- PhD in Philosophy, UCLA, in progress
- C.Phil in Philosophy, UCLA, Winter 2018
- Graduate Certificate in Writing Pedagogy, UCLA, Spring 2017
- M.A. in Philosophy, UCLA, Spring 2015
- M.A. in Philosophy, San Jose State University, Spring 2013
- B.A. in Comparative Religion, Minors in Philosophy and Ethics, California State University, Chico, December 2010
General Research Interests:
Perception, Action, and Cognition, Metaphysics, Scholastic Medieval and Contemporary.
Current Research Projects outside Dissertation:
- Aquinas on Organization
- When we read Aquinas not in terms of what he explicitly argues for, but in terms of what he presupposes and utilizes in his arguments, we find a remarkably coherent and unified natural philosophy. At the core of this natural philosophical picture is a metaphysical structure that is presupposed in the positing of any being, description, or activity. This paper attempts to elucidate the features of this structure I am calling an ‘organization.’
- An Alternative to Accuracy
- Most theorists of perception take as common sense the claim that perceptual experiences can be compared with the way the world is and so can be assessed for accuracy or fit with the objective world. This paper tests this claim against an argument derived from one levied against the correspondence theory of truth. If the account of perceptual success according to which success means fit with the objective world is found wanting, then we’ll need an alternative account of perceptual success. In the final section of the paper, I attempt to describe what that alternative will look like.
Normality Judgments: Content and Structure
Abstract: There are (at least) three sorts of generalizations that cognitive beings make. One is a universal or nomic judgment, where any counterexample refutes the generalization. Another is a statistical or frequency judgment, where any change in the prevalence of the ascribed feature falsifies the generalization. There is a third sort of judgment which is often overlooked: a sort of generalization where there don’t appear to be straightforward counterinstances and there don’t appear to be specific prevalence attached to the generalization. This sort of generalization I’m calling a “normality judgment.” The project of the dissertation is to elucidate this form of judgment. This conversation overlaps with extant literatures, such as discussions of generic sentences, ceteris paribus claims, functions, dispositions, non-monotonic logics, et al. Rather than engaging directly in those discussions, though, the goal is to carve out some room for a different sort of conversation. Instead of giving a semantics for a class of sentences or attempting to describe what scientists are up to when they employ certain sorts of judgments in their rarefied practice, the goal is instead to ask a folk psychological question: what are cognitive beings like humans up to when they make normality judgments?
The resulting dissertation will consist of 6 chapters making step-wise progress toward understanding these judgments more clearly:
- What is the distinction between universal, statistical, and normality generalizations?
- Is merely specifying an individual an explanation of its possession of certain features?
- What is the general content shared by perhaps all normality judgments?
- What are some implications and potential worries for this account?
- Why did Aquinas think that the normal would be frequent and the frequent would be normal?
- What can we say at this early stage about the inferential structure of normality judgments?
Fall 2018 Totals:
- 24 Courses Instructor of Record
- 8 Courses Teaching Associate
Instructor of Record
- Intro to Ethics (1 Quarter, 1 Semester, 2 total)
- Deductive Logic (1 Quarter, 1 Semester, 2 total)
- Logic and Critical Thinking (3 quarters, 12 semesters, 15 total)
- Science, Technology, and Human Values (1 Semester – Upper Division)
- Business Ethics (1 Intersession – Upper Division Online)
- Western Religions (1 Semester)
- Historical Introduction to Philosophy (1 Summer)
- Environmental Ethics (1 Semester)
- Historical Intro to Philosophy (1 Summer, 2 sections – Lower Division)
- Early Modern Philosophy (1 Quarter, 2 sections – Upper Division)
- Introduction to Ethical Theory, Writing Intensive (1 Quarter, 2 sections – Lower Division)
- Ancient Greek Philosophy (1 Quarter, 2 sections – Upper Division)
- Introduction to Deductive Logic (1 Summer, 2 sections – Lower Division)
- Russell’s “On Denoting” (1 Quarter, 2 sections – Upper Division)
- Classical Arabic Philosophy (1 Quarter, 2 sections – Upper Division)
- Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (1 Quarter, 2 sections – Upper Division)
Teaching Dossier Materials
Passwords available upon request
Teaching Philosophy Statement:
Supplementary Letters of Recommendation and Teaching Evaluations
Open Education Materials
I’ve authored a few education resources that I am sharing with anyone who can use them.
Attribution is always appreciated if you publish them beyond your classroom, but edit and transform as needed.
An in-class exercise: Pass out the top half and have them work in pairs to identify as many errors as possible. This helps students get into a critical mindset when it comes to their own writing and serves as an opportunity to discuss common errors. Follow up by showing them the bottom half, where a paragraph on essentially the same topic is written more successfully.