine Ritchie is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at UC Irvine. Her research lies at the intersection of inquiry into linguistic and mental representation and the social world. She has written on the nature of social groups (e.g.\, teams\, committees\, races\, genders)\, the semantics of terms that pick out groups (e.g.\, plurals\, collective nouns\, slurs\, generics)\, and the ways we mentally represent groups. One central thread in her current research is to investigate how insights from metaphysics and from the ways we represent can help inform viable social-political projects. Her work has been published in Ethics\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, Cognition\, Cognitive Psychology\, Mind & Language\, and other journals and volumes. \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-kate-ritchie-uc-irvine/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Kate-Ritchie-Wordpress-image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231020T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20231020T180000
DTSTAMP:20231020T204847Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231020T204847Z
UID:72941-1697817600-1697824800@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2023-24 Colloquium: "Aesthetic Acquaintance in Practice"
DESCRIPTION:October 20\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nKaplan 193 & Zoom\nRSVP HERE\n  \nZoom link: \nhttps://ucla.zoom.us/j/97140529852?pwd=a1NSL1AwVnBrMnF3eStHQTg4RlhDdz09 \nMeeting ID: 971 4052 9852 \nPasscode: 314912 \n  \nJoin us on October 20\, 2023 for a colloquium with Nick Riggle\, University of San Diego. The talk will take place in Kaplan 193 (and via Zoom) from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Shostak Terrace to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nAesthetic Acquaintance in Practice\n  \nThe Acquaintance Principle (AP)—the claim that aesthetic beliefs must be based on first-hand engagement and not on testimony—used to be “well-entrenched” in aesthetics. But today there is a near consensus that it fails in the light of a range of apparent counterexamples. Even pessimists about aesthetic testimony who believe in the spirit of AP reformulate its letter to accommodate these counterexamples. I will argue that when AP is correctly understood\, a position opens up that accommodates both pessimism and optimism. AP is not a principle to which there are counterexamples but rather a practice-governing rule to which there are legitimate exceptions. As such\, the so-called counterexamples do little to diminish the rule. The view results\, in part\, from appreciating how the norms of aesthetic valuing require us to apply AP not merely to the hearer but also to the speaker: one must base one’s aesthetic beliefs on one’s own engagement with their objects\, and not only must aesthetic testimony not be accepted\, it must not be offered. The exceptions to AP allow aesthetic knowledge to pass around under special circumstances but do nothing to minimize AP’s importance and force\, which can be justified by appeal to central features of the social practice of aesthetic valuing. The result is a more thoroughgoing Unusability Pessimism nestled within a novel communitarian theory of aesthetic value. If this is right\, then the decades-long debate between optimists and pessimists dissolves. \n  \nNick Riggle is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Diego. He completed his BA in philosophy at UC Berkeley\, earned his PhD at NYU\, and has been teaching at USD since 2015. Riggle’s work is primarily in aesthetics\, though his publications draw on and contribute to a range of fields in philosophy\, including the philosophy of language\, value theory\, social philosophy\, and the history of philosophy. He writes for both public and academic audiences\, and his work has appeared in The Philosophical Review\, The Philosophical Quarterly\, Philosophers’ Imprint\, The New York Times\, Aeon\, Penguin Books\, McSweeney’s Internet Tendency\, and many other outlets. His most recent book\, This Beauty: A Philosophy of Being Alive\, explores the existential significance of valuing beauty. \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2023-24-colloquium-nick-riggle-uc-san-diego/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Nick-Riggle-Wordpress-Image.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230526T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230526T180000
DTSTAMP:20230526T224820Z
CREATED:20220808T194013Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230526T224820Z
UID:72020-1685116800-1685124000@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23 Colloquium: "Art as a Shelter from Science"
DESCRIPTION:May 26\, 2023 | 4:00PM – 6:00PM\nRoyce 314\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99826733700?pwd=cGUvN1ZzdXdrZmVibElaVVRTZnJTZz09\nRSVP HERE\n  \nJoin us on May 26\, 2023 for a colloquium with C. Thi Nguyen\, University of Utah. The talk will take place in Royce 314 from 4:00PM – 6:00PM with a reception on the Royce Patio (3rd floor) to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nArt as a Shelter from Science\n  \nAesthetic judgment is different from scientific judgment. For many\, a key difference is that aesthetic judgment does not proceed via inferences. We cannot infer the existence of an aesthetic property based on the application of a rule. We must see for ourselves if some arrangement of lines and colors is\, in fact\, graceful. But we also give\, exchange\, and demand of each other reasons for our judgments about aesthetic properties. What kind of property could be non-inferential\, but\, at the same time\, subject to reasons? I would like to present a new solution: that non-inferentialism about aesthetic properties is not a some mysterious metaphysical feature of aesthetic properties\, but is rather a norm of a social practice. When we accept this rule\, the activity of aesthetic appreciation goes better in a few ways. First\, it drives the appreciator’s attention towards looking at particular details in a work\, rather than looking for recurring statistical regularities or abstract principles. This prevents a purely scientific approach to aesthetic judgment\, and drives the appreciator towards a detail-oriented perception of a work’s particularities. It drives conversants to continue to sensuously attend to works\, rather than shifting to more abstract methods of inquiry such as the philosophical search for first principles\, or the scientific study of aggregate regularities in perception. Second\, it sculpts a particular kind of interaction: open-ended exchanges of reasons which motivate the conversants to return to attending to the work. The value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation turns out to be quite distinct from that of\, say\, science. The goal is not the accumulation of true knowledge\, but fostering engagement in a particular valuable human activity. Perhaps we don’t disagree about art to get to the truth\, but we construct our artworks and art practices to foster endless\, satisfying disagreement.  \n  \nC. Thi Nguyen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. His research concerns aesthetics and social epistemology; he has written about trust\, games\, echo chambers\, cultural appropriation\, and the ethics of transparency. His first book is Games: Agency as Art (OUP). \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-c-thi-nguyen-university-of-utah/
LOCATION:Royce Hall 314
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Thi-Nguyen.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230512T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230512T180000
DTSTAMP:20230512T205018Z
CREATED:20230316T172758Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230512T205018Z
UID:72389-1683907200-1683914400@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23: Colloquium: Does Institutional Racism Presuppose Racist Ideology?
DESCRIPTION:May 12\, 2023 | 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM PT\nKaplan 193 (and Zoom)\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/98656610498?pwd=TkRXeUMvdDVkRDlPY1piQVVxZ2gydz09\n  \nJoin us on May 12\, 2023 for a colloquium with Alberto Urquidez\, St. Olaf College. The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall Room 193 from 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM with a light reception on the Shostak Terrace in front of Murphy Hall to follow. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \nDoes Institutional Racism Presuppose Racist Ideology?\n  \nWhat is racism? Standard definitions depict racism as a personal phenomenon thereby inviting questions about personal responsibility. A common definition analyzes racism as a cognitive phenomenon\, as in the belief that race R1 is superior to race R2. A nonstandard version of the cognitive approach centers widely held beliefs (rather than mere individual belief) and\, for purposes of moral assessment\, stresses social consequences (not mere cognitive contents). This approach is typically put in the service of explaining the persistence of racial inequality/injustice. Tommie Shelby defends a version of the nonstandard cognitive approach. For him\, racism is racist ideology. Roughly\, racist ideology consists in a widely held set of racial beliefs that misrepresent racial oppression and that function\, through this distortion\, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations. One alleged virtue of the nonstandard cognitivist approach is that it explains institutional racism. In this talk\, I will argue that at least one kind of institutional racism cannot be explained in terms of racist ideology. While I will not advocate rejecting Shelby’s analysis\, I will underscore the limitations of his analysis as a general theory of racism \n  \nAlberto G. Urquidez is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at St. Olaf College. He will be an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religion at James Madison University in Fall 2023. Urquidez works primarily on the nature of racism\, drawing on the tools of analytic philosophy in conjunction with interdisciplinary insights to understand racism in connection with various topics\, such as the problem of white identity politics\, moral responsibility for racial oppression\, and the relationship of individual racism to institutional racism. His aim is to develop an empirically-informed\, comprehensive\, structuralist analysis of racism as a system of racial oppression. He is the author of (Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis (Palgrave Macmillan 2020). \n  \n\nRSVP HERE\n  \n  \n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-alberto-urquidez-st-olaf-college/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Alberto-Urquidez.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230508T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230508T133000
DTSTAMP:20230508T163300Z
CREATED:20230316T172758Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T163300Z
UID:72604-1683547200-1683552600@philosophy.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:2022-23: Colloquium: Hume on Economic Inequality
DESCRIPTION:May 8\, 2023 | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM PT\nKaplan 193 and Zoom\nZoom link: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99674975385\n  \nOn May 8\, 2023\, the Philosophy Dept. History Occasional Colloquium will host a talk by and discussion with Professor Margaret Schabas (UBC) on “Hume and Economic Inequality.” The talk will take place in Kaplan Hall Room 193 from 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM.  \nHere is the Zoom link if you would like to join virtually: https://ucla.zoom.us/j/99674975385 \nRSVP HERE\n  \nHume and Economic Inequality\n  \nIn his essay “Of the Original Contract\,” Hume endorsed the longstanding belief in “how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force\, and even in their mental powers and faculties\, till cultivated by education.” Although not an egalitarian\, Hume\, I will argue\, sought to reduce economic inequality of income though not necessarily of wealth. Two central goals of his economic philosophy were to raise the standard of living of the lower classes and to expand the so-called “middle station.” Above all\, Hume opposed the “utility of poverty” doctrine as a hindrance to economic growth. His position was motivated by utilitarian ends: a more prosperous laboring class would result in a happier nation\, not only because of the larger basket of goods in the household but also because citizens would tend to become more law-abiding and thus promote political stability. As Hume observed\, “a too great disproportion among the citizens weakens any state.” Finally\, Hume sought to enrich poorer nations and thereby reduce economic inequality between nations\, primarily as a means to foster peace. \n  \nProfessor Schabas (FRSC) works primarily in the History and Philosophy of Science\, with a focus on Economics.  Her first book\, A World Ruled by Number (Princeton\, 1990) addressed the transformation of economics into a mathematical science; her second book\, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago\, 2005) addressed the concept of the economy since the early modern period; her third and most recent book is on Hume’s economics (A Philosopher’s Economist Chicago\, 2020).  She has also co-edited a book on Hume’s economics and another entitled Oeconomies in the Age of Newton. \n  \nRSVP HERE\n  \n[gravityform id=”32″ title=”true”]
URL:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/event/2022-23-colloquium-hume-on-economic-inequality/
LOCATION:Kaplan Hall 193
CATEGORIES:Colloquia
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Margaret-Schabas.jpg
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END:VCALENDAR